























Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 

















A n  in v e s t ig a t io n  in t o  L a t e -M e d ie v a l  e p is t e m o l o g y  w it h  
Sp e c ia l  r e f e r e n c e  t o  J o h n  m a ir  (ca., i467-i550) a n d  
M e m b e r s  o f  h is  C ir c l e
BY
R o b e r t  N e il  W o o d
SUPERVISED BY
P r o f e s s o r  Al e x a n d e r  B r o a d ie
A THESIS SUBM ITTED
IN F u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t h e  R e q u i r e m e n t s
FOR THE DEGREE OF
d o c t o r  o f  P h il o s o p h y
AT
T h e  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  G l a s g o w
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  p h il o s o p h y  
S e p t e m b e r  1994
Robert Neil Wood 1994
ProQuest Number: 10992267
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10992267
Published by ProQuest LLO (2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 






A b s t r a c t
The central theme o f my thesis is the nature o f assent as expounded in 
late-medieval epistem ology and the way demonstrative assent relates to 
assents o f probable reason, in particular, assents o f faith and opinion. 
The historical context for my discussion is the sixteenth century and I 
make extensive use o f the writings o f John Mair (ca., 1467— 1550), 
Principal of the University o f Glasgow from 1518 to 1523 and members 
of his circle.
1 begin by exploring what it means to be a human being. The 
human being, as understood by Mair and his colleagues, is “mind 
informing body”. There is only one specific form o f human beings, the 
“mind” (anima intellectiva). The mind is primarily the powers o f  
intellect and of will. It is in virtue o f these powers that a human being is 
able to acquire knowledge. The remaining chapters are dedicated to an 
examination o f the late-medieval use o f “notion” (notitia) which is a 
technical term used to refer to a variety of cognitive acts. It is one o f the 
building blocks o f late-m edieval epistem ology; it was universally  
accepted that a notion is a quality which vitally changes the cognitive  
power. The term “notion” did not originate in late-medieval philosophy 
although it is clear from the attention it received in the opening years o f  
the sixteenth century that the “notion” was a central feature o f late- 
m edieval epistem ology. John Mair and the members o f his circle 
distinguished in the first instance between sensory and intellectual 
notions, intuitive and abstractive notions, and, apprehensive and 
judicative notions. These divisions o f notions were explored in order to 
reveal the structure o f human cognition and to distinguish scientific or 
demonstrative knowledge from belief and opinion, and to distinguish  
between theoretical and practical know ledge. In the thesis c lose  
attention will be paid to these divisions.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
This dissertation, as its title reveals, is virtuously lim ited in 
ambition. It is an investigation into late-medieval epistem ology with 
particular reference to John Mair and members of his circle. The central 
theme o f my thesis is the nature o f assent. I am especially interested in 
the variety o f human abilities by means o f which the pilgrim is able to 
acquire knowledge.
PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIVES
The first chapter is dedicated to introducing and developing a 
coherent picture o f the human being. It begins with the pilgrim as the 
ordinary Christian on the way toward the end. The pilgrim’s journey 
starts either from the first instant the pilgrim employs reason or from the 
last instant in which the pilgrim does not use reason and the journey 
continues until the time that the pilgrim reaches the end. This 
introduction to the concept o f the pilgrim makes it clear that like many 
medieval philosophers Mair was not averse to introducing logic in order 
to clarify primarily theological statements. In the next section attention 
is given to how Mair and his colleagues understood the nature o f the 
human composite. The pilgrim is “mind informing body”. What is the 
relationship o f the mind to the body? The answer is given in terms o f  
the relation between form and matter but there was widespread  
controversy as to whether a human being was composed o f many forms 
inhering in the same matter, or whether there was only one form  
inhering in matter which was specific to the human being.
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In the second chapter my attention turns to the metaphysical nature 
of the mind. Briefly stated, the mind is understood to be capable both of 
acts o f intellect and acts o f will. Medieval philosophers were at odds 
over whether or not the diversity of mental acts was evidence o f a real 
diversity in the mind’s constituent powers, that is, the powers in virtue 
o f  which the mind is able to perform acts o f intellect and acts o f  will. 
Som e philosophers, am ongst whom  Aquinas may be numbered, 
maintained that the diversity of mental acts is sufficient evidence that the 
distinction between the intellect and the w ill is a real one. Others, 
including Ockham and Mair, thought that the distinction between the 
intellect and will as powers o f the mind was a construction o f reason. 
Mair thought that the mind was a metaphysically simple substance. He 
maintained that while the terms “intellect” and “w ill” are imposed in 
order to represent properly and to help clarify the dynamic nature o f  
mind, they do not reveal anything o f the true metaphysical nature o f the 
mind.
The remaining chapters introduce and explore various kinds o f  
notions, or cognitive acts. I begin with a discussion o f notions in general 
and indicate that the central feature of a notion is that it is a likeness o f  
the object it represents. The notion vitally changes the cognitive power, 
and in the strict sense, the notion is itself the vital change. One o f the 
m ost important controversies in m edieval philosophy concerned the 
possibility of action at a distance. In epistemology this issue arose in the 
attempt to describe the nature o f the contact that exists between the 
cognitive power and the object. Some thinkers, like Mair, thought that it 
was necessary to posit the existence o f species which radiated from their 
objects to the cognitive power. However, those who postulated the 
existence of species in the medium were obliged to respond to W illiam  
o f Ockham whose lectures on the Sentences o f  Peter Lombard  denied
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the existence o f species in the medium. This is an interesting debate 
which clearly reveals that the epistem ology o f John Mair cannot simply 
be interpreted as Ockhamist because, unlike Ockham, Mair accepted the 
existence o f species in the medium and defended their necessity in the 
cognitive process. I conclude the chapter with a brief consideration o f  
the division between sensory and intellectual notions.
Chapter 4  concerns the division between intuitive and abstractive 
notions which is crucial to developing the concept o f  scien tific  
know ledge. Late-m edieval philosophers, like their predecessors, 
adhered to the Aristotelian doctrine that there was nothing in the intellect 
that had not been first in the senses. Moreover, like many others, Mair 
thought that knowledge is ultimately acquired through intuitive notions. 
However, scientific know ledge concerns the universal and not the 
particular. I exam ine Mair’s account o f the relationship o f universal 
knowledge to knowledge o f the particular and explain how the former 
can be generated from the latter. There are two central themes in my 
discussion. First, intuitive and abstractive notions terminate with equal 
immediacy at the same external object. Thus, the distinction between  
intuitive and abstractive notion cannot be formulated in terms o f their 
object. Mair, and the members o f his circle, argued that they are to be 
distinguished in terms o f the judgm ents to which they g ive rise. 
Intuitive notions are notions precisely representing their object. They 
cause evident judgments concerning the existence and the contingent 
properties o f their object. In contrast, through an abstractive notion it is 
not possible to judge o f the existence or non-existence o f the object, nor 
is it possible to judge o f the contingent properties o f the object. There 
are at least two kinds o f abstractive notions, memorative and universal. 
Though I discuss these two kinds o f abstractive notion at length, it is 
with the abstractive notion qua universal that I am primarily concerned
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since it serves as the basis for scientific knowledge. It is clear that since 
intuitive and abstractive notions terminate at the same object, it is 
possible to defend the claim that scientific knowledge which is o f  the 
universal begins with intuitive notions o f the singular. The claim is 
defensible because if they did not terminate at the same object then it 
would not be possible to have direct knowledge o f the external object. 
However, since both intuitive and abstractive notions terminate at the 
same object it follow s that experience is ultimately the basis o f scientific 
knowledge which is about what is universally and necessarily true. 
Second, I consider the ontological status o f the universal and defend the 
doctrine which maintains that universals are made up (ficta) from  
particulars collected by the intellect, against the doctrine that universals 
truly exist and are discovered by the intellect. I conclude that the fact 
that universals are made up (ficta) and are imposed to signify at the 
pleasure (ad  placitum )  o f  the intellect does not im ply that their 
signification can be changed at the pleasure o f the intellect. Despite the 
fact that the signification o f universal terms is by definition general, 
once im posed their reference is unique. It is beyond doubt that 
understanding the division between intuitive and abstractive notions is 
central to grasping the nature o f scientific knowledge.
The mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive division between  
apprehensive and judicative notions is an important division since it is 
on this d iv ision  that the distinction betw een understanding and 
knowledge rests. It is the division between apprehensive and judicative 
notions that is introduced and developed in Chapter 5. Simply stated it 
is possible to have an apprehensive notion both in relation to incomplex 
things, e.g ., a notion o f a person is sim ple, and also in relation to 
complex things such as propositions and syllogisms; e.g., “This person is 
white.” and “This mind is an intellect. This mind is a will. Therefore a
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will is an intellect.” An apprehensive notion is one through which we  
understand something without judging that what has been apprehended 
is either true or false. Judicative notions are exclusively in relation to 
the complex, e.g., propositions and syllogisms. A judicative notion is a 
judgm ent that a proposition we are apprehending is true or false. 
Apprehensive notions are naturally prior to judicative notions. A s a 
result, apprehensive notions are the foundations for judicative notions. 
Judicative notions are of two kinds, evident and inevident. I take this 
division to be the next stage in the acquisition o f scientific knowledge.
In chapter 6 the discussion is located in the context o f Mair’s discussion  
o f the nature o f theological truth and whether it is possible for the 
pilgrim to give evident assent to such a truth. The basic issue concerns 
the acquisition o f demonstrative assent which relates directly to the 
nature o f the assents o f probable reason, for example, assents o f faith 
and opinion. I begin with a consideration o f Mair’s definitions o f  
evident assent, delaying a consideration o f inevident assent to my 
discussion o f the “Virtue of Faith” in the following chapter. An evident 
assent is an assent which is unhesitant, true, caused by principles 
necessitating the intellect, to which the intellect assents, and in so 
assenting it cannot be deceived. Scientific knowledge is about the 
knowable, which is nothing other than propositions fitted by nature to 
becom e evident by the application o f discursive reason. I consider 
whether Mair thought it possible for the pilgrim to acquire scientific  
knowledge o f theological truth and this leads to a discussion o f the 
nature of theological truth. It is interesting, that as it was understood and 
developed by Mair, theology in the restricted sense constitutes faith 
rather than knowledge because theology is ultimately aimed at providing 
justification for faith.
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In chapter 7, I address the question “How is the pilgrim to acquire 
faith?”. A discussion o f the nature of inevident assent is undertaken 
here. I limit my attention to the nature o f two kinds o f inevident assent: 
opinion and faith. An assent o f faith was thought to be produced by 
means o f an assent to the conclusion o f a topical argument and an act o f  
will. I explore the relationship between the conclusion o f the topical 
argument and the act o f w ill in order to determine precisely what is 
understood by the term “faith”. In this chapter I bring to bear many o f  
the concepts developed in earlier chapters, especially, what is meant by 
an act o f intellect and an act o f w ill, and the nature o f  scientific  
know ledge. H aving estab lish ed  the nature o f  fa ith  and its 
epistemological status I consider in Chapter 8 the relationship o f faith to 
scientific knowledge and opinion. Is it possible to give both a scientific 
and a faithful assent in relation to the same proposition? Is faith 
compatible with knowledge? If so, under what conditions?
In the final chapter I return to the nature o f theological inquiry and 
address the question: “W hether theology is theoretical or practical 
know ledge?”. I take this opportunity to consider the nature o f  
theoretical and practical notions. I develop the contrast that whereas 
theoretical knowledge aims at understanding, practical knowledge aims 
at activity. Thus one o f the concerns which is taken up is whether 
theology is aimed at understanding or whether theology is about guiding 
human action. This prompts a consideration o f whether som e 
theological sy llog ism s are constructed exc lu siv e ly  o f  theoretical 
premises. If there are theological syllogism s which are constructed 
exclusively o f theoretical premises, can they be formally directive of 
human activity? Or, are theological arguments which are form ally  
directive of activity constructed out o f a combination o f both theoretical 
and practical premises? I then consider the nature o f prudential
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knowledge and link this with the question: Is faith related to human
activity in the same way that prudential knowledge is? In other words: Is 
faith a virtue which guides all other virtues regulating human conduct in 
the same way that prudential knowledge is the guide o f all moral virtue?
In order to elucidate these matters I have studied a wide range o f  
late-medieval logical, philosophical, and theological works. However, 
as this dissertation is a discussion o f late-medieval epistem ology with 
particular reference to John Mair, I have dedicated the large part o f my 
efforts to a detailed exam ination o f his writings. Central to my 
investigation is the Commentary on the Sentences o f  Peter Lombard. It 
is a theological work rich in philosophical insight whose influence on 
the philosophers and theologians o f the early sixteenth century was 
enormous. Except for the writings o f  Professor Alexander Broadie, 
there is not a substantial amount o f scholarship in my immediate area o f  
research. Therefore, through my thesis, I am endeavouring not only to 
clarify the relevant philosophical concepts but I am also striving to make 
available source material that has not been published since the 
reformation. And in so doing I hope that my research will shed much 
light on the intellectual and cultural scene o f pre-reformation Scotland.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In recent years, research has shown that the early sixteenth century 
was a period o f  tremendous intellectual activity in Scotland and Paris.
The period prior to the Reformation saw no few er than tw elve Scots 
hold the Rectorship o f the University o f Paris. The attraction to the 
University was great and though Scotland had its own Universities it 
was uncommon for a promising Scot to pursue his entire academic 
career at home. The enticement to Paris was the presence o f renowned 
scholars such as Jan Standonck and Erasmus the distinguished spiritual
R. N. Wood Introduction 14
leaders from the Low Countries. The presence o f  such great thinkers 
contributed to the reputation o f the University o f Paris as the most 
influential and prestigious learning centre in all o f  Europe. As such, it 
attracted many o f the most brilliant intellectuals o f  the time. One o f  the 
most extraordinary figures o f  this period was John Mair o f Gleghornie 
whose intellectual influence can be detected in the works o f  his students 
and colleagues David Cranston, Gilbert Crab, George Lokert, W illiam  
Manderston, Hector B oece o f Aberdeen, Robert Ceneau, G ervaise 
Waim, Antonio and Luis Coronel, and Robert Caubraith. These thinkers 
form what has been labelled the “circle o f John Mair”. John Mair and 
the members o f his circle are sometimes referred to as the “spirit o f  
Parisian Nom inalism ”. This is largely the result o f the emphasis o f  
current scholarship which has directed its attention to a consideration of 
the importance o f the early sixteenth century as the last great period of 
scholastic logic. This characterization o f early sixteenth century is 
unfortunate since it does not fully represent the scope of the independent 
and interesting philosophical and theological achievements o f Mair and 
his colleagues during this period.
Mair was born in ca., 1467 in the village o f  Gleghornie near 
Haddington in East Lothian. It was there that Mair received his early 
education. His first known movement, an unusual one for a Scot, was to 
G od’s House College, Cambridge which was renamed Christ’s College 
in 1505. Shortly afterwards he proceeded to the College de Sainte Barbe 
in Paris and received his final arts degree in 1494. The follow ing year 
he took up his duties as Regent o f  Arts, that is, became a full-tim e 
lecturer. At this time Mair began the study o f  theology under Jan 
Standonck o f the C ollege de M ontaigu. This relationship was to be 
short-lived as Standonck was banished in 1499 by Louis XII for having
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protested and campaigned against the divorce and remarriage o f the 
monarch.
In the absence o f Standonck it was Mair and his friend Noel Beda 
who took charge of Montai gu. During this period Mair’s logical talents 
were manifest and his lectures on logic began appearing in 1499 before 
printing had been introduced to Scotland. In 1505 a collection o f these 
logical writings was published as a Commentary on the Logic o f  Peter o f  
Spain.^ It was as a fellow  o f Navarre in 1506 that he received his 
Doctorate o f Theology. In the same year, 1506, Mair began lecturing on 
the Sentences o f  Peter Lombard  the recognized medieval textbook o f  
theology. At that time the Sorbonne was the headquarters o f the faculty 
o f  theology which was the hub o f  theological disputations. A  
theological disputation was the public defense o f on e’s thesis and 
formed part o f  the exam ination system ; Mair from 1506 to 1517  
presided over at least one major academic disputation a year.- Mair’s 
first theological works began appearing as Com m entaries on the 
Sentences o f  Peter Lom bard  and by 1509 he was considered to be a 
formidable authority in matters o f  logic, philosophy and theology. 
Antonio Coronel offers confirmation o f our M aster’s talents when he 
writes that Mair was known as the outstanding prince o f princes among 
theologians and not only o f theologians but also o f philosophers.^
Despite efforts to bring Mair back to Scotland it was not until 1518 
that he relented to take up the Principalship at the University o f  
Glasgow. Mair returned to Scotland at the apex o f his popularity in
 ^ John Mair. Acutissim i artium  in terpretis M agistri loannis m aioris in P etri 
Hyspani summulas Comrnentaria, (Lyons, 1505). Hereafter referred to as In 
Petri Hyspani summulas.
 ^ James Farge. B ib liograph ica l R eg is te r  o f  P aris  D octors o f  Theology, 
(Toronto, 1979); [p. 305].
3 Hubert Élie. “Quelques maîtres de Tuniversité de Paris vers l ’an 1500” Archives 
d'histoire doctrinale e t littéraire du m oyen âge 25-26 (1950-1951): 193-243, 
[p. 209]. Élie is quoting from A. Coronel. Posteriora Aristotelis, \5 \0 ) .
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Paris. This was no doubt owing to both his ability as an educator and his 
skillful and prolific writing. It is not only Mair’s personal contribution 
to the intellectual scene which should be noted. The success o f  his circle 
o f students and colleagues was also great. Of these David Cranston, 
from the D iocese o f G lasgow, bears a special mention. His career, 
though brief, was certainly admirable. His logical writings, like Mair’s, 
display a m arvelously clear and probing intellect. H is reputation is 
apparent in the 1509 edition o f Mair’s Commentary on the Fourth Book 
o f  the Sentences^  It was not only edited by Cranston but is also  
prefaced by a dialogue between the Scots poet Gavin Douglas and 
Cranston him self. It is a dialogue constructed by Mair in order to 
elucidate the relationship between philosophical and theological 
questions. A lways keen on appealing to his audience Mair constructed 
this dialogue at a time when the relationship between philosophy and 
theology was under intense scrutiny and criticism  from both the 
Humanists and religious reformers. This fruitful friendship between  
Mair and Cranston was to be brief because Cranston’s career came to an 
early end with his death in 1512.
The works o f Mair reveal the close relationship that he maintained 
with both colleagues and students. Noel Beda, George Lokert, Antonio 
Coronel and Robert Ceneau are among those who have directly edited 
works o f Mair. Thus, Mair’s departure from Paris by no means implied 
the end o f his influence. During these years Mair continued with pace 
unabated teaching in both the faculty o f arts and theology w hile  
fulfilling his official duties and publishing extensively.
During his period at Glasgow, 1518-1523, his workload was surely 
enormous. Nevertheless, it was during these years that Mair published
4 John Mair. Quartus Sententiarum, (Paris, 1509).
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his History o f  Greater Britain^ which placed the search o f  truth as the 
end o f all historical inquiry. The ardent desire to shed light on the truth 
is evidenced in all o f  Mair’s writings. In a more practical light the 
History  was a sustained argument for the alliance o f Scotland and 
England. This work was so voluminous that no Scottish press could  
undertake the task o f its publication and Mair, in 1521, returned to Paris 
in order to see his work through the presses. His time in Glasgow, 
though productive in respect o f publications, was significantly less so 
than in earlier years. He published only four more works. His final 
work, which was to appear in 1530, was a Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Ethics which was begun while Mair was still at G l a s g o w I n  1523 Mair 
was incorporated into the University o f St. Andrews one year after 
Archbishop James B eaton’s transfer from G lasgow to that same 
university town. It is thought that Mair may have proceeded to St. 
A ndrews in order to maintain his friendship and professional 
relationship with Beaton. During the years 1523-1525 Mair again joined 
with Lokert and together they served as assessors to the dean o f the 
faculty o f arts suggesting and implementing academic reforms on the 
model o f the University o f Paris.
In matters pertaining to faith Mair’s position was nothing less than 
orthodox. This is nowhere more evident than when on 29 February 1529 
Patrick Hamilton was burned at the stake for preaching the heretical, 
Lutheran doctrine o f justification by faith alone. Mair, though regretful 
at the loss o f such a fine theologian, extended his congratulations to 
Archbishop James Beaton for “removing, not without the ill-w ill o f
3 John Mair. H istoria M aioris Britanniæ tarn Anglice quam Scotiæ p er  loannem  
M aiorem, nomine quidem Scotum, professione autem Theologum, e veterum  
monumentis concinnata, (Paris, 1521).
 ^ John Mair. Ethica Aristotelis Peripateticorum  principis. Cum loannis M aioris 
Theologi Parisiensis commentariis, (Paris, 1530).
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many a noble but unhappy follow er o f the Lutheran h e r e s y . I t  must 
not be forgotten that Mair was first and foremost a scholastic theologian 
whose writings and life were dedicated to preserving it. His scholastic 
attitude is captured in his Dedication to Cardinal Wolsey in the
Commentary on Aristotle*s Ethics.
In alm ost all [A ristotle’s] opinions he agrees with the 
Catholic and truest Christian faith in all its integrity... in so 
great and manifold a work, if it be read as we explain it, you 
meet scarcely a single opinion unworthy o f  a Christian 
gentleman. 8
Though Mair may have at one time intended to remain in Paris the 
political and cultural climate was highly charged and Noel Beda was 
“enthusiastically” engaged in the pursuit o f heretics. A  pursuit o f which 
Mair does not appear to have been too keen himself. And in 1531, the 
aging Mair returned to St. Andrews^ perhaps seeking, what he thought 
would be, the tranquil surroundings o f his home country. Two years 
later, in 1533, Mair became Provost of St. Salvator’s College and the 
Dean o f the Faculty o f Theology.
One relationship about which there has been much speculation is 
that o f Mair to the reformation. Particularly there is interest in exploring 
the impact that Mair may have had on John Knox who in 1531 began 
studying theology under Mair’s tutelage. K nox’s much cited testimonial 
to Mair in The History o f  the Scottish Reformation  leaves little doubt 
that Mair was influential in K nox’s intellectual formation. Knox writes 
that Mair in 1528 was a man “whose word then was held as an oracle in
 ^ A lexander Broadie. Lokert. Late-Scholastic Logician, (Edinburgh, 1983); 
[p. 14].
 ^ Broadie. Lokert. Late-Scholastic Logician, [p. 16]. Broadie is quoting from the 
D edicatory ep istle  o f M air’s Introductorium  in A ris to te lis  d ia lecticen , 
(Paris, 1508).
 ^ Farge. A Bibliographical D icitionary o f  Paris Doctors o f Theology, [p. 307].
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matters o f religion”3*^  It is unfortunate in the absence o f publications by 
Mair from  1530 onwards that this a lso  m eans the lo ss  o f  
autobiographical material which was always rich in the opening pages of 
Mair’s works. The last twenty years o f his life saw no new publications.
The final period immediately preceding Mair’s death in May 1550 was 
one o f radical change, the reformers were unstoppable. Until recently 
Mair’s philosophical and theological achievements have been neglected.
His writings were eclipsed in part by the rise o f humanism, but more 
importantly his achievements fell victim  to the upheavals o f  religious 
reform. In this thesis I hope to foster a greater appreciation o f the 
writings o f John Mair and the members o f his circle.
John Knox. John K nox’s H istory o f the Reformation in Scotland  (2 Volumes), 
cd. William Croft Dickinson, (London, 1949); [Volume 1, p. 15].
CHAPTER 1
T h e  H u m a n  C o m p o s i t e
In t r o d u c t i o n
John Mair’s Commentary on the Sentences o f  Peter Lombard  might 
seem an odd text for an investigation into late-medieval epistem ology  
and the distinction between knowledge and belief. But for reasons 
which will quickly emerge that will be the main text. I shall begin my 
consideration with a distinctly theological question—“How is the 
pilgrim able to acquire faith?” The justification for this starting point 
is suggested by the text itself, a systematic elucidation o f the concept o f  
acquired religious faith, it is an exploration o f the metaphysical and 
epistem ological framework o f the pilgrim. “The pilgrim,” the ordinary 
Christian in his journey through life, Mair writes, “is one who exists in 
the state o f dementing and meriting blessedness. Or to put it this way, 
the pilgrim is someone who is on his way and making for the end.” ^^
The question o f the pilgrim meriting and dem enting the grace o f  
God is clearly a theological concern. Though it is important not to blur 
the distinction between philosophical and theological inquiry we must 
not lose sight o f the fact that our master was both an outstanding 
theologian and a philosopher. A s a result, Mair often em ploys 
theological principles to accomplish what would not be possible simply
John Mair. In prim um  Sententiarum, proL, q. 1; (Paris 1519); \fol. 
Quomodo possit viator acquirere fidem?
Mair. In primum, proL, q. 1; [fol. Viator est ille qui existit in statu
demerendi et merendi sibi beatitudinem. Vel sic. Viator est qui tendit de via ad 
terminum.
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by way o f philosophical argument. Consequently, many philosophical 
statements and problems are explored within a theological framework 
and are relevant to both disciplines. There is no doubt that theology was 
the preeminent mode o f discourse and a brief comment should be made 
on the precise nature o f the relationship o f theological to philosophical 
and scientific inquiry. In a defense o f theological writing Mair writes:
“it is not objectionable to introduce philosophy and other sciences  
without which theology cannot be understood thoroughly.”i3 O f all the 
sciences, that which was most widely employed and to which the most 
attention was devoted, was logic.
TH E STATE OF GRACE AND THE LOGIC OF INCEPTION TYPE
PROPOSITIONS
The late-medieval concern with logic is obvious when Mair writes 
that the state o f the pilgrim qua homo meriting blessedness begins 
(incipit), either from the first instant (a prim o instanti) he em ploys 
reason, or from the last instant (ab ultimo instanti) in which he does not 
use reason until the time he is at the end. 4^ A proposition whose main 
verb is “to begin” (incipit) or “to cease” (desinit) is the paradigmatic 
case o f a verb either indicating inception or cessation and was classed as
3^ John Mair. In quartum Sententiarum, proL, q. 1; (Paris 1519); [foL Non
obscenum est introducere philosophiam et cæteras scientias sine quibus theologia 
non potest bene capi.
14 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 1; [fol. U^]. Status enim merendi incipit a primo 
instanti in quo homo utitur rati one vel ab ultimo instanti in quo non utitur ratione 
quousque sit in termino. Terminus autem est quando est beatus vel primo non est 
sive sit in purgatorio sive inferno. Hoc namque sonat vis vocabuli viator 
secundum legem. Good historical accounts of the development o ï incipit!desinit 
propositions are by Norman Kretzmann. “Incipit/ Desinit” in M otion and Time, 
Space and M atter, eds. Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull, (Ohio, 
1976); [pp. 101-136] and John E. Murdoch. “Infinity and Continuity” in The 
Cam bridge H istory o f  Later M edieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, 
A nthony K enny, Jan P inborg, (C am bridge, 1982); [pp. 564 -5 9 1 ;  
n.b. 585-587]. For a detailed analysis of this topic in late-medieval logic see 
Broadie. George Lokert. Late-Scholastic Logician, [py>. 108-119].
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an exponible proposition. 15 It was generally agreed that an exponible 
proposition is a proposition having an obscure sense by reason o f a sign 
posited in it.i^ The term exponibile, like much o f scholastic vocabulary, 
is a technical term that con ventionally  is rendered sim ply as 
“exponible”; but it is more perspicuous when it is glossed as “that which 
is capable o f exposition”; or even, “that which requires exposition”.
W hile there was universal agreement as to the fact that an exponible 
proposition is obscure exactly what was meant by “having an obscure 
sense” was a much disputed question among logicians and there is no 
evidence that consensus was ever achieved. Mair was certainly hesitant 
to declare that his definition o f exponible proposition was the right one.
This is obvious when he writes that it is usage rather than art that
13 John Mair. Exponibilia  in In P etri H yspani summulas, (Lyons, 1505); 
[sig. 11 8^^]. ...dictiones quæ important inceptionem vel decisionem cuiusmodi 
sunt istæ: incipit, producitur, sit, generatur; desinit, destruitur, corrumpitur 
propositiones exponibiles reddunt. Et quia incipit et desinit inter cæteras sunt 
famosiores sunt de eis præ omnibus dicendum est.
1^  Mair. Exponibilia, [sig. ii Propositio exponibiiis est propositio obscurum 
sensum habens ratione signi in ea positi. Duæ differentiæ ponuntur in hac 
definitione. Primo dicitur “obscurum sensum habens” defectu cuius hæc non est 
exponibiiis; Ignis est calidus. Dicitur “ratione signi in ea positi” defectu cuius 
hæc et similes: Hominis a asinus quodlibet rudibile est, non est exponibiiis 
secundum eos qui dicunt universales non debere exponi inquantum huiusmodi; 
quia licet propositio habeat obscurum sensum veritatis quia dubium est ad 
condicendum propositioni datæ quin eadem condicat isti: a hominis a asinus 
quodlibet rudibile est. Hoc non obstante ilia non est exponibiiis quia ille 
obscurus sensus non provenit ratione signi sed ratione huius quando terminus 
distribuitur in ordine ad duos terminos quorum unus stat determinate et alter 
confuse tantum respectu termini distributi. Quæ sunt signa in hoc proposito? 
Arbitrer magis ex usu dependere quam ex arte quia quid nominis debet suaderi 
ex communi modo loquendi. The sign a is a special quantifier that confers 
merely confused supposition onto the term which it imm ediately precedes 
regardless of the kind of supposition the term would have had in the absence of 
the sign a. Merely confused supposition is when it is possible to descend from a 
proposition such as “All dogs are black” to a disjunction o f singulars; for 
example, “All dogs are this or this or this ...”. Conversely one can ascend from 
any disjunct back to the original proposition. See A. Broadie. The Circle o f  
John Mair: Logic and Logicians in Pre-Reformation Scotland, (Oxford, 1985); 
[pp. 53-54] and George Lokert. Late-Scholastic Logician, [p. 46]. Exponible 
proposition is also defined in George Lokert. Termini M agistri G eorgii Lokert 
Scoti theologice professoris acutissimi, (Paris, ca., 1523); [sig. 2^]. For the Latin 
see fn. 18.
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indicates those terms that render a proposition obscure. Hector Boece  
gives the following account of “having an obscure sense”:
an exponible proposition is a proposition having an obscure 
sense by reason o f  som e syncategorem ata or a term 
including a syncategoremata on account o f  which it is 
fitting to unfold its meaning (explicare) by means o f a 
proposition more known that is convertible with it on which 
its truth or falsity depends,
A syncategorematic term is a term that signifies not something but 
in some way. Lokert provides a list o f  the terms normally treated as 
requiring exposition, the list o f terms thought to render a proposition 
obscure includes, exclusives, exceptives, co llectives, reduplicatives, 
comparatives, superlatives, and incipit and d e s i n i t O f these terms 
some are said to be purely syncategorematic terms and some are said to 
include syncategoremata. On the account given by B oece there are
1^  Hector Boece. Explicatio quorundam vocabulorum ad cognitionem dialectices  
conducentium  opera H ectoris B oethii P hilosophi insignis in lucem édita, 
(Paris, 1519); [sig. m 5*’^ ]^. Propositio exponibiiis est propositio obscurum  
sensum habens ratione alicuius syncategorematis vel terminum includentis 
syncategorema propter quod opus est eam explicare per propositionem notiorem  
secum convertibilem a qua eius veritas vel falsitas dependet. Cf., David 
Cranston. Sequuntur abbreviationes omnium parvorum  logicalium  collecte a 
m agistro  Anthonio R am irez de V illaescu sa  cum a liqu ibu s d ivision bu s  
term inorum  eiusdem : necnon cum tracta tu  term in erum m agistri D avid is  
Cranstoni ab eodem correcte, (Paris, ca., 1513); [sig. b 7^^]. Propositio 
exponibiiis est propositio obscurum sensum habens ratione signi positi in ea sed 
secundum hanc propositionem a  homo non est animal esse  exponibilem  et 
sim iliter quamlibet propositionem  sophisticam  cum quælibet talis habeat 
obscurum sensum ratione alicuius termini positi in ea. Ideo aliter dicitur 
propositio cuius sensus est obscurus de gratia alicuius signi positi in ea venit 
necessario explicandus per propositionem  hypotheticam  vel per aliam  
propositionem equivalentem  hypothetice. Ulterius nota quod multiplex est 
propositio exponibiiis secundum diversitatem  signorum exponibilium  quia 
quædam signa exponibilia sunt pura syncategoramata sicut sunt signa universalia 
dictiones exclusivæ , reduplicativæ et exceptivæ. A lia  sunt categoremata 
cuiusmodi sunt incipit, desinit, comparativus et superlativus, differt, infinitum, 
totus, et sic de al iis.
George Lokert. Termini, [j/g c 2 ^  Tertia divisio propositionum aliqua dicitur 
exponibiiis ilia scilicet in qua ponitur exponibile sicut est signum exclusivum, 
exceptivum , reduplicativum , co llectivu m , term inus com parativus vel 
superlativus, ly “incipit”, ly “desinit”, ly “mediate”, ly “differt”, et ita de 
quocumque alio termino faciente obscurum sensum propositionis.
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terms that immediately signify in some way and these are called purely 
syncategorem atic terms, for exam ple, exclu sives, excep tives, and 
collectives; and there are those terms that include syncategoremata, for 
example, comparatives, superlatives, incipit and desinit. The obscure 
sense o f an exponible proposition is removed by the expansion o f the 
exponible into a set o f propositions that are called the “exponents”.
Boece is very clear when he states that the truth or falsity o f an 
exponible proposition is judged according to its exponents because the 
truth o f the exponible is not grasped in virtue o f the supposition or the 
non-supposition o f the extremes o f the exponible proposition. It is 
evident, as Mair writes, that the terms exponible and exponent are 
relative and correlative terms.^^ I will only discuss the exponibility of 
incipit-iypQ propositions that, like their counterparts desinit-iypQ  
propositions, have the interesting characteristic o f uniting questions of 
both metaphysics and logic. A proposition containing the term “begins” 
was treated as an exponible proposition because the term “begins” 
requires exposition. “Begins”, a categorematic term was said to include 
a syncategorematic term because it implicitly refers both to being (esse) 
and to not having been (non-fuisse), or, to not having been (non-fuisse) 
and will be (fore)P'^
It was thought that before any account of a incipit-typQ proposition 
could be given, the terms “immediately” and “instant” required further 
exposition. Time was understood as a continuum and its measure an 
imposition o f reason. There is, between any two instants, an infinite 
number o f  instants, consequently, no two instants are contiguous. The
Boece. Explicatio, [5 /^. b 7 ^b] Dicitur “a qua” etc. quia veritas exponibilis non 
sumitur ex suppositione vel non suppositione extremorum.
Mair. Exponbilia, [jfg. ii 7^^]. Et isti duo termini “exponibile” et “exponens” 
sunt termini relativi et correlativi.
Mair. Exponbilia, [sig. 11 8^^]. Hæc verbum “incipit” importât esse et non 
fuisse; vel non fuisse et fore.
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difficulty is transparent. If, between any two instants there is som e 
intermediate instant, then how is it possible to identify the first instant o f  
something com ing to be and the last instant o f  its non-being? The 
problem is even more perplexing when we take into account that any 
given instant is generated and destroyed at the same time.^^
Mair goes on to distinguish two kinds o f instants that are applicable 
to inception: the first instant o f being (primum instans esse)  and the last 
instant o f non-being (ultimum instans non esse):
The first instant o f being (esse) is the instant in which it is 
true to say, o f this or that thing, that the thing now is and 
was not immediately before this. This can be understood in 
two ways. One way, that the thing itself is at some instant 
and before that instant nothing o f  it was acquired. In 
another way, that the thing itself is at som e instant and 
before that instant it was not, though something o f it was.
The last instant o f non-being o f a thing is the instant in 
which it is true to say of this thing that the thing now is not 
and immediately after this that it will be.^^
The solution that Mair ultim ately provides, for both kinds o f  
incipit-type  propositions, is that having identified a first instant o f being 
it is not possible to state the last instant o f n o n - b e i n g . 2 4  This is  
necessary because o f the assertion that time is a continuum and that 
between any two instants there is some mediating instant. If one were to 
try to identify both the first instant o f being and the last instant of non-
22 Mair. Exponbilia, [vfg. 11 8^^]. Et instans quodlibet generatur et corrumpitur
simul nee sequitur quod simul sit et non sit ut infert magister Gregorius.
22 Mair. Exponbilia, [5 /^. 11 8^%]. Primum instans esse est instans huius rei vel
illius in quo verum est dicere hæc res nunc est et non immediate ante hoc fuit. Et 
hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo quod ipsum sit in aliquo instanti, et 
ante illud instans nihil eius fuit acquisitum. Alio modo quod ipsum sit in aliquo 
instanti et ante illud instans non fuit, licet aliquid eius fuerit. Ultimum instans 
non esse rei est instans in quo verum est dicere hæc res nunc non est et 
immediate post hoc erit.
24 Mair. Exponbilia, [5 /^, 11 8vb] Notandum est quarto quod in quibuscumque
rebus est dare primum instans esse in eisdem non est dare ultimum instans non 
esse.
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being, then there would always be som e mediating instant and this 
destroys the possibility o f som ething com ing to be in an instant. 
Moreover, if  one identifies both the first instant o f being and the last 
instant o f non-being then being and non-being would have to coexist in 
the same instant which is logically impossible. After all, that an instant 
is simultaneously generated and destroyed does not in anyway imply an 
instant is and is not. That an instant seem s to have som e kind of  
duration is a fault o f language that obscures the metaphysical nature o f  
what is meant by the term “instant”. The instant at which the pilgrim  
begins employing reason must be identified as either the first instant at 
which it is true to say that the pilgrim is using reason or as the last 
instant at which it is true to say that the pilgrim is not using reason. 
Something can begin in two ways and the proper exposition o f any 
incipit-iype^ proposition into its exponents is by means o f a disjunction of  
two conjunctions (copulaîivæ). The most fitting exposition is this: the 
first conjunction is composed o f a positive proposition about the present 
and a negative proposition concerning the past. The second conjunction 
is com posed o f a positive proposition about the future and a negative 
proposition about the present. The term “immediate” is omitted from  
this account o f inception and the com plex term “instant that is present” 
(instans quod est præsens)  is understood in a restricted sense.25 The
25 Mair. Exponbilia, [j/g. mm 1^^]. Quælibet propositio de incipit sufficienter 
exponitur et formaliter per disiunctivam compositam ex duabus copulativis. 
Quarum una erit per positionem de præsenti et remotionem de præterrito; et 
altera per positionem  de futuro et remotionem de præsenti negando istum  
terminum “immediate” et capiendo hoc complexum “instans quod est præsens” 
et hoc restrictive. Patet. Propositio non videtur aptior modus exponendi. Iterum 
quælibet res incipiens esse incipit per primum instans sui non esse nec est 
possibile quod aliter incipiat. Si primum, verificabitur per positionem  de 
præsenti et remotionem de præterito. Si secundum, verificabitur per positionem  
de præsenti et per consequens totus ambitus verificationis continebitur in 
disunctiva ilia composita ex illis duabus copulativis. Et contra. Nisi sit 
impedimentum per terminos discretos vel per aliquam determinationem quod 
cavetur sic exponendo (iudicio meo) ut verbi causa: A incipit esse; ergo in 
instanti quod est præsens est et A non immediate ante instans quod est prasens
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exposition  o f  an incipit-iypQ proposition may be hindered by the 
presence o f certain terms. In this context Mair makes a special mention 
o f propositions containing discrete terms26 and claims that these kinds o f  
proposition require a different kind o f exposition.27 The proposition,
“The first instant at which the pilgrim begins using reason” is expounded 
in this way: The pilgrim at the present instant is employing reason and it 
is not the case that immediately before the present instant the pilgrim  
was em ploying reason, or the pilgrim immediately after the present 
instant will be employing reason and it is not the case that the pilgrim at 
the present instant is employing reason. It is important to note the subtle 
attention that Mair devoted to logical and philosophical detail since it is 
constantly presenting itself in theological statements such as the one we 
have just considered: “The state o f  the pilgrim meriting blessedness 
begins either from the first instant he employs reason, or from the last 
instant in which he does not use reason until the time the pilgrim has 
reached the end.”
TH E PILGRIM DEHNED AS MATTER AND FORM
The ultimate end o f the pilgrim is to enter into a state o f  
blessedness upon death, that is, to gain a direct and immediate insight 
into the nature o f God which is not naturally possible in this lifetim e.
Mair favoured a hylomorphic theory o f being which maintained that the 
nature o f the substantial union o f soul and body expresses a general 
relationship o f actuality to potentiality. In this instance the dichotomy is
fuit; vel A immediate post instans quod est præsens erit et A  in instanti quod est 
præsens non est.
26 John Mair. Termini in In Petri Hyspani snmmulas, [v/g. b 4^^]. A discrete term, 
also known as a singular term, was explained by Mair as follows: Terminus eo  
dicitur singularis quia ei répugnât secundum acceptionem  secundum quam 
accipitur sumi pro pluribus ut ista animalia demonstrando “omnia animalia in 
mundi”.
27 The precise nature o f the difficulty is explained in Mair. Exponibilia,
[jfg. mm mm 5^^].
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expressed in the relationship o f form to matter. There is no sign o f any 
great innovation when Mair defines the pilgrim as "'anima informans 
corpus''. It is the detailed exposition o f this concept that is interesting.
The pilgrim qua homo is a composite of soul (anima) and body (corpus). 
“Socrates is a pilgrim and not a pilgrim because he is body qua  matter 
(corpus)2ind soul qua  form (anima)". Socrates is not a pilgrim solely  
qua corpus nor is Socrates a pilgrim solely qua anima. The pilgrim is a 
com plex unity o f soul and body and Socrates is only a pilgrim qua 
anima informans corpus  (soul informing body). Hence the paradoxical 
conclusion that Socrates is a pilgrim and is not a pilgrim.28 The answer 
to this dilemma will be suggested shortly.29 The immediate question is 
whether the soul directly informs the body as prime matter or whether it 
is necessary to attribute to body its own specific form o f  corporeity 
(forma corporeita tis). There was universal concern am ong late- 
m edieval philosophers and theologians over the question o f  whether 
each creature had just one form or whether there was a plurality o f forms 
in one and the same being . 20 The issue was the subject o f much 
controversy because o f its im plications for the way in which the 
theological question o f transubstantiation was to be understood, but that 
is a separate issue for the purposes o f this discussion.
28 Mair. In primum, proL, q. l ,[ fo l.  H^]. ...Sortes est viator et non viator: quia est 
corpus et anima. Et anima informans corpus est viatrix cum sit in statu merendi 
sibi beatitudinem.
29 See p. 38.
20 John Mair. In secundum Sententiarum, d. 15, q. 2; (Paris, 1519); [fol. 9 2  
...An in homine in sexto die creato sit alia forma ab anima intellectiva. Mair. 
In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [fol. 95^^]. Variæ sunt philosophorum sententiæ 
recitatæ de unitate vel pluralitate formarum. Cf., Mair. In secundum  
Sententiarum, (Paris, 1528); d. 15 q. 2; [fol. 46 Quæritur utrum in homine 
in sexto die creato sit alia forma quam anima intellectiva. Et pro brevi 
responsione sit hæc conclusio. In nullo composito est aliqua forma substantialis 
nisi una.
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PLURALISM  REFUTED
Mair begins by com m enting on several arguments in favour o f  
positing a plurality o f substantial forms in a composite being. The first 
position claims that “there are as many forms in a composite being as are 
essentially predicated in respect o f a pronoun indicating the thing”.2i 
This position draws attention to the important distinction between  
metaphysical and logical discourse. Metaphysics discusses the nature of  
a human being in terms o f matter and form. Logic, on the other hand 
uses a very different vocabulary and forces one to make the distinction 
between matter and form in terms o f subject and predicate. Metaphysics 
is necessarily bound to and limited by the requirements o f good logical 
expression. The distinction between matter and form via  the distinction 
between subject and predicate is readily communicated in the context of  
a categorical proposition such as: "Homo est ra t io n a l is” where 
"rationalis"  is predicated o f  the subject "hom o” and indicates a 
category o f things o f which it is true to say: “This is rational” where 
“this” refers to the subject "homo” . Despite its clarity o f  expression the 
claim that there are as many forms in a composite as there are predicates 
o f a pronoun representing a com posite is rejected. Mair explains that if 
there is an infinite number o f categorical forms in a com posite then it 
fo llow s that there would an infinite number o f categorical forms in 
Socrates.22 This quite simply is unacceptable. If we grant that Socrates 
is a man and that to be a man is to be an animal then “there is one form 
by which Socrates is Socrates, another form by which Socrates is a man 
and yet another by which Socrates is an animal.”22 This is only the
21 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \fol. 92^%]. ...tot sunt formæ in composito quot 
sunt prædicata essentialia dicibilia de pronomine rem demonstrante ut una forma 
qua Sortes est Sortes, et qua est homo, et qua est animal.
22 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \fol. 92^%]. Ex bac opinione eorrelarium infero 
ab ea negandum, hoc scilicet, quod sunt infinitæ formæ categorematicæ in Sorte.
22 For the Latin see fn. 31.
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beginning: in order to give an appropriate description o f the composite 
substance that is known as “Socrates” it would necessary to give a 
description o f Socrates which includes a reference to all categorical 
forms present in Socrates. It would not be possible to give an adequate 
metaphysical description o f Socrates because the number o f  forms 
predicable under this situation could never be exhaustive. It would 
always be possible to identify another quality that Socrates possesses in 
virtue o f a corresponding form and this would lead to a multiplication o f  
forms beyond necessity which destroys the possibility o f achieving a 
good metaphysical or logical definition.
Another way o f conceiving the union o f soul and body is to posit 
three really and specifically distinct forms in man, that is, the form of  
corporeity (forma corporeitatis), the sensitive soul (anima sensitiva) and 
the intellective soul (anima intellectiva).^"^ The form o f corporeity is the 
form in virtue o f which a body is a body and is something distinct from 
the intellective soul, the form in virtue of which a body is the specific  
form of human being in virtue o f which a someone is said to be alive and 
rational. The sensitive soul is the form in virtue of which a body is said 
to be sentient. Mair rejects this version o f the pluralist argument on 
several grounds. The first objection is that the initial tripartite division is 
insufficient because it ignores the really and specifica lly  distinct 
existence o f the vegetative soul.25 Mair seems to have in mind that if 
one is going to make a distinction between the sensitive and the 
intellective souls because o f their different functions then it is necessary
24 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \fol. 92^4-vb] Secunda via est quod in homine 
est triplex forma realiter distincta, scilicet forma corporeitatis anima sensitiva et 
anima intellectiva. Et istæ très realiter et specie distinguuntur.
25 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \fol. 9 2 ^^] Sed contra hanc positionem  
arguitur. [Sec fn. 34  ] 111a positio eodem modo débet ponere quattuor formas in 
homine sicut una alia opinio circa quam non insisto ponit scilicet animam  
vegetativam distinctam a sensitiva et intellectiva.
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to introduce a vegetative soul in order to account for basic biological 
processes such as growth and decay, reproduction and nutrition. One 
might conceivably reply that the vegetative soul is “virtually” contained 
in the intellective and sensitive soul and that any further distinction is an 
empty or trivial one.26 This too is problematic. Mair writes that “if the 
intellective includes the sensitive, then the sensitive is useless.”27 This 
objection has two components. First, if  the intellective soul includes the 
sensitive soul virtually, that is, in such a way that the sensitive soul is 
subordinated to the intellective soul; then there is no reason why the 
sensitive soul should be posited as something really distinct; in fact, 
such a positing is trivial. The second component o f  Mair’s objection is 
premised on the assumption that if we postulate the existence o f two 
really distinct souls in a human being, such as the intellective soul and 
the sensitive soul; then, that same subject is sim ultaneously both an 
animal and a human being. Thus, in so far as a subject is said to have an 
intellective soul it is really and properly called a human being and to the 
extent that the same subject possesses a sensitive soul it is really an 
“animal”. Moreover, if one additionally posits a vegetative soul then the 
same subject is really a man, an animal, and a plant conjointly.28 This is
26 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \fol. 9 2 ^b] Sed hie diceret quod intellectiva et 
sensitiva virtual iter vegetativam includunt et per consequens ipsa esset inanis.
27 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [fol. 92vb] Contra. Sic intellectiva includit 
sensitivam; ergo inutilis est sensitiva.
28 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [foL 9 2 vb] Secundo ex positione sequitur 
quod homo ex bruto et homine conflatur quod est absurdum concessum. Et si 
ponatur anima vegetativa sequitur quod homo esset plantam, brutum et hoc 
copulatim. Note; It was common when discussing the conjunction “and” to 
distinguish  betw een co p u la tive  and copu la tim . R o b e r t C au braith , 
Quadrupertitum in oppositiones, conversiones, hypotheticas et modales M agistri 
R oberti Caubraith omnem ferm e difficultatem  dialecticam  enodans, (Paris, 
1510); [fol. 80^4], Pernotandum est illam coniunctionam et bifariam accipi 
copulative videlicet et copulatim. Primo modo coniungit inter propositiones 
sensum hypotheticum reddens. Secundo vero modo inter terminos sensum  
cathegoricum constituens. “The conjuction “and” is to be understood in two 
ways, namely, conjunctively (copulative) and conjointly (copulatim). In the first 
way it connects propositions turning them into a molecular (hypotheticum) 
proposition. In the second way it connects terms and constitutes a categorematic
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not acceptable because more should not be posited than is necessary, and 
since the dynamic nature of a human being can be explained in virtue of  
an intellective soul informing body it is superfluous to posit any other 
animating principle. Mair is also anxious to reject this way o f  
distinguishing between the intellective, sensitive and vegetative souls 
because he thinks that positing any form over and above the intellective 
soul stands to impair its functioning. Mair, in another place, writes: 
Socrates is an animal, a human being, and a substance by means o f the 
same form. Insofar as he is risible he is a human being and not an 
animal and Socrates insofar as he is sensitive he is an animal and not
risible.29
A third consequence which Mair rejects as inconsistent, despite its 
acceptance by many, is the obvious inference that in positing a plurality 
of forms the same matter is informed by several really distinct forms.^o 
It stands to reason that according to one who accepts that the body has a 
form o f corporeity “the intellective soul has in the first instance a 
perfectible body composed o f matter and a form of corporeity: in this 
way one can say that the intellective soul has a two fold composition of 
matter and a sensitive soul which is perfectible from the first instance.”"^!
This is undesirable because such a division implies that several really
term.” It is useful to keep this distinction. See Broadie. The Circle o f  John 
Mair, [p. 151].
29 Mair. In secundum, d. 15 q. 2; [fol. 9 4 ^b] Sortes per eandem formam est 
animal homo et substantia. Et tamen est risibilis secundum quod homo et non 
secundum quod animal et sensitivus secundum quod animal et quod non risibilis 
secundum quod animal.
^  Mair. In secundum, d. 15 q. 2; [fol. 92^^]. Tertio ex positione sequitur quod 
plures formæ informant eandem materiam; quod est inconveniens. Sed hæc ratio 
repueretur a multis.
Mair. In secundum, d. 15 q. 2; \fol. 92vh]_ Ut patet de ponentibus formam 
corporeitatis sicut ipsi dicunt. Anima intellectiva habet pro primo perfectibili 
corpus compositum ex materia et forma corporeitatis. Sic ipse potest dicere quod 
anima intellectiva habet binarium ex materia et anima sensitiva pro primo 
perfectibili. Vel dicere potest libere utraque illarum informât eandem materiam 
immediate, sicut alii libere et rationabiliter consequenter dicere possunt quod 
anima intellectiva et forma corporeitatis informant eandem materiam.
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distinct forms inform the same matter. He continues that on the 
foregoing account one is entitled to say that the intellective soul, the 
sensitive soul and the form o f corporeity directly inform the same 
matter. Mair is brief, to the point of omission, as to why this account is 
unsatisfactory. O f all the unlikely allies it is probable that Mair is 
following the lead o f Thomas Aquinas in his rejection o f the doctrine o f  
a plurality o f forms inhering in the human composite. Aquinas thought 
that the unitary nature o f a com posite substance was threatened by a 
diversity o f constituents. He argued that if one grants that it is form that 
perfects matter then, if the intellective soul enters into matter previously 
organized by either the form of corporeity and/or the sensitive soul, then 
the intellective soul does not uniquely determine the existence o f the 
substance. Therefore, it is not a substantial form. Moreover, on the 
basis o f this, it is possible to conclude that the intellective and other 
souls are in some way accidental to substance and hence separable from
substance.42
M a i r ’s  a r g u m e n t  f o r  t h e  u n i t a r y  n a t u r e  o f  c o m p o s i t e
BEINGS
The number o f pluralist accounts concerning the nature o f the 
human com posite to which Mair attends is testimony to its popularity 
and to the quality o f its advocates. Mair’s defense of the unitary nature 
o f the human composite would have been at one time a minority report 
but had widespread support among the members o f his c i r c l e . 4 3  Mair’s
42 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiæ, Prima Pars, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4.
42 I give two examples. George Lokert. Scriptum in m ateria notitiarum, (Paris, 
I5I4); [sig. a 7 ^^] Nom inales moderniores ponunt eadem rem, scilicet, 
animam rationalem esse potentiam sensitivam et intellectivam in homine licet illi 
termini habent diversas rationes. William Manderston. Bipartitum in m orali 
philosophia, (Paris, I5I7); [sig. k 3 ^^]. An in homine sunt ponendæ très animæ 
distinctæ realiter. Respondetur breviter relicta opinionum pluralitate quod eadem  
res numéro in homine dicitur anima rationalis, anima sensitiva, et anima 
vegetativa diversis tamen rationibus propter diversas operationes quas nata est 
exercere.
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argument for the unity o f  form in human beings begins with the 
qualified acceptance o f a thesis he attributes to Alexander o f Hales and 
to Thomas Aquinas: in any composite being there is only one form in 
virtue o f which we identify the com posite as a specific substance and 
this is the substantial form (forma substantialis)."^  The further 
determ inations o f  a com posite substance such as the accidental 
properties, quality and quantity, that are ascribed to a substance are said 
to inhere in the com posite in virtue o f an accidental form (forma  
accidentalis). Mair writes: “In a human being there is one form. And a 
human being is the most perfect o f animals. And if one form suffices for 
the most perfect o f animals, then one form will suffice for that which is 
less perfect. Though this issue is taken up specifically with regard to 
human beings some descriptions are universal concerning a form [viz., 
substantial form] that is held in c o m m o n . ” 5^ At the heart o f this claim is 
the conviction that more should not be posited where fewer will suffice.
It is possible to preserve the diversity of human nature because the same 
form can be responsible for diverse operations. Mair discussed the 
subject as follows:
...anything com posed o f matter and form in whatever way 
substantial is a substance and is extended. Since it is not 
incorporeal and a spirit it is therefore a corporeal substance.
Therefore it is a body. Therefore [in the case o f human 
nature] it is not reasonable to posit a form o f corporeity 
apart from the intellective soul. And insofar as it is a body 
it is also an animal. This is obvious. It is a human being
^  Mair. In secundum, d. 15 q. 2; [fol. 93^^]. Quarto est opinio quam tenet 
Alexander Hallensis in Secunda Parte 62 et utrobique sequitur Sanctus Thomas 
quam solam teneo. Et propterea ponitur hæc conclusio. In nullo composito est 
aliqua forma substantialis nisi una.
“^5 Mair. In secundum, d. 15 q. 2; \Jol. 9 3 Probatio. In homine est sola una 
forma. Et homo est perfectissim um  animalium. Et si ad perfectissim um  
animalium una forma sufficiat ad imperfectiora una satis erit. Prosequatur 
materia de hom ine, licet aliquæ rationes sint universales circa formam in 
communi.
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since it is a rational substance. Therefore the substance is 
an animal. By the same form, also indivisible, it is a human 
being, an animal, a body, etc. M oreover, it should be 
thought to be incongruous that a human being is a human 
being [and] an animal and a plant conjointly. Therefore it 
should not be less incongruous to concede this: Socrates is a 
man, a stone, or any other inanimate being. That Socrates is 
a man and not a man is not in doubt since he is Socrates and 
his matter which is not a man. But matter alone does not 
belong to any determinate species o f being since it does not 
have form as a part o f it.46
Mair explicitly rejects the need for the form o f corporeity as an 
intermediate form that stands between form  and prime matter. He 
adopts in its place the substantial union o f body and form. The detailing 
of the relationship o f form to matter qua the relationship o f soul to body 
begins with the comment that Socrates is both a human being and not a 
human being. Socrates is a human being qua  human being, that is, qua 
anima intellectiva or as the union o f soul and body. In the absence o f  
this union there is only a material substratum which in the state of being 
uninformed is indeterminate and unspecified. It is possible for matter to 
stand devoid  o f  any substantial or accidental form  only under 
extraordinary circumstances as ordained by the absolute power o f God 
(potentia Dei absoluta)/^’^  Mair like alm ost all medieval philosophers
Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [fol. 9 3 ra-rbj ...quod aliquid est compositum  
ex materia et forma quacumque substantiali est substantia et extensa. Quia non 
est incorporea et spiritus, ergo substantia corporea. Ergo est corpus. Ergo non 
oportet ponere aliam formam corporeitatis ab anima intellectiva. Et sicut est 
corpus, ita est animal. Patet. Est homo cum est substantia rationalis. Ergo est 
animal. Ab eadem forma etiam indivisibili est homo animal corpus et caetera. 
Insuper absonum reputari debet quod hom o est hom o, brutum, et planta 
copulatim. Ergo non minus absonum debet reputari concedere hanc: Sortes est 
homo, lapis, vel aliquod ens pertinens ad speciem  inanimati. Quod Sortes sit 
homo et non homo non est dubium: cum est Sortes et sua materia quæ est non 
homo. Sed materia sola non pertinet ad aliquam determinatam speciem  entis 
cum nec habeat formam tamquam partem eius.
47 Mair. In secundum, d. 12, q. 1; [fol. 63^%]. Et pono conclusiones quarum 
prima est: Deus potest facere materiam sine forma substantiali. Probatio. 
Quandocumque sunt duæ res creatæ quarum neutra est pars alterius Deus potest 
quamcumque illarum rerum producere sine reliqua, sed materia et forma realiter
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provides three principles applicable to natural things: matter, form, and 
privation. Mair notes his disagreement with Aquinas, who despite his 
affirmation that form and matter were distinct principles o f natural 
things, thought that it was not possible for matter to exist without form 
because this implied a logical contradiction which is the only limit on 
the power o f God.48 The contradiction, according to Aquinas, amounts 
to this: God, the creator is the most perfect active cause hence anything 
created by God does not lack a form."^9 jje  continues: “to exist” involves 
actuality and this implies to have a form. Therefore, to say that matter 
exists without form is to say that there is an actual being without 
actuality which is a contradiction.50 The basic assumption underlying 
this position is that uninformed matter lacks positive being o f its own, it 
is in some way deprived of existence. This solution proved to be wholly 
unsatisfactory to Mair who thought that matter and form were indeed 
separable if only de potentia Dei absoluta. It prompted the question:
How could something lacking positive being in its own right contribute 
to the existence o f a com posite being? Mair writes: “form is really
distinguuntur et utraque creatura; ergo Deus potest producere materiam sine 
forma. Mair. In secundum, d. 12, q. 1; \fol. 64*’^ ]. Secunda conclusio. 
Materia potest esse sine forma accidentali. Probatio. Materia potest esse sine 
forma substantiali ex præcedenti conclusione. Ergo materia eadem potest esse 
sine forma accidentali.
Mair. In secundum, d. 12, q. 1; {fol. 64 *^4]. Contra priorem conclusionem  
arguitur argumentis Sancti Thomæ et Durandi quibus probare satagunt, Deus non
potest facere illud quod contradictionem implicat. Materiam esse sine forma
substantiali implicat [contradictionem]. Igitur consequentia tenet cum mai ore. 
Minorem probat Sanctus Thomas in lYima Parte Quæstione 66 Articulo Primo. 
Materia non potest esse nisi sit in actu. Non potest esse in actu sine forma. In 
argumentum hoc dilutum est quæstione præcedenti s, nec habet colorem recte 
dicit Gregorius in 12 Distinctione: rationes Sancti Thomæ modicum valent. For 
the full text of Gregory of Rimini’s discussion of the inadequacy of the opinion 
of Thomas Aquinas see Gregory of Rimini. Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura 
super primum et secundum sententiarum  (7 Volumes), ed. A. Damasus Trapp 
OSA, Venicio Marcolino, Manuel Santos-Noya, (Berlin/New York, 1979-1987); 
[Volume 5, pp. 285-288; n.b. 287-288].
49 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologice, Prima Pars, q. 66, a. 1, ad 4
59 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologice, Prima Pars, q. 66, a. 1, R.
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distinct from matter. Proof: Matter alone is produced in creation. Form 
is produced naturally and is actualized from the potential o f  matter.”5i 
It may be objected that granted that matter is potentiality and form  
is actuality, then it is simply impossible that matter is something actual.
Mair as part o f his solution distinguishes between objective and 
subjective potentiality a distinction popularized by John Duns Scotus.52 
The distinction between subjective and objective potentiality, as it was 
understood by Mair, is explained in the follow ing way: If matter is said 
to have only objective potentiality then matter is understood to be in the 
potential for existence but is, as yet, not actual. However, to claim that 
matter is the fitting subject o f change is to state that it has subjective 
potentiality and this does not conflict with the simultaneous claim that 
matter actually exists.52 Matter in this sense is said to have objective 
potentiality insofar as it can receive a determining substantial form. 
Matter, in this sense, has positive existence and is the fitting subject for 
receiving a substantial form. Mair issues a caveat  explaining that 
appropriately and according to common usage that matter is not held to 
be in act. Matter is called “potentiality” because it actualizes nothing 
but is able to receive a range o f forms. Form always actualizes apart
51 Mair. In secundum, d. 12, q. 1; \Jol. 6 3 1’^ ]. Forma realiter distinguitur a 
materia. Probatur hæc conclusio. Materia sola in creatione producitur. Forma 
naturaliter producitur et educitur de potentia materiæ.
52 John Duns Scotus. Opera Omnia Tomus 12. Quœstiones in Secundum  
Sententiarum, ed. Lucas Wadding, (Paris, 1639); d. 12, q. 1; [p. 556]. Aliquid 
enim potest esse in potentia dupliciter: uno modo ut terminus; alio modo ut 
subiectum, et forte est eadem potentia, sed ut comparata ad diversa dicitur 
subiectiva vel obiectiva, ita quod subiectum existens dicitur in potentia 
subiectiva, et eadem ut respicit agens, dicitur obiectiva; possunt tamen separari; 
ut in creabili, ubi est potentia obiectiva et non subiectiva quia ibi non subiicitur 
aliquid. See also Opera Omnia Tomus VII. In XII Libros M etaphysicorum  
Aristotelis Expositio, ed. Lucas Wadding, (Paris, 1639); [p. 536].
2^ Mair. In secundum, d. 12, q. 1; [fol. 631"^ ]. Materia vocatur in potentia, primo 
Physicorum  [192^2-31], et forma actus; ergo nullomodo materia est actus. 
Respondetur distinguendo quod materia sit in potentia, vel in potentia obiectiva 
tantum, et sic nego. Solum illud est in potentia obiectiva tantum quod non est et 
potest esse. Esse in potentia subiectiva non répugnât actuali existentiæ.
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from the intellective soul and it is on account o f this that form is called 
“ a c t ” .5 4  Matter is not a privation o f being and exists on its own, as the 
underlying substratum o f inherence necessary for the existence o f both 
substantial and accidental forms. It is a positive principle and can thus 
contribute to the existence o f the composite. The paradox which was 
introduced above that “Socrates is and is not a pilgrim because he is 
body and soul” can now be resolved. Socrates is a pilgrim only as the 
substantial union o f the intellective soul and body, or as expressed  
above, as anima informans corpus. Socrates is not a pilgrim qua body 
because strictly speaking a body not in substantial union with an 
intellective soul is not a human body at all. The point that Mair is 
attempting to emphasize is that soul and body inhere in the same subject 
and are one substance. Mair concludes that the right way to consider the 
union o f body and soul is as a unity and to posit one form in a substance 
per se in virtue o f which the whole is called one.
It might be objected against the Unitarian account o f the nature o f a 
com posite being that the same form is responsible for a number o f  
diverse operations. In the case o f human beings one might think it 
impossible that the intellective soul is responsible for both the pursuit of 
and the flight from an object o f desire. This objection is almost certainly 
a version o f one o f the proofs that W illiam o f Ockham offers in favour 
of positing a plurality o f substantial forms in the human com posite.55 
The perceived difficulty is: if the same object is desired according to the
54 Mair. In secundum, d. 12, q. 1; \fol. 63^^]. Appropriate et in communi usu non 
dicitur actus. Vocatur potentia quia nihil actual sed cæteras formas in se recipit. 
Forma semper actual extra animam intellectivam propterea vocatur actus.
55 Marilyn McCord Adams. William Ockham  (2 Volumes), (Notre Dame, 1987); 
[p. 657]. William o f  Ockham: Quodlibetal Questions (2 Volumes), eds. and 
trans., Alfred J. Freddoso & Francis E. Kelley, (New Haven, 1991); [pp. 132- 
136]; William of Ockham [Guillelmi de Ockham]. Opera Theologica. Tomus 
IX, Q u od libeta  Septem , ed. Joseph C. W ey, (Bonaventure, 1980); 
[p. 156 line 4 to p. 158 line 40].
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sensitive appetite and, at the same time, not desired according to the 
rational appetite then there results in the subject a natural opposition  
between w illing and not-willing the same object. Ockham confessed  
that it was difficult to prove that there was a plurality o f  forms in the 
human com posite, or in fact in any com posite being because such a 
position  was not estab lish ed  upon se lf-ev id en t p rop osition s. 
Nevertheless, he argued that it was im possible for two contradictory 
states, i.e., desiring and not-desiring, to exist in the same subject but he 
maintained that it was at the same time obvious that acts o f desiring and 
acts o f resisting were to be found co-existing in the human composite in 
the state o f nature. This implied for Ockham that there were really 
different substantial forms in order to account for these very different 
powers. Mair continues, in phrasing which closely  parallels that o f  
Ockham, that this objection is thought to be confirmed because its 
proponents argue that the same power cannot be responsible for 
choosing the same object both naturally via the sensitive appetite and 
freely in virtue of the rational appetite. Hence, there can be no doubt 
that it is necessary to grant that there are two subjects or two loci for the 
different kinds o f acts or appetites, one subject being the sensitive soul 
and the other the rational or intellective s o u l . 56
56 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \fol. 94*'^]. lam arguitur contra eandem  
conclusionem (viz., quod in nullo composito est aliqua forma substantialis nisi 
una) probando quod sit una anima sensitiva ab intellectiva distincta. Et erit 
decimum argumentum quo sic arguitur im possibile est naturaliter qualitates 
contrarias esse in eodem subiecto. Sed actus appetendi aliquid renuendi sunt 
contrarii. Et tamen sunt simul per te, si sit nisi una anima in homine. Appetitus 
sensitivus desiderat cum obiecto ei convenienti coniungi: ut comedendo cibum  
vetitum. Appetitus rationalis illud obiectum renuit. Confirmatur hæc ratio. 
Eadem potentia non simul elicit idem obiectum naturaliter et libere. Sed 
appetitus sensitivus appétit aliquod obiectum naturaliter. Et appetitus libere illi 
conform iter appétit, interdum conform iter secundum  rectam  rationem  
nonnunquam difformiter non refert. Ergo oportet dare duo subiecta istorum  
actuum quorum alter naturaliter et alter libere elicitur. Ad hoc potest introduci 
Aristoteles 3 De Anima dicens in eodem sunt appetitus contrarii.
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Mair, like W alter Chatton one o f O ckham ’s early critics, is 
unsympathetic to this position.57 Mair insists, as Ockham had, that the 
sensation o f the appetitive act inheres in the human com posite, in other 
words, in the aggregate, that is the total human being made up o f body, 
understood as instrument (organum) , and o f soul.58 He argues against 
his objector that the acts o f sensitive appetite and rational appetite are 
not naturally opposed, and distinguishes between different m odes o f  
apprehending the same object as both desirable and undesirable. The 
power o f sensation informing the sensitive appetite and the power o f  
intellection informing the intellective appetite are posited as the modes 
in which an object is apprehended as both desirable and undesirable 
without any natural contrariety. Moreover even at the most basic level 
o f sense—apprehension there is no possibility o f contrariety unless the 
same object is perceived as agreeable and disagreeable in virtue o f the 
same sense-organ.59 Mair writes that “acts o f desiring and o f fleeing the 
same object apprehended by different senses stand together and are not 
opposed.”60 He claims that both o f these arguments are firmly grounded
57 The response o f Walter Chatton to Ockham is discussed in Adams. William  
Ockham, [pp. 657-658]. See also William o f Ockham: Q uodlibetal Questions, 
[pp. 132-136]. Ockham. Quodlibeta Septem, [pp. 156-157].
58 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [fol. 94^^]. Respondeo. Hæc argumenta [See 
fn. 56] non habent colorem contra hoc quod tenere intendo in sequentibus; puta 
quod sensatio actus appetitus sensitivi inhæret aggregate ex organo et anima.
59 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \fol. 9 4 *’b-va] Actus isti [viz., acts of desiring 
and acts of fleeing] de quibus fit mentio non inhærent eidem subiecto primo. Et 
per eonsequens inter illos non est contrarietas. Contraria sunt nata circa idem (ex 
Prædicamentis). Sed adhuc istud non tenendo argumenta non concludunt. 
Tenendo quod sensatio, intellectio, appetitio sensitiva, et appetitio intellectiva 
animæ inhærent tanquam suo subiecto; primo concede maiorem argumenti: ad 
minorem dice quod ipsa est vera quando sequuntur eandem apprehensionem. 
Secus est si diversas apprehensiones sequantur. M ode actus appetitus sensitivi 
sequitur sensationem; actus appetitus intellectivi sequitur rationem* causa quare 
vocantur appetitus sensitivus et intellectivus. Mode isti actus non sunt contrarii 
sed actus sensitivus obiecti appetitivus contrariantur actui sensitive renuendi 
idem obiecto. Et hoc si fuerit secundum eundem sensum. *1 am reading 
“sequitur rationem” for “sive rationama” which is almost certainly a printer’s 
error.
60 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \fol. 94^4] Actus appetendi et refugiendi idem 
obiectum diversis sensibus apprehensum stant simul et non sunt contrarii. Patet
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in experience and provides two illustrations. It is obvious that the 
intellective and sensitive appetites are not opposed. The cat is hungry 
and desires the fish which in the past has satisfied its hunger, but the fish 
is in water which the cat does not want to touch. It is possible to say that 
the cat desires the fish in virtue o f the intellect but that the cat is averse 
to the sensation o f water on its paws. Perhaps this position can be 
criticized as being anthropomorphic because one can deny that a cat has 
any true cognitive capacity. However, though not without its objectors, 
we must not forget that it was com m only thought by m edieval 
philosophers that animals had a material intellect and that they were 
capable o f engaging in some kind o f reasoning. Mair and his colleagues 
custom arily d istinguished  betw een the in te llec tiv e  soul (anima 
intellectiva) as the specific form attributable only to human beings and 
anima as a cognitive power (potentia  cognitiva)  that includes the 
material intellect o f animals. Nevertheless, Mair provides another more 
interesting illustration: It is common place that on the basis o f  sensation 
the sun is judged to be smaller than the earth but that the intellect judges 
the sun to be larger. The initial judgment of the sun being smaller than 
the earth gives way and is replaced by the proper judgm ent o f the
experimento. Si carnem multum calidam famenti catto porrexeris gustus catti 
appétit et ad carnem accedit gustu cattus alleetus ut cam capiat. Sed tactus 
abhorret. Et pro tempore prope carnem comminus sedendo carnem renuit. Sic 
de pisce in aqua secundum carmen vulgare. Cattus vult piscem  sed non vult 
tangere limpham. Sic de medio sensus et intellectus potest dici. Ut iudicando 
secundum sensum solem  minorem terra et secundum intellectum  maiorem  
quousque indicium sensus intellectus corrumpuerit sicut actus rationalis potest 
removere actum sensualitatis cui non formaliter contrariantur sed solum  
virtualiter. Proportionaliter actus intellectivus unus alteri contrariatur quando 
uterque est liber et in idem obiectum latus vel a principio libero productus. Actus 
naturaliter continuatus qui a principio libero procedit de prosequutione “a” 
obiecti contrariantur renutioni libere eiusdem obiecti. Hoc non obstante actus 
unius sensus qui est prosecutivus “a” obiecti et intellectus qui est fugitivus 
eiusdem possunt dici virtualiter contrarii pro quanto diversificandi in idem  
obiectum tendunt unus prosequendo et alter fugiendo. Et sic unus illorum alium  
corrumpit in aliquo tempore secundum activitatem et resistentiam unius alterius.
Sicut forma substantialis aquæ corrumpit quem secum pro tempore compatitur. 
Secum virtualiter. Licet formaliter. Pro ista solvitur argumentum et dictum  
Aristotelis in 3 De Anima.
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intellect. He claim s that in a similar way “a rational act is able to 
remove a sensual act to which it is not formally opposed but only  
virtually opposed”.6i Mair continues:
the act o f one sense which is pursuant of object “a” and the 
act o f intellect which flees the same object can be said to be 
virtually opposed insofar as they are different and are 
directed to the same object with one o f them pursuing and 
the other fleeing from it. And thus one o f them destroys the 
other at some time according to the activity and resistance 
of the other.62
The suggestion is that the less intense and resistant appetite would give 
way to the more intense and resistant. The intense sensation of gustatory 
satisfaction one receives from drinking aqua vitæ may give way to an 
intellectual prohibition since one reacts adversely to aqua vitæ. It is 
quite feasible for the same subject to experience both desire and aversion 
with regard to the same object but desire and aversion stand virtually 
opposed because the same object cannot be both pursued and avoided in 
virtue o f the same appetite.
Mair now turns his attention to two different ways in which the 
same cognitive power can relate to various objects as testimony to the 
claim  that the same power can be responsible for a diversity o f  
operations:
The same power in respect o f the same object has an 
in tu itive and abstractive notion , a ju d ica tive  and 
apprehensive; not judicative, sensitive and intellective.
M oreover, the soul naturally understands an object and 
w ills the same object freely. Similarly an act o f will is 
naturally produced by a free act. For example, one who 
efficiently w ishes an end and knows that “a” is the only
61 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; \Jol. 94^4] Por the Latin see fn. 60.
62 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [fol. 94^4] Por the Latin see fn. 60.
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way naturally possible wills that way and is able to w ill the 
same freely.63
There is ultimately nothing incongruous in the same pow er being the 
author o f diverse activities. The diversity o f operations is therefore 
insufficient to establish the existence o f a diverse number o f powers. 
Moreover, howsoever diverse the operations may be this does not permit 
one to conclude that there is a diversity o f substantial forms in a 
com plete being (su ppos itu m )M  Mair encapsulates his lengthy  
exposition in favour o f the Unitarian position as follows:
There are various opinions o f philosophers concerning the 
unity or the plurality o f  form s o f  w hich the more 
appropriate I think is that which posits one form in one 
complete being p er  se (siippositiim p e r  se) by which the 
whole is called one. I do not speak about the absolute 
power o f God. I believe that He is able to make as many 
forms as He wishes to inform one matter.65
Reminiscent o f the doubt confessed by Ockham at the beginning o f  
his proof in favour o f the plurality o f  substantial forms, the admission  
that a plurality o f forms could inhere in one form by means o f the 
absolute power o f God acknowledges that the case in favour o f the 
Unitarian position is also difficult to prove.
63 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [fol. 94^4] Ad confirmationem nego cam. 
[See fn. 56.] Eadem potentia respectu eiusdem obiecti habet notitiam intuitivam 
et abstractivam, iudicativam ct apprehcnsivam. Non iudicativam, sensitivam et 
intellectivam. Præterea anima intelligit obiectum naturaliter et idem vult libere. 
Similiter voluntas habet unum actum naturaliter productum ab actu libero. Ut qui 
efficaciter vult finem et scit “a” medium solum possibile naturaliter tunc voluntas 
vult tale medium et potest idem libere velle.
64 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [fol. 9 4 vb_g^raj Habere diversitatem non 
arguit sufficienter diversitatem potentiæ... Sed quantumcumque sunt diversæ in 
eodem supposito non concluditur formarum substantialium diversitas quia non 
répugnât ut nuperrime diximus eidem  formæ substantiali habere dissim iles 
operationes [et] qualitates.
65 Mair. In secundum, d. 15, q. 2; [Jol. 95^4] Quæstionem paucis ob eius 
prolixitatem colligam. Variæ sunt philosophorum sententiæ recitatæ de unitate 
vel pluralitate formarum. Quarum rectiorem puta (=puto) viam illam quæ ponit 
unam formam in uno supposito per se a qua totum denominatur unum. Non 
loquor de potentia Dei. Credo quod potest facere tot formas quot vult unam 
materiam informare.
CHAPTER 2
T h e  N a t u r e  o f  M in d
A n i m a  i n t e l l e c t i v a — t w e  s p e c i h c  f o r m  o f  h u m a n  b e i n g s
Though there is som e reluctance to declare that the Unitarian 
position is the right one there is no hesitation w hile introducing a 
discussion concerning the immortality o f the soul when Mair claims that 
the natural light o f reason reveals to us that the human intellect is the 
specific form o f  the human b o d y . 6 6  The theological question o f the 
immortality o f  the intellective soul in human beings introduces a 
distinction between the intellective soul as a principle o f animation and 
the intellective soul as a principle o f  operation. The em bodied  
intellective soul as the first principle o f animation, as that which gives 
life  to body, was thought to be separable from the body and was 
therefore immortal. However, immortality was denied to the intellective 
soul w hich, as a principle o f  operation, was capable o f  acts o f  
intellection and volition. It was the intellective soul separated from the
66 Mair. In secundum, d. 18, q. 4; \fol. 104^4] Intellectus est forma corporis 
humani. Aristoteles dicit 2 De Anima. Anima est actus primus corporis physici 
organici in potentiam vitam habentis. Insuper hoc intelligitur realiter; ergo habet 
intellectum tanquam partem eius; non intelligit per materiam nec per formam  
corporeitatis vel sensitivam  (si ponatur); ergo intelligitur per animam  
intellectivam. Insuper ponit beatitudinem hominis in speculatione intellectus 
consistere decimo Ethicorum: dicit: Illud non fieret si anima non esset pars
hominis. Et nono Ethicorum: dicit: ad hominem pertinet corpus humanum et 
anima intellectiva. Perpetuitas animæ est nota ex verbis C hr isti dicentis: nolite 
timere eos qui corpus occidunt, animam autem non possunt occidere. Et 
A ristoteles ex separatione animæ a corpore quoad operationem; hoc est, 
intellectionem vel volitionem, concludit quod anima potest separari a corpore. 
Mair. In quartum, d. 43, q. 2; [fol. 329^^]. Intellectus humanus est forma 
corpus inform ans... Anima est actu s primus corporis physici organici in 
potentiam vitam habentis. Mair. In quartum, d. 43, q. 2; [fol. 330^^]. Primo 
notum est in lumine naturali quod anima est forma corporis ipsum informans.
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activity o f intellection and volition that was immortal. In order to 
distinguish these two aspects of the intellective soul it will be helpful to 
introduce some terminology. I w ill now translate the term anima as 
“mind” to refer exclusively to the human intellective soul capable of acts 
o f understanding and acts o f will. This is desirable in order to avoid  
confusion with the broader sense o f "anima" as a “principle o f  
anim ation” that may be attributed equally to plants, animals, and 
humans. The term "anima" when used in this way implies something 
quite different than the term “mind” as a principle o f operation. The 
term “mind” will also be used to avoid any implication o f immortality 
normally associated with the term “soul”. The next crucial consideration 
is: What is the nature of mind? Mair puts forward the follow ing two 
questions for consideration: Is the essence o f mind distinct from its 
powers? and How are the essence of mind and its powers related to one
another?67
S o m e  r e l e v a n t  m e a n i n g s  o f  t h e  t e r m  “p o w e r ”
The history o f the various meanings imposed on the term “power” 
(potentia) is complex. It is not surprising that Mair offers a brief review 
o f what he takes to be the most relevant definitions o f “power” before 
proceeding to the analysis o f the controversy surrounding the nature o f  
mind. The first definition he provides is that of Aristotle as it is given in 
the Metaphysics  where “power” is resolved into the active and the 
passive. Mair reports that Aristotle also distinguished between power in 
terms o f  “inability” (inhabilitas)  and “power” as that which is 
“incapable o f suffering” (impassibilis) by which Mair understands the 
qualitative disposition according to which a subject is able to resist being
67 Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; \fol. 9 5 ^b] Quomodo essentia animæ et eius 
potentia inter se habeant? Gratia illius quæram hunc questionis titulum: an 
potentiæ animæ ab essentia animæ distinguuntur?
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corrupted and being moved. “Power” understood in this last way 
implies being in a certain state or condition and belongs to the first 
species o f Aristotelian quality. 68 Mair continues that Aristotle goes on 
to describe active power as a principle o f change in virtue o f which one 
thing changes another and a passive power as a principle o f change in 
virtue o f which one receives change from another.69 The last definition, 
of power as a principle o f transformation, is attributed to Aquinas who 
thought that the powers o f the mind taken generally are accidents o f the 
mind that are to be distinguished from the substance o f  mind. The 
powers o f the mind are further divided between the organic powers such 
as the senses and the non-organic such as the intellect and will and 
memory.70 This final definition o f the term “power” (potentia) is taken 
as the starting point for M air’s d iscussion  o f  the nature o f  the 
relationship between the essence o f mind and the powers o f intellect and 
will.
REALISM ESCHEW ED— THE MIND IS SIMPLE AN D INDIVISIBLE
There is neither a real nor a formal distinction to be made between 
the mind and its powers nor is a distinction to be made between the 
mental powers themselves. The essence o f mind is really its principal
68 Aristotle. Categories, [8b27].
69 Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. \ , \J o l .  95i'b]. ...Aristoteles 5 [1019415-102046]
et 9 \\0 ^ ^ 9 -\5 \M eta p h ysicæ  distinguit potentiam quantum ad eius principia in 
potentiam activam et potentiam passivam et inhabilitatis impassibile, hoc est, in 
qualitativam  dispositionem  secundum  quam subiectum  potest resistere
corruptivis et motivis. Iste tertius modus potentiæ ad primam speciem qualitatis
pertinet. Postea describit potentiam activam et passivam dicens quod potentia 
activa est principium transmutandi alterum inquantum alterum. Et potentia 
passiva est principium transmutandi ab altero.
70 Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; \fol. 9 5 rb-vaj Postea scito Beatus Thomas in
Prima Parte q. 77  et 54 tenet general iter quod potentia distinguitur ab anima et 
est accidens quarum quædam inhærent animæ tantum ut potentiæ non organieæ 
ut intellectus, voluntas et memoria sunt acccidentia secundum eum. Organieæ, 
quales sunt sensitivæ , sunt accidentia et inhærent toti com posito, hoc est, 
aggregato ex anima et determinata portione car ni s.
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powers, that is, the non-organic powers o f intellect and o f w ill.71 Mair 
rejects the realist position which maintains that the powers o f intellect 
and w ill are natural capacities o f the mind belonging to A ristotle’s 
second species o f quality, that is, o f natural capacity and incapacity.
This results in accidental and not essential or per  se unity.72 The unity is 
accidental because while something y  may have the capacity to be x  it 
will not be x  or acquire x unless that capacity is actualized; and it is not 
necessary for that capacity to be actualized in order for the subject to 
continue existing as y. Intellect and w ill, on this account, must be 
accidents that are really distinct from the substance o f mind. Mair 
invokes in this context the theological principle that God by his absolute 
power can destroy every accident o f an object while still preserving the 
substance in which the accident inheres. God is able to do this because 
the existence o f a substance does not depend on its accidental properties. 
Substance and accident are metaphysically distinct; hence it is logically  
possible for God to destroy one w hile preserving the other. On the 
realist account it is possible then for God to preserve the substance o f the 
mind while destroying the accidents o f intellect and will. There is a very 
serious metaphysical consideration underlying this discussion and it is 
brought to the fore when Mair writes that according to the realist 
doctrine it is possible that God can make it such that the intellective soul 
having neither intellect nor will is still able to understand and to will.73
71 Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. \ 95^4] Secunda conclusio. Anima est sua
potentia principalis loquendo de potentia non organica. Hoc est, anima realiter 
est suus intellectus et voluntas et memoria.
72 Aristotle. Categories, [9414-15].
73 Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; \fol. 95^4] Probatur. Da oppositum. 
Intellectus animæ est accidens ab essentia animæ distinctum et est accidens 
absolutum cum est de secunda specie qualitatis secundum eos. M odo Deus de 
potentia absoluta potest destruere omne accidens (potissim um  absolutum) 
conservando substantiam eius cum substantia non dependent ab accidente. 
Mirabile est quod[=si?] Deus non potest conservare substantiam destruendo 
accidens eius. Etsi hoc Deus potest dabitur anima intellectiva nec habens 
intellectum nec voluntatem et istis seclusis anima potest adhuc intelligere vel
R. N. Wood Chapter 2; The Nature of the Mind 48
Mair denies that the natural capacities o f the minds are distinct from the 
substance o f mind. It is quite clear that it is not possible to perform an 
act without having the capacity or potency to do so. There can be no act 
of understanding without having the potential to understand and the 
potential as the capacity to understand something is passive. If it is 
admitted that the mind can really be distinguished in terms o f substance 
and accident then one must grant that God can either destroy the 
accident while preserving the substance or destroy the substance w hile  
preserving the accident. Moreover, as we have just seen, it is possible 
for God to preserve one accident while destroying another. Hence the 
realist doctrine must allow that it is possible for God to destroy the 
capacity to understand while preserving the act o f understanding. This 
is nonsense because it is not possible for me to be in engaged in the act 
of understanding Latin if God were by his absolute power to destroy my 
capacity to understand Latin. This is a hard doctrine that the realists 
would accept but it is precisely because o f  this im plication o f  
separability that neither the Nominalists nor the Scotists admit any real 
distinction between existence (esse) and essence (essentia) on the part 
o f a thing.74 The mind is a sim ple substance without accidents or 
divisions. It follow s from the above rejection o f the realist position that 
an intellect is a will (intellectus est voluntas).
velle. If the “quod” is not rejected in favour of “si” then the “non” in the phrase 
“...mirabile est quod Deus [non] potest conservare substantiam destruendo actus 
eius.” the “non” is certainly mis-placed. If not, we are forced either to conclude 
that Mair is simply contradicting him self from one line to the next or that the 
indicative mood of “esse” should read in the subjunctive in which case the “non” 
would be permissible but seems improbable. It is more probable that we should 
read “si” in which case the difficulty disappears.
74 Mair. In secundum  d. 16, q. 1; \fol. 95^4] Nec nominalium unus, nec 
Scotistarum aliquis existimat discrimen aliquod inter esse et essentiam ex parte 
rei. Quælibet essentia est suum esse et econverso. Nec passio est accidens ut 
ipsi ponunt ut alibi videri habet apud me hæc maxima est utrobique admittenda: 
in quibuscunque rebus creatis et distinctis quarum una non est pars alterius Deus 
potest quamcumque illarum conservare reliqua corrupta sive sit accidens sive 
substantia. Et ita nominalium quilibet concedit.
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T h e  S c o t is t  c h a l l e n g e — t h e  f o r m a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  r e j e c t e d
“This mind is an intellect. And this mind is a will. Therefore a will 
is an intellect” and by means o f an appeal to the principle o f conversion 
Mair concludes that an intellect is a will.^^ It is important to note that 
the above syllogism  was classed as a third figure expository syllogism , 
in respect o f which there are two salient features. First, the central 
feature o f the third figure is that the middle term occurs as subject in 
both the major and the minor premise, for instance, the term “this mind” 
in the above syllogism.^^ Second, an expository syllogism  by definition 
is one that holds true in virtue o f singular terms which in the above 
syllogism  is revealed by the singularity o f the demonstrative pronoun 
“this”.77 It is important to note these features o f the syllogism  Mair 
offers as proof o f the identity of intellect and will because it is reveals 
the possibility o f predicating the terms “intellect” and “w ill” o f  each 
other, for example, “This intellect is a w ill”. It is a predication that 
could not have been admitted by Scotus who thought that the distinction 
between the powers o f intellect and will meant that they were formally
Mair. In secundum, d. \6 , q. [fol. 9 5 '^ b] Teitia conclusio. Intellectus est 
voluntas. Probalur. Hæc anima est intellectus. Et hæc anima est voluntas. Ergo 
voluntas est intellectus. Et convertens illius conversas est tertia conclusio. 
Probatur maior. Aliquid est intellectus. Et non accidens ex secunda conclusione. 
[Sec fn. 71]. Nec est alia substantia ab anima. Qualibet alia seclusa anima 
potest intelligere. Ergo est intellectus. Sicut recte in libro de Spiritu e t Anima 
dicitur quod anima est intellectus dum intelligit et voluntas dum vult. Secundo 
arguitur ad idem non est petenda pluralitas ubi paucitas sufficit. Sed omnia 
optime salvantur ponendo intellectum esse substantiam animæ. Nec possunt 
salvari res multiplicando distinctas. Igitur.
John Mair. S yllogism i in In P etri H yspani summulas, (Lyons, 1505);
[sig. y  4^%]. Horum autem terminorum alter vocatur medium, alter maior 
extremitas, alter vero minor extremitas. Medium terminus bis sumptus ante 
conclusionem. Maior extremitas est terminus sumptus in maiori propositione 
cum medio. Minor extremitas est terminus sumptus in minori propositione cum 
medio... Figura est ordinatio trium terminorum secundum debitam subiectionem  
et prædicationem... Tertia figura est quando medium subiicitur in utraque ut 
omnis homo est animal, omnis homo est substantia, ergo quædam substantia est 
animal unde versus.
Mair. Syllogismi, [5 /^. jc 1^^]. Notandum est primo quod syllogism us 
expositorius est syllogismus tenens virtute termini singularis.
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distinct and hence could not be predicated o f one a n o t h e r M a i r  is 
careful to focus on his fellow  country-m an’s formal distinction in 
response to the allegation that the rejection o f any real or formal 
distinction between the powers o f mind is untenable because it follow s  
from this that an intellect wills, or similarly, that a will understands.
John Duns Scotus, like Mair, rejects Aquinas’ distinction between 
the powers o f the intellect and will and between the powers and the 
essence o f the mind.^^ They both thought that the intellect and will are 
so inextricably bound together that not even God by an act o f absolute 
power could separate them without destroying the simple substance qua 
essence o f mind. Unlike Mair, Scotus does not deny that there is some 
kind o f real distinction between the intellect and will nor does he deny 
that the distinction has its basis in the intrinsic nature o f mind. It is on 
this basis that Scotus posits formal distinction because while he does not 
want to say that the intellect and will are real or essential parts o f the 
mind, by the same token he does not want to claim that the intellect and 
will cannot, in some way, be distinguished. He thinks that the terms 
“intellect” and “w ill” refer to different formalities o f the mind as a 
principle o f operation that are so intrinsically and inextricably linked 
together that one cannot exist without the other, but he does not hesitate
It is possible that the attention Mair directs towards Duns Scotus is partially 
based on the following passage, of which I offer only a report. It is a passage in 
which Scotus rejects Henry of Ghent Quodl. 3, Quæst. 4  in Reportata  
Parisiensis , d. 16, q. 1, in Opera Omnia Tomus 23 \ [p. 77]. Ad aliud cum 
dicitur quod hæc erit vera, intellectus est voluntas, dico quod non, quia intellectus 
imponitur naturæ, ut sub hoc respectu, voluntas, ut sub illo vel illo conceptu. Vel 
potest dici quod quantumcumque sint eadem realiter in essentia animæ, tamen 
quidditative vel formaliter distinguuntur; et ista diversitas impedit prædicationem 
unius de alio. Si igitur an intellectivo et volitivo abstrahantur intellectus et 
voluntas, si est ibi aliqua distinctio formalis, unum non prædicatur de alio, sicut 
nec animalitas de humanitate, quamquam includantur in illo; sed ratione unitatis 
realis potentiarum in essentia animæ hæc erit vera: intellectivum est volitivum in 
causa, etsi abstrahantur intellectus et voluntas ab eo, quod est causa unitatis, 
neutrum de alio verificatur.
See John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, d. 16, q. 1; in Opera Omnia 
Tomus 23, [pp. 67-77].
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to reject the possibility o f predicating the powers o f each other. This is 
unlike Mair who writes that the only distinction between the powers of 
the mind is a logical one. Mair admits that having denied that the 
existence of a formal distinction between the powers o f the mind, he is 
committed to the follow ing premises “This intellect understands. This 
intellect is a w ill.” but Mair denies that this forces him to the follow ing  
conclusion: “Therefore, a will understands.”^^  Mair offers the following  
solution to the objection:
But the will does not understand by means o f the will. The 
mind by means o f the will understands but it does not 
understand by means o f the will. The first part, [that the 
mind by means o f the will understands], is obvious. The 
mind by means o f this intellect understands. This intellect 
is the w ill. Therefore. [The mind by means o f this w ill 
understands]. The second part, [that the mind understands 
by means of the w ill], says that the will is the principle o f  
understanding which is false. I posit no such formal 
distinction. In every way the intellect is the will and there 
is no distinction except o f reason and in connotation. They 
are not synonym ous terms. “Intellect” indirectly (in 
obliquo) implies an act o f understanding. “W ill” does not 
connote this but the aptitude for an act o f will. They are 
nevertheless convertible terms. Once the terms have been 
understood sign ificatively  nothing is stated about the 
intellect unless the same is said about the will^i
80
81
Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; \fol. 96vb] Contra tertiam conclusionem  
arguitur. Ex ea sequitur quod intellectus vult. Similiter hæc conclusio. Sequitur 
quod voluntas intelligit. Istæ conclusiones sunt omnem modum loquendi et quod 
sequatur patet sic. Hie intellectus intelligit. Hie intellectus est voluntas. Ergo 
voluntas intelligit. Expositorie in tertia figura. A lia conclusio patet. Hæc 
voluntas vult. Hæc voluntas est intellectus. Ergo intellectus vult. Consequentia 
tenet ut prius. Et premissæ sunt veræ secundum dicta: quia non pono 
distinctionem realem vel formalem more conterranei [i.e., Scoti] inter voluntatem  
et intellectum. Respondetur concedendo conclusiones illatas.
Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; \fol. 9 6 ^^] Sed voluntas non intelligit 
voluntate. Anima voluntate intelligit sed non intelligit voluntate. Prior pars 
patet. [i.e.. Anima voluntate in tellig it] Anima hoc intellectu intelligit. Hie 
intellectus est voluntas. Igitur. [i.e.. Anima hac voluntate intelligit ] Secunda 
pars [i.e.. Anima intelligit voluntate ] dicit quod voluntas est principium
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TH E LOGIC OF TERM S— “INTELLECT” AND “WILL” ARE CONVERTIBLE
BUT NOT SYNONYMOUS TERMS.
Some definitions o f the key terms will help shed light on the wealth 
of logical sophistication in the rejection, implied by Mair’s position, that 
the will is a principle o f understanding. The crucial distinction, between 
synonym ous and convertible terms, is treated at length in David  
Cranston’s detailed additions to Mair’s logical work Termini. One 
category o f terms is those terms that are said to be convertible:
Convertible terms are so related that it is not possible for 
one to be true o f something with som e mediating copula 
without the other likewise being true o f the same thing with 
a similar copula unless one o f them, and not the other, 
cannot be verified  on account o f  being r e f l e x i v e ^ ^
(reflexionem) .83
intelligendi. Quod est falsum. Ad illam distinctionem formalem nullam talem  
pono. Omni modo intellectus est voluntas nec est distinctio ulla nisi rationis et in 
connotatis. Et non sunt termini synonymi. Intellectus actum intelligendi in 
obliquo [viz., the genitive “intelligendi”] importât. Hoc non connotat voluntas 
sed aptitudinem ad actum volendi. Sunt tamen termini converti biles. Nihil de 
intellectu enunciatur quin illud idem de voluntate enunciatur significative captis 
vocabulis.
82 On the subject of reflexive notions see Broadie. Notion and Object, [pp. 28-29]. 
1 offer two of Mair’s definitions. First, Mair. Posterior a  in In Petri Hyspani 
Summulas, (Lyons, 1505); [sig. dd 2^^]. Notitia reflexa est notitia repræsentans 
directa rem quæ non est notitia significans, et tunc potest dici quod conceptus 
entis in ordine ad notitias est reflexa, sed in ordine ad Sortem et Platonem est 
directa. “A reflexive notion is a direct notion representing something which is 
not a signifying notion, and then it can be said that the concept of a being ordered 
to notions is reflexive, but ordered to Socrates and Plato it is direct.” Second. 
John Mair. In tertium Sententiarum, (Paris, 1519); [fol. 3H1^]. Notitia reflexa 
notitiæ Sortis est natural is similitudo solius accidentis, et nullomodo naturalis 
sim ilitudo Sortis, et cum  est conceptus ultim atus nullo m odo Sortem  
repræsentabat. Numquam conceptus ultimatus repræsentat aliquid nisi cuius est 
naturalis similitudo. “A reflexive notion of a notion of Socrates is a natural 
likeness of only an accident, and in no way a natural likeness o f Socrates, when 
the concept is ultimate it in no way way represents Socrates. Never does an 
ultimate concept represent something unless it is a natural likeness of it.” Since 
reflexive notions are not natural likenesses of objects they cannot be convertible.
83 John Mair. Termini, [5ig. b S^b] Termini convertibiles sunt termini sic se 
habentes quod non stat unum illorum pro aliqua re verificabilem esse mediante 
aliqua copula quin alter pro eadem re similiter acceptas mediante simili copula 
verificabilis sit nisi uni illorum répugnât verificari propter reflexionem et non 
alteri.
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O f convertible terms only those that have the same ultimate 
signification can be said to be synonyms. Synonymy, thus, is a sub­
division within convertibility and while it is true that all synonymous 
terms are convertible it is not the case that all convertible terms are 
synonymous. Cranston gives the most detailed account o f  synonymous 
terms in his Terminorum:
Of terms, some are synonymous, others non synonymous.
Synonymous terms are terms signifying the same thing in 
an adequate way at least according to the signification in 
virtue o f which they are synonymous terms. An example is 
concerning these terms: “man”, “man”. There are many 
differences in respect o f synonym ous terms. Som e are 
outright synonym ous as regards every signification o f  
which nature are identical terms such as those two terms 
given. Other terms are synonym ous in virtue o f every 
essential sign ification , not according to accidental or 
grammatical signification, o f this kind are the direct and the 
indirect, for example, “angel” and “angel’s”. Other terms 
are synonym ous as regards ultim ate signification , for 
example; lapis'' (stone) and ‘"petra" (stone), "'gladius"
(sword) and "‘‘ensis"  (sword). From these this corollary 
fo llow s: these terms “/zomo” and ^^risibile" are not 
synonym ous terms, that they are convertible terms is 
obvious; since they are universally verifiable of each other.
From the above statements the follow ing definition o f non- 
synonymous terms follows. Hence a term non-synonymous 
with another is that which does not signify the same thing 
both adequately and in the same way as the other, for 
example, these terms: “angel” and “incorporeal”.84
84 David Cranston. Tractatus terminorum, [b 2 ^b] Termini synonymi sunt termini 
significantes idem adæquate modo saltem secundum significationem secundum  
quam sunt termini synonymi. Exemplum est de istis terminis terminis: “homo”, 
“homo”. Et isti se habent in multiplici differentia. Nam quidam sunt synonymi 
simpliciter quoad omnem significationem  cuius naturæ sunt termini identic! 
quemadmodum sunt illi duo termini dati. A lii termini sunt synonymi secundum  
omnem significationem essentialem non secundum significationem accidentalem  
sen grammaticalem cuiusmodi sunt rectus et obliquus ut: “angelus”, “angeli”. 
Alii sunt termini synonymi quoad significationem  non ut sunt isti termini:
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It is beyond a doubt that the definition o f synonym y is different 
from the modern one in virtue o f the inclusion o f identical terms in the 
list o f those terms that are to be classed as synonymous. There is good 
reason to think however that identical terms were a particular case. 
Cranston in his additions to Mair’s Termini writes:
Of convertible terms some are convertible according to only 
one signification. Others according to two or three. Others 
according to every signification. An example o f the first 
''Tullius'\ ''Marcus'' are converted with "homo", "risibile" 
according to ultimate signification. A lso, there are two  
kinds o f “according to ultimate signification”. Som e o f  
these terms are synonymous according to one signification  
only, for example, terms signifying the same thing or terms 
signifying somehow in the same way and these, according 
to the Philosopher, are properly called synonymous terms 
and are to be distinguished from identical terms. A lso, o f  
convertible terms som e are in no way synonym ous, for 
example, "homo", "risibile". An example o f the second, for 
example, "mucro" and "gladius" which are convertible as 
regards two significates that are also ultimate, e .g ., a real 
sword and a painted sword.... An example of the last kind, 
such as “man”, “man” which are convertible terms as 
regards every signification.85
“lapis”, “petra”; “gladius”, “ensis”. Ex his correlariæ sequitur istos termines 
“hom o”, “r isib ile” non esse  term ines synonym es. Quod sint termini 
convertibiles patet quia universaliter de se invicem verificantur.
85 Mair. Termini, [sig. c Terminorum convertibilium quidam secundum
unam significationem  tantum convertuntur. Quidam secundum duas vel tres. 
Quidam secundum omnem su am significationem  convertuntur. Exemplum  
primorum: “Tullius Marcus” convertuntur secundum significationem ultimatam 
“homo”, “risibile”. Etiam secundum significationem ultimatam, et adhuc isti 
sunt duplices: quidam illorum sunt synonymi secundum unam significationem  
tantum, ut sunt termini idem vel aliqualiter eodem modo significantes, et isti 
proprie termini synonymi appelantur secundum Philosophum [Categories, 1^6], 
et distinguuntur contra terminos identicos. Quidam vero nullomodo synonymi 
sunt ut “hom o”, “risibile”. Exemplum secundorum ut “mucro”, “gladius”, 
convertibiles sunt quoad duo significata etiam ultimata, puta, in ordine ad 
gladium verum et ad gladium pictum... De ultimis exemplum ut “hom o”, 
“hom o” sunt termini quoad sunt termini quoad omnem significationem  
convertibiles.
R. N. Wood Chapter 2: The Nature of the Mind 55
The verifiability o f the identity o f the terms “man”, “man” requires 
that each instance o f the term “man” occurs within the same kind o f  
language, i.e., mental, vocal, or written. Hence an utterance o f the term 
“man” can never be identical with a written or a mental occurrence o f  
the term “man”. Enough o f this brief digression. The most relevant 
kinds o f  synonym ous terms, for our purpose, are those that are 
synonymous according to ultimate signification, for example, gladius  
(“sword”) and ensis  (“sw ord”) w hich are both convertib le and 
synonym ous because though different with respect to non-ultimate 
signification they have the same ultimate signification.
NATURALLY AND CONVENTIONALLY SIGNIHCANT TERMS
Before proceeding to an exposition o f the distinction between non- 
ultimate and ultimate signification it w ill be helpful to introduce two 
concepts that are basic to any late-m edieval discussion o f meaning: 
signification and supposition. It was universally agreed by late- 
medieval terminist logicians that to signify is to represent something, or 
to represent in some way to the cognitive faculty.86 It was common to 
divide terms into those that were naturally significant and those that 
were significant by convention, i.e., terms significant by voluntary 
imposition or at the pleasure (ad placitum) o f the language user.
To signify naturally is to represent apart from any imposed
meaning, according to a thing’s nature, not in the sense that
86 Mair. Termini, [jfg. a 8^ ]^ Insuper ad verte quod significare sic describitur: est 
potentiæ cognitivæ aliquid repræsentare. “Repræsentare” ponitur in loco generis 
non quia communior capiendo significare ut hie definitur, sed quia terminus 
notior quod sufficit in definitionibus quid nom inis. Dicitur “aliquid” 
iranscendenter ut includat aliqua et aliqualiter. Dicitur “potentiæ cognitivæ” ad 
excludendum potentias non cognitivas quemadmodum est potentia ignis quæ 
potentiæ apud Aristotelem vocantur irrationales et per potentiam nihil aliud 
intelligo quam intellectum sive fuerit nudus solus vel purus. Et dicitur “potentiæ 
cognitivæ” et non “intellectivæ” ad significandum quod aliquid repræsentatur 
brutis quod sic declaratur: canis in aula a consuetudine vocatur “Sortes”, audita 
hac voce “Sortes” movetur et non nisi quia ei aliquid significatur per hanc vocem  
“Sortes”.
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imposition is always excluded from natural signification as 
is obvious from the term “being”, but in this way, that 
granted that there had not been an imposition none the less 
it might signify that thing.... To signify “at pleasure” is to 
represent by imposition or by custom, for example, this 
term “man” signifying m e n . 87
Earlier in his Termini Mair wrote that a “mental term is a concept 
of the mind or a modification o f the mind signifying naturally and it is 
sometimes called an act o f understanding, an apprehensive notion o f  the 
thing, a vital transformation, an effigy, a likeness, a c o g n i t i o n . ”88 In 
contrast, spoken and written terms, are conventional signs that are 
imposed to represent a mental concept. Natural signs are prior to 
conventional ones: there must be an apprehensive notion in place before 
a sign can be imposed to represent the concept. Conventional signs, 
though they are imposed to represent natural signs, do not have the same 
meaning as natural signs. The difference between the meaning o f  
natural and conventional signs originates in their different ontological 
status. Natural terms qua  mental terms are cogn itive acts; but 
conventional signs, either spoken terms or written, are not acts o f  
understanding; rather, they are physical objects that are instituted in 
order to permit the communication o f  concepts. Mental terms once 
established cannot alter; but conventional signs, because they are 
arbitrarily imposed to refer to a concept can change their signification.
The terms "gladius"  and "ensis" are conventional signs imposed to
87 Mair. Termini, [jzg. a gva-vbj Significare natural iter est ex natura rei 
quacumque im positione remota repræsentare non ad hunc sensum quod a 
significatione natural i semper impositio excludatur ut patet de ter mi no “ens”, sed 
sic scilicet quod dato quod non esset impositio non minus illud significaret... 
Significare ad placitum est ex impositione vel consuetudine repræsentare ut iste 
terminus “homo” in significando homines.
88 Mair. Termini, [sig. a 2^%]. Terminus mentalis est conceptus animæ vel passio 
naturaliter significans et vocatur nonnumquam actus intelligendi, notitia  
apprehensiva rei, vitalis immutatio, effigies, simulachrum, cognitio.
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signify the same mental concept, i.e., a sword; but they could equally 
have been imposed to signify something else, for example, a shield.
M ATERIAL AND PERSONAL SUPPOSITION— DISTINGUISHING  
NON-ULTIM ATE AND ULTIMATE TERMS
The second m ost important doctrine in the late-m edieval 
discussions o f meaning and truth is supposition. Supposition is a 
restricted kind o f signification and a term supposits only when it is 
placed in the context o f a proposition. Mair begins his discussion o f  
supposition in De Suppositionibus the following way:
supposition is a term in a proposition that is verifiable o f a 
demonstrative pronoun or a noun signifying the thing which 
it signifies by means o f a copula o f the proposition in which 
the term is posited or by means o f a similar [copula] in 
which the terms are similarly accepted as regards their 
logical properties.... It is said “verifiable of a demonstrative 
pronoun” because when it is doubted whether a term 
supposits we may see the object which [the term] signifies 
by positing the pronoun that stands for the [noun-]subject (a 
parte  subiecti) and if the proposition in which the given  
term is predicated by means o f the pronoun is true [then] 
such a term supposits.89
Having explained the general character o f supposition Mair 
explains that a distinction should be made between terms that have 
material supposition and terms that have personal supposition. This is 
most helpfully introduced in terms o f the distinction between ultimate 
and non-ultimate supposition. He writes:
89 Mair. Parva Logicalia: Tractatus de suppositionibus  in In P etri H yspani 
summulas, [5 /^. dd gra-rbj Suppositio est terminus in propositione existens 
verificabilis de pronomine demonstrante vel nomine significante rem quam  
significat mediante copula propositionis in qua ponitur terminus vel mediante una 
simili in qua termini similiter accipiuntur quantum ad proprietates logicales. 
Dicitur “verificabilis de pronomine demonstrante” quia quando dubitatur de 
aliquo termino an supponat videamus rem quam significat ponendo pronomen a 
parte subiecti et si propositio sit vera in qua prædicatur terminus datus de 
pronomine talis terminus supponit.
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Personal supposition is the supposition o f a term for its 
ultim ate significate ordered (in ordine)  to an ultimate 
concept.... Material supposition is the supposition of a term 
for its non-ultimate significate according to a non-ultimate
concept.90
In his Termini Mair states that “a concept is said to be non-ultimate 
on account o f the fact that it is a natural likeness o f a distinct term.”9i 
Thus, the written terms gladius  and ensis are different with respect to 
non-ultimate signification because they are spelled differently. The non- 
ultimate concept o f  gladius  is the apprehension o f "gladius” qua written 
term with a given material composition; "ensis” gives rise to a different 
non-ultimate concept, that is, "ensis”. They have different material 
supposition. In short, in the context o f a proposition when a term is 
understood according to its material supposition then the predicate refers 
to the subject as it occurs in that proposition without any reference to 
what the subject really means, that is, the subject taken according to its 
ultimate signification.92 In a certain way it is possible to claim that
96 Mair. Tractatus de suppositionibus, [sig. ee Suppositio personalis est
suppositio termini pro suo sign ificato ultim ato in ordine ad conceptum  
ultimatum. Hoc clare dicitur. Duo requiruntur ad hoc quod terminus supponat 
personaliter. Primum quod pro suo significato ultimato accipiatur. Secundum  
est quod terminus secundum talem significationem  secundum quam capitur 
subordinetur conceptui ultimato... Suppositio materialis est suppositio termini 
pro suo significato non ultimato secundum conceptum non ultimatum. Ponere 
suppositionem  sim plicem  in via nominalium est solum multiplicare verba. 
Omnis suppositio est personalis vel materialis. Si libeat loqui cum loquentibus 
suppositio simplex est quando terminus qui non est conceptus ultimatus supponit 
pro conceptu qui non ultimate significat.
Mair. Termini, [5 /g. a V^b] Conceptus dicitur non ultimatus eo quod est 
naturalis similitudo termini distincti.
92 Walter Burleigh (b. 1275—d. 1345?) offers an interesting and different account 
regarding the material supposition of syncategorematic terms. He writes that in a 
proposition such as “Omnis est syncategorema syncategorematice acceptum", 
quod hæc est vera secundum quod “om nis” tenetur material iter et per modum  
categorematis; supponit tamen pro seipso syncategorematice accepto, et ideo est 
vera, quamvis prædicatum non insit ei quod supponit prout hie supponit. Sufficit 
enim ad veritatem huius affirmativæ, quod prædicatum insit ei pro quo supponit; 
et hoc est verum, quia certum est quod “om nis” in aliqua propositione est 
syncategorema syncategorematice acceptum. Briefly, the suggestion is that in 
the above proposition the term “omnis” supposits for equiform ocurrences of the 
word in other propositions e.g. “Omnis homo est rationalis”. “Omnis” in the 
original proposition supposits materially and can functions categorematically.
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material supposition treats the subject as non-significative because, in 
the context o f that proposition, it is not signifying that w hich it 
customarily signifies. In contrast, one can say that gladius  and ensis 
have the same ultimate signification , that is, the same personal 
supposition, because after each term has been apprehended qua term the 
mind progresses until it reaches the concept o f that which the term was 
imposed to signify which in each case is the same. Mair explains in the 
follow ing way:
A concept is called ultimate since it is regularly a later 
concept which we have o f a term. The term itself causes 
two concepts. For example, having grasped the term “king” 
it generates efficiently in the hearer at first a concept o f this 
utterance “king” and afterwards a concept o f the significate 
o f  “k in g”. And granted that both are produced  
instantaneously, nevertheless, the non-ultimate concept is, 
at any rate, prior in nature, and is presupposed in time or in 
nature by the ultimate concept provided that the ultimate 
concept is caused by the term: but not vice versa, when the 
term naturally represents a non-ultim ate concept and 
conventionally an ultimate concept. A lso  a concept is 
called ultimate since there the understanding ultim ately  
rests and a term is called non-ultimate for the opposite 
reason. For example, when the utterance anthropos  is 
grasped by a Latin speaker the mind o f the hearer does not 
rest there but progresses to the concept o f the signified thing 
as the signification is explored.93
H owever, on Burleigh’s account, in order to determine the truth o f  the 
proposition it is necessary to consider its equiformity with its occurrence in other 
propositions and hence according to both its personal or ultimate signification  
and according to its proper syncategorematic function. Walter Burleigh. De 
Puritate Artis Logicæ Tractatus Longior, with a Revised edition o f  the Tractatus 
B revior, ed. Philotheus Bœhner, (New York, 1955); [p. 6]. See also A. Broadie. 
Introduction to M edieval Logic, 2^  ^ Edition, (Oxford, 1993); [p. 31].
93 Mair. Termini, [5 /^. a 8^^]. Conceptus vocatur ultimatus quia regulariter est 
posterior conceptus quem de termino habemus. Terminus ipse duos causat 
conceptus ut capto isto termino “rex” generat efficienter in audiente primo 
conceptum huius vocis “rex”: postea conceptum rei significatæ. Et licet uterque 
instantanée producatur conceptus tamen non ultimatus est prior saltem natura et
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Briefly, a term supposits materially when it signifies itself qua term and, 
a term supposits personally when signifying that which it was imposed 
to signify.
TH E LOGIC OF TERMS APPLIED TO THE TERMS “M IND” , “INTELLECT” ,
“WILL” .
It is clear that when Mair writes that the terms “mind”, “intellect” 
and “w ill” understood significatively, that is, according to personal 
supposition, are convertible but not synonymous terms he wants to draw 
to our attention the fact that while it is possible to substitute one term for 
another in a categorical proposition salva veritate it is not the case that 
these terms are synonymous. “M ind”, “intellect”, and “w ill” do not 
signify the same thing in precisely the same way. Having grasped each 
term in its material significance one is led to a different ultimate 
concept. For exam ple, “intellect” leads one to think o f  the mind 
engaged in an act o f understanding and “w ill” prompts one to consider 
the mind engaged in act o f choosing. Thus, the terms are imposed to 
signify different modes o f act o f the simple substance called “mind”.
When the terms have been understood significatively there is nothing 
that can be said about the intellect without the same being said about the 
will. They are not synonymous because “w ill” and “intellect” refer to 
mind exercising different powers. They are not interchangeable in all 
respects; but they are convertible, because what is said about one power 
can be said, and indeed must be said, o f the other since “intellect” and 
“w ill” refer to the “mind” which is really and truly one and the same
præsuppositus tempore vel natura conceptu ultimato dummodo conceptus 
ultimatus causetur a termino: sed non econverso cum terminus conceptum non 
ultimatum naturaliter repræsentat ultimatum vero ad placitum. Etiam dicitur 
conceptus ultimatus quia ibi intellectus ultimo quiescit et non ultimatus opposito 
modo dicitur: ut prolata hac voce “anthropos” coram Latino apprehensa voce  
animus auditoris non quiescit sed in conceptum rei significatæ cum discursu 
significationis progreditur.
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thing as its powers. The terms “mind”, “intellect” and “w ill” are 
verifiable o f one another.
It is obvious that Mair’s rejection of Scotus’ formal distinction is at 
least partially based on the allegation that the denial o f the existence o f a 
formal distinction in respect o f  the essence o f  mind and its powers 
implies that the terms “mind”, “intellect”, and “w ill” are synonymous 
terms. Once again, synonymous terms are terms that signify the same 
thing in an adequate way or signify in the same way. Unlike the 
contention o f Scotus from the fo llow in g  premises: “This intellect 
understands. This intellect is a w ill.” Mair does not think that he is 
forced to conclude: “Therefore, a will understands.” because this implies 
that the will is a principle o f understanding which is denied.
TH E NOMINALIST SOLUTION
The only distinction between the mind and its powers is one o f  
reason and in the connotation o f terms. It was stated earlier that Mair 
thought “intellect” (intellectus) in an oblique case connotes an act o f  
understanding (actus intelligendi) and similarly that “w ill” (voluntas) in 
an oblique case connotes an act o f willing (actus volendi). He is careful 
to draw our attention to the fact that “properly speaking it is not objects 
that are posited in a category, rather, it is terms by reason of their mode 
of signifying an object in either an absolute or connotative manner that 
are placed in a specific category.”94 It is obvious by now that “mind” 
properly belongs to the category o f substance and while it is plausible to 
speak o f the mind as having parts we should not forget that this is a 
linguistic im position which does not necessarily portray the true
94 Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; [fol. 9 6 *’b-va] Tertio potentiæ animæ sunt in 
prædicamento qualitatis. Ergo sunt accidentia... Ad Tertium dicitur proprie res 
non ponuntur in prædicamento sed vocabula ratione modorum signifieandi 
absolute vel connotative. Non inconvenit aliquid poni in omnibus prædicamentis 
tamquam rem signifieatam.
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metaphysics o f mind. The division o f categorematic terms into absolute 
and connotative terms is o f great importance and is given a prominent 
position in the discussion o f terms by Mair and his colleagues. It is this 
division which serves as the basis for the distinction between a real 
definition (definitio quid rei ) and a nominal definition (definitio quid  
nominis). Briefly stated a real definition is one which expresses the 
nature o f an object without implying anything extrinsic to the object and 
explains both what the object is (quae est) and what kind o f object it is 
(qualis est res). In the opposite way a nominal definition explains what 
is signified by the term without touching on the essential nature o f the 
object being defined.95 
“INTELLECT” AND “WILL” — ABSOLUTE AND CONNOTATIVE TERMS
Cranston in his additions to Mair’s Termini begins his discussion o f  
absolute and connotative terms with this definition;
an absolute term is one which neither implies, nor might 
im ply, anything beyond the material sign ificate; nor 
[im plies, nor might imply] the material sign ificate as 
existing in some way (aliqualiter) granted that [the term] 
had a material significate according to which it is absolute.
In the position here laid down I understand by “material 
significate” the significate for which the term is fitted by 
nature to supposit without ampliation, etc. but if not so 
fitted by nature [to supposit] except by ampliation then the 
material significate is known according to the term placed 
first in its defmition.96
95 John Mair. Præ dicabilia  in In P etri H yspani summulas, (Lyons, 1505); 
[5 /^. r 4 vb] Duplex est definitio: quædam quid rei alia quid nominis. Et vocatur 
quid rei quia explicat quæ res est et qualis est res explicata per definitum. Alia 
est quid nominis et est definitio explicans quid per nomen significatur non 
curando quæ res est et qualis sit quæ definitur et hie capitur nominis ut tantum 
valet sicut termini.
96 Mair. Termini, c 5^^ ]. Terminus absolutus est qui nihil ultra materiale 
significatum nec aliqualiter illud importât nec importaret esto quod significatum  
materiale haberet secundum quod absolutus est. Per “materiale significatum” in 
proposito intelligo significatum  pro quo terminus natus est supponere non
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Absolute terms refer to a determinate group o f individuals, that is, a 
term that signifies absolutely can be predicated o f any individual without 
further qualification and does not signify one thing directly and another 
thing indirectly or obliquely. The material significate o f a term was 
contrasted with the formal significate o f a term. The formal significate 
identifies a common or universal nature and the material significate is 
that to which the com mon nature belongs. Though late-m edieval 
nominalist logicians, like Mair and Cranston, shunned the use o f an 
expression such as “common nature” or “universal nature” ; they made 
the same distinction by differentiating between whiteness and those 
things that are white.97 The material significate o f an absolute term is 
that for which the term is naturally fitted to supposit; it is the significate 
of the term considered according to its ultimate signification. In the case 
o f absolute terms the formal significate determines a unique range o f  
material significates. This is clarified in the follow ing way: the term 
"homo” is an absolute term which formally signifies all things that have 
a human nature and neither signifies anything beyond the group o f  
material significates nor signifies the material significates as existing in 
some way.
In contrast “a connotative term im plies something beyond the 
material significate or denotes the material significate as existing in 
some way.”98 The indirect or the implied significate, was also known as
ampliatus etc., vel si non sit natus nisi per ampliationem significatum materiale 
cognoscitur penes terminum positum primo loco suæ definitionis. See also  
David Cranston. Tractatus Terminorum, [5 /^. b 2^^]. Terminus absolutus est 
ille qui ultra significatum non dénotât ipsum materiale aliqualiter se habere ut 
sunt isti termni “homo”, “animal”, “asinus”.
E. J. Ashworth. Language and L ogic in the P ost-M edieva l Period, 
(Dordrecht, 1974); [p. 92].
98 Mair. Termini, [jzg. c 6^^ ] Terminus connotativus est terminus qui ultra 
materiale significatum  aliquid importât vel ipsum materiale significatum  
aliqualiter se habere dénotât. Prima pars probatur propter tales terminos 
“calidum”, “album”; secunda, propter istos “pedale” et “currens”.
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the connoted. The first part o f the definition is obvious from the 
following example: one cannot apprehend the term “hot” without calling 
to mind something in which heat inheres. Hence while “hot” materially 
signifies hot things it formally connotes the quality o f heat. In the same 
way, the term “white” materially signifies something that is “white” and 
formally signifies the quality o f white. It was obvious to Mair, perhaps 
less obvious to us, that “w hite” signifies white things directly and 
indirectly signifies whiteness. The formal significate o f a connotative 
term does not necessarily determine a unique group o f individuals; as a 
result, a connotative term can be predicated over a range o f different 
material significates that share a com mon feature.99 This may be 
helpfully illustrated as follow s: the connotative term “red” may be 
applicable to flowers, trees and birds. The second part o f this definition 
is demonstrated by terms such as “walking” and “running” which denote 
both that something exists and that it exists in some way. For instance, 
the term “walking” not only materially signifies all things of which it is 
true to say “This is walking” but also implies that what is being referred 
exists in some way.
The importance o f the division o f absolute and connotative terms 
for our discussion is highlighted in Hector B oece’s extremely interesting 
and detailed exposition o f the division:
An absolute term is a term signifying something or some 
things according to a quidditative description (sub ratione 
quidditativa) and in its stricter description no oblique term 
is posited. A connotative term is a term signifying  
something or some things not according to a quidditative 
description and in its stricter description an oblique term is 
posited and sometimes several oblique terms by which its 
formal significate is expressed. M oreover, the formal
99 E. J. Ashworth. Language and Logic in the Post-M edieval Period, [p. 92].
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significate is that by which a term is said to be absolute or 
connotative. A lso the formal significate is that by which a 
term is posited in a category because in respect o f absolute 
terms [the formal significate] is not distinct from the 
material significate. Sometimes, in the case o f connotative 
terms [the formal significate] is distinct [from the material 
significate], for exam ple, either by im plying accidental 
forms or by implying an essential part. Som etim es, [the 
form al sign ificate] is not d istinct from  the material 
significate, for example, in the case o f  these [terms] which 
imply an accidental mode because o f the formal significate.
In respect o f connotative terms, [the formal significate] is 
called, the connoted. But, the material significate is that 
which the term signifies in the nominative case for which it 
is accepted when it supposits in a proposition. Hence 
“according to a quidditative description” is that according to 
which something is considered a thing, as the being it is, not 
having a relation to the parts out o f which it is com posed  
whether to an accident or to any essential or accidental 
mode o f existing. “N ot according to a quidditative  
description” is that description according to which a thing is 
considered by the intellect to have a part or to have parts, to 
have an accident or to have accidents an accidental or 
essential mode o f existing or inasmuch as it lacks some 
accident or som e mode o f  existing. For exam ple, the 
description by which something is considered a “man” in so 
far as he is a “man” without having a relation to anything 
else is absolute and quidditative. And a term signifying a 
man according to that description is an absolute [term] but 
the description according to which a “man” is considered 
such as “white” or “black”, “sitting” or “standing”, “poor”
or “rich”, is non—quidditative. 160
6^6 Boece. Explicatio, [fol. 2^4-vb] Terminus absolutus est terminus significans 
aliquid vel aliqua sub ratione quidditativa et in eius definitione magis propria 
nullus ponitur obliquus. Terminus connotativus est terminus significans aliquid 
vel aliqua non sub ratione quidditativa et in definitione eius magis propria 
ponitur obliquus et nonnunquam plures obliqui qui bus exprimitur formale eius 
significatum. Est autem formale significatum id a quo terminus dicitur absolutus 
vel connotativus a quo etiam ponitur terminus in prædicamento quod in terminis 
absolutis non distinguitur a materiali significato. In connotativis aliquando
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Boece, as was commonplace, distinguished between absolute and 
connotative terms on the basis o f the material and formal significate. He 
states that whether a given term should be classed as absolute or 
connotative depends on the nature o f  the distinction betw een the 
material and formal significate of the term. A  quidditative description is 
a description which considers a being qua  being (ens in quantum ens).
In the case o f absolute terms such as “man”, the description according to 
which it is possible truly to predicate the term “man” o f  “all things 
sharing human nature” without reference to any particular determination 
or circumstance is the quidditative description. It is according to this 
description that man is considered qua man; for example, in all cases 
where it is possible to point to something and say: “This is a man” when 
what is meant is that the object is represented by the formal significate, 
that is, human nature. On B oece’s account o f  absolute terms it is not 
possib le to distinguish the material sign ificate  from the formal 
significate. The material significate o f the term is all things that share 
human nature and the formal significate o f the term "homo" is the mode 
o f existence o f the material significate, which in this case is homo qua 
homo. The account o f the distinctions to be drawn with regard to the 
formal and material significates in respect o f connotative terms is a good 
deal more complicated. Boece explains that in respect o f connotative
distinguitur ut in importantibus formas accidentales vel partem essentialem: 
aliquando non distinguitur a materiali ut in his qui important accidentalem  
modum de formali et vocatur in terminis connotativis connotatum. Est autem 
materiale significatum id quod terminus significat in recto pro quo accipitur in 
propositione quando supponit. Unde ratio quidditativa est secundum quam 
consideratur res ut ens est non habendo respectum ad partes ex quibus 
componitur vel ad accidens vel ad aliquem modum se habendi essentialem  vel 
accidentalem. Ratio non quidditativa est ratio secundum quam consideratur res 
ab intellectu prout habet partem vel partes accidens vel accidentia modum  
accidentalem vel essentialem se habendi vel prout caruerit accidente aliquo vel 
aliquo modo se habendi. Ut ratio qua consideratur homo inquantum est homo 
non habendo respectum ad aliud est absoluta et quidditativa. Et terminus 
significans hominem sub ea ratione est absolutus sed ratio qua consideratur homo 
prout est “albus” vel “niger”, “sedens” vel “stans”, aut “d ives” est non 
quidditativa.
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terms som e terms are intrinsically and other terms extrinsically  
connotative. He elaborates on the distinction in the follow ing way:
an intrinsically connotative term is a term connoting  
adequately an essential part o f the thing for which it is apt 
by nature to supposit or adequately connoting that the thing 
exists in an essential mode. For exam ple, “rational” 
formally connotes a rational soul as part o f a human being.
“O f stone” supposits for the thing while connoting that the 
th ing is sub stan tia lly  and e sse n tia lly  a s to n e ....
“Adequately” because though this term “part” im plies an 
essential part o f a thing since it signifies all parts formally, 
it nevertheless does not connote adequately an essential 
part; and the same sort o f thing should be said concerning 
these terms “divided”, “having parts” and the like. An 
extrinsically  connotative term is a term im plying an 
accident as the formal significate by means o f a term 
adjacent [i.e., not separated by a copula] or not to that for 
which it [the term] is fitted by nature to supposit; or [an 
extrinsically connotative term is a term implying] som e 
accidental mode o f existing. For exam ple, “w h ite”,
“black”, “sitting”, “standing”, “poor”, “rich” so on.^^i
The formal sign ificate o f  an intrinsically connotative term
adequately captures the essential mode o f  existing o f an object but
unlike an absolute term the material and formal significate can be
distinguished. For example, the term “rational” implies “rational soul”
which may be formally and essentially predicated o f the term “human
6^1 Boece. Explicatio, \foL 3^^], Terminus connotativus intrinsece est terminus 
connotans adæquate partem essentialem  rei pro qua natus est supponere vel 
ipsam rem essentiali modo se haberi; ut “rationale” connotat de formali animam 
rationalem prout est pars hominis: “lapideum” supponit pro re connotando eam  
substantialiter et essentialiter esse lapidem. Pari modo dicendum est de his 
terminis “materiatum” “ferreum” “angelicum ” et sim ilibus. Dicitur hie 
“adæquate” quia hie terminus “pars” licet importât partem essentialem rei quia 
omnes partes significat de formali tamen non connotat adæquate partem 
essentialem. Et similiter dicendum est de his terminis “partitum”, “habens 
partes” et similibus. Terminus connotativus extrinsece est terminus importans de 
formali significato accidens per modum adiacentis vel non adiacentis illi pro quo 
natus est supponere vel aliquomodo accidentali se habere: ut “album”, “nigrum”, 
“sedens”, “stans”, “pauper”, “dives”, et huiusmodi.
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being”. In the opposite way, an extrinsically connotative term does not 
formally refer to an essential mode o f existing but refers only to some 
accidental mode o f existence. Consider the extrinsically connotative 
term “sitting” (sedens)  in the proposition: "homo est sedens". An 
accidental mode o f existence is implied in respect o f the absolute term 
“homo”. The formal significate “sitting” is not essential to the nature of  
man. U nlike the intrinsically connotative term “rational”, w hich  
connotes a material significate distinct from the formal significate; the 
extrinsically connotative term connotes as its material significate  
something sitting which can be applied to an indeterminate group o f  
things that share the attribute “sitting”.
This is an interesting account but it will be helpful to present Mair’s 
account o f the same division as given in the Praedicabilia:
...To connote intrinsically is to connote d istinctly an 
essential part o f the thing for which it supposits if  it 
supposits im plying nothing extraneous, for exam ple,
“rational” supposits for “man” while connoting a rational 
soul which is an essential part o f the thing for which it 
supposits. “If it supposits” because granted that no man 
existed this term “rational” w ill none the less connote  
intrinsically. “Extraneous”, is said advisedly, because if the 
term “a” were to supposit for “man” while connoting that 
which has a rational soul fitted to be in motion or to 
understand it would not connote w holly intrinsically but 
sim ply extrinsically .... To connote extrinsically is to 
connote something extrinsic in relation to the thing for 
which [the term] supposits if  it supposits or to connote that 
something exists in a way or not exists in a way which is 
not essential to the thing for which the term is accepted.
Briefly, as often as a term connotes and not distinctly an 
essential part o f a thing for which it is accepted either it 
signifies the same thing in an oblique case which it signifies 
in the nominative case, or, if not, it connotes extrinsically....
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Briefly, to connote extrinsically is to connote something
which is not an essential part o f the object for which it is
accepted. 162
It is beyond doubt, according to Mair and B oece, that it is 
completely improper to think that to construe the mind as having parts is 
anything more than an imposition o f reason. This is affirmed in the 
following corollary given by Boece: “Every term signifying a substance 
according to a description by which it contains parts or contains an 
accident or has an accidental or essential mode o f  ex istin g  is 
connotative.”163 M oreover the terms “intellect” and “w ill”, on all 
accounts, are extrinsically connotative. The description by which the 
mind is said to have parts in no way implies that these parts are either 
essential to the substance o f mind or integral to the substance o f mind.
There is absolutely no distinction between the mind and its powers or 
between the powers themselves. The terms “intellect” and “w ill” name 
the same simple and indivisible substance: “This mind is an intellect.
And this mind is a will. Therefore an intellect is a w ill.” Y et w e do 
speak about the mind as the ability to perform different kinds o f acts.
Even our definitions betray us: the definition o f “intellect” as a power o f  
understanding excludes the definition o f  “w ill” as a power o f willing.
162 Mair. Prædicabilia, [5'/ .^ q 6^t»-vaj ...connotare intrinsece est connotare 
partem essentialem  distincte rei pro qua supponit si supponat nihil extranei 
implicando ut “rationale” supponit pro homine connotando animam rationalem  
quæ est pars essentialis rei pro qua supponit. Et dicitur “si supponat” quia dato 
quod omnis homo non esset iste terminus “rationale” non minus intrinsece 
connotabit. Et dicitur notanter “extranei” quia si ly “a” supponeret pro homine 
connotando quod habeat animam rationalem aptam moveri vel intelligere non 
connotaret omnino intrinsece sed simpliciter extrinsece... Connotare extrinsece 
est connotare aliquod extrinsecum respectu rei pro qua supponit si supponat, aut 
connotare aliqualiter esse vel non esse qualiter non est essentiale illius rei pro qua 
accipitur. Et breviter quotienscumque terminus connotat et non distincte partem 
essentialem rei pro qua accipitur sive significet idem in obliquo quod significet in 
recto sive non tunc extrinsece connotat... Sed connotare extrinsece breviter est 
connotare aliquid quod non est pars essentialis pro qua accipitur.
163 Boece. Explicatio, \fol. Tertium corollarium. Omnis terminus
significans substantiam sub ratione qua habet partes vel accidens vel 
accidentalem vel essentialem modum se habendi est connotativus.
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But this is far from being incompatible with claiming that the powers of 
the mind cannot really be distinguished. When we use the terms we 
sim ply signify what is really the same cognitive power. In a very 
definite way the terms “intellect” and “w ill” signify the same substance.
But “intellect” connotes the ability o f the mind to be engaged in a 
naturally caused cognitive act, that is, an act o f understanding and “will” 
connotes the ability o f the mind to engage in a freely caused cognitive 
act, that is, an act o f will; but both terms signify the same simple and 
indivisible cognitive power. In other words, while the terms “intellect” 
and “w ill” refer to different modes o f operation and to that extent can be 
said to have different formal significates they share the same material 
significate, which is named by the term “mind”. A ll o f  the above 
distinctions betw een “in tellect” and “w ill” are purely nom inal. 
“Intellect” and “w ill” do not refer to things that are distinct in the thing 
as such (a parte rei). They are distinct only as “beings” o f reason (entia 
rationis), they have a purely mental existence as “mental entities”. 
“Intellect” and “w ill” are only partially significative o f the m ind’s 
essence. But “mind” lacks partial connotation, that is, one cannot think 
o f the mind without conceiving o f mind as an intellective, volitive, 
simple substance. “Intellect” and “w ill” are nom inally defined; as a 
result all the terms which occur in their definition are connotative. They 
render explicit and clarify that which is only indistinctly signified by that 
which is being defined (definitum) . I t  is knowledge by description as 
opposed to knowledge by direct cognitive experience.
164 Mair. Prædicabilia, r 5^^]. Definitio quid nominis solum est terminorum 
connotativorum et proprie terminorum non potentium supponere mediante hoc 
verbo “potest”: et definitum et definitio in talibus subordinantur eidem conceptui. 
Et vocatur ideo definitio quia explicite et distincte déclarât quid per definitum  
indistincte significatur.
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TH E MIND HAS PARTS BY EXTRINSIC DENOMINATION
There is a basic friction as regards the way we experience and 
understand the substance we call “mind” and the true metaphysical 
nature o f  mind. This tension between the way w e know things and the 
way things are is re-emphasized when Mair writes that the mind is said 
to have parts not because there is some real com posite to which the 
terms “intellect” and “w ill” refer, but only by way o f analogy. W hile we 
may describe the mind as a com plex structure having parts; these 
descriptive parts do not refer to an intrinsic or essential structure o f the 
mind. The mind is really a simple substance and is said truly to have 
parts only “subjectively by extrinsic and accidental denom ination” 
(subiective denominatione extrinseca et accidentali)
105 Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. \ \\fo l. 97**^ ]. Secundo arguitur tertio A/zzma. 
Intellectus et voluntas dicuntur partes animæ sed pars non identificatur cum suo 
toto. Igitur. Respondetur distinguendo quod sunt partes animæ vel partes 
essentiales vel intégrales. Et sic negatur. Tales enim partes non habet anima 
sicut dicitur in de Spiritu et Anima capitulo octavo: Tota animæ essentia in suis 
potentiis eonsistit nee per partes dividitur cum sit simplex substantia et individua. 
Et si aliquando partes habere dicatur ratione potius similitudinis quam veritate 
compositionis intelligendum est. Simplex substantia est anima. Vel quod sunt 
partes similitudinarie et quodammodo subiective denominatione extrinseca et 
accidentali. Et sic concedo. Aliqui termini in sua connotatione important unum 
officium  animæ et aliqui aliud offieium  de quibus anima indirecte tanquam 
minus connotativum [sed generalius officium  habens] denominative prædicatur. 
Propterea res importatæ cum tota connotatione quodammodo dicuntur partes 
animæ. Intellectus potentiam connotat ad intelligendum. Ecce unum officium  
animæ. Voluntas habet aliam connotationem in qua aliud animæ officium  
connotatur. Memoria significat animam potentem memorari. Et sic de aliis. 
Terminus “anima” non habet talem connotationem partialem. Et sic quia isti 
termini important unam partem significationis animæ dicuntur partes animæ 
importare. Some phrases in this passage are quite opaque in an effort to clarify 
the diffieulties I first consulted a later edition of the In secundum Sententiarum, 
(Paris, 1528) to which the phrase “sed generalius officium habens” is added to 
the text. Despite this emendation the text remains obscure. One possible reading 
for the most troubling passage which begins:A%z<z termini in sua... and ends 
with ...prædicatur might be: “Some terms in their connotation imply one function 
of the mind and other terms imply another function by which terms the mind is 
indirectly and denominatively predicated as if [the term mind] is less connotative 
but has a more general function.” The implication may be while “mind” signifies 
a cognitive power it is not as explicit as the terms “intellect” and “w ill” which 
connote specific capacities o f the o f mind and hence the term “mind” is in a 
sense less connotative but has a more diverse range of cognitive functions. I 
consulted the 1510 edition o f In secundum dl fo l. 35^4-rb The text is very 
unlike later editions but it provides the following to support my interpretation.
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The topic o f extrinsic denomination was standardly invoked when 
discussing the relationship o f an act o f assent or dissent to the truth- 
value o f a proposition (propositio). W hile there was no hesitation 
among any o f the members o f Mair’s circle in assigning a truth-value to 
a judgment it was agreed that a judgment could not be true in the same 
way that a proposition could be true. An act o f  assent, unlike a 
proposition which has an identifiable structure, is simple and without 
com plexity. George Lokert writes that “judicative notion is said to be 
true or false by extrinsic denomination since it corresponds to a true or 
false p r o p o s i t i o n ”  1^ 6 The relationship is between act and object: the act 
o f  assenting is said to be true because its object is a true proposition 
which is the appropriate bearer o f a truth-value. The truth o f a judgment 
is vicarious.
In a similar way we can only say that the mind has parts by 
extrinsic denomination. In the same way that it is inappropriate to 
attribute com plexity to an act o f assent, it is improper to say that the 
mind is really something com plex. The com plexity o f  the mind is 
derivative from the various propositions used to describe it. The mind is 
only indirectly and denominatively predicated o f the terms “intellect” 
and “w ill”. It is only in this sense that it is appropriate to say that the 
powers of the mind are accidental to the substance o f the mind which is 
m etaphysically simple. This is parallel to the claim  that the terms
Quod potentiæ dicuntur ebullire ab anima et eius partes quia aliquid importatur 
per potentiam quod non evacuat totum ambitum animæ. Intellectus connotat 
actum intelligendi et supponit pro essentia animæ, voluntas pro eadem  
connominando aliam operationem scilicet velle. Sic de memoria dicatur. 
Terminus anima hæc non connotat sed omnia ilia indeterminate significat quare 
cum alii termini partiales operationes animæ important partes eius dicuntur vel 
dicuntur par [te] s in modo ad suum totum. Quando commentator dicit potentiæ 
ebulliunt ab essentia animæ capite potentias pro actibus illicitis potentiarum.
9^6 George Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [5'zg. e 8^^] Notitia iudicativa 
dicitur vera vel falsa denominatione extrinseca quia respondet propositioni veræ 
vel falsæ.
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“intellect” and “w ill” are extrinsically connotative terms. The terms 
“intellect” and “w ill” do not refer to things that are intrinsically different 
from one another. Unlike the terms “intellect” and “w ill” the term 
“mind” does not have partial connotation. One cannot conceive o f the 
mind without at the same time conceiving o f the intellect and the will.
The idea that the mind is not one and the same with the powers o f  
intellect and the will is simply incomprehensible as Mair understands the 
nature o f mind. Thus “intellect” and “w ill” are said to be parts o f the 
mind only because they imply one part o f  the true signification o f the 
term “mind” as a dynamic cognitive power. They are distinct qua  
functions o f the mind but they are not distinct qua the metaphysical 
nature o f the mind. It is not com pletely inappropriate to describe the 
mind as having parts but it must be recognized that such a description 
does not portray the true nature o f  mind. The description is 
representative o f the mind only by way o f analogy and is not evidence o f  
a true metaphysical structure o f the mind.
S e n s i t i v e  a n d  a p p e t i t i v e  p o w e r s  a r e  r e a l l y  d i s t i n c t
W hile there is no real distinction to be made between the mind and 
the powers o f intellect and will the same is not true for the sensitive and 
the appetitive powers. Mair writes:
The organic powers o f the mind, the sensitive as well as the 
appetitive powers, are really distinct from the mind. This is 
obvious in regard to a sense or in regard a power, the 
verdict is the same in regard to all these powers. Sense is 
not intellect ( I am speaking about the senses in a human 
being). Therefore. The assum ption is obvious. Any  
sensation w hatsoever is extended. N o intellection is 
extended. Therefore, they have different subjects o f which 
one is divisible and extended and the other unextended. If 
sensation is not extended then this conclusion follows: the
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mind can have two intuitive notions o f distinct kinds at one 
and the same time in respect o f the same object. This is
inconsistent. 107
The distinction  between the intellect and the sensitive and 
appetitive powers is both obvious and necessary.
W e now see by what convention intellect, w ill, and memory 
are really to be identified with the mind and, as a result, 
with each other. W hatsoever things are identical with a 
third are identical with each other. However, the senses are 
to be distinguished from the mind as a w hole is to be 
distinguished from  its parts and the senses are really 
distinct. This is obvious. Though they have the same mind 
inasmuch as it is a principal part nevertheless there are 
different parts and dispositions required for each o f the 
senses. They are nevertheless essentially homogeneous as a 
group and accidentally heterogeneous and o f a different 
description. And though sense (sensus) is entitatively more 
perfect than the intellect since it contains the intellect and 
something e lse  as w ell, nevertheless the intellect is more 
perfect than sense. W hatsoever sense is able to sense the 
intellect is able to understand that same thing. The sense is 
only able to sense the sensible. The intellect understands 
every sensible and together with it indivisibles which are in 
no way the objects o f sense,
Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; [fol. 95vb] Quarta conclusio. Potentiæ 
animæ organicæ tarn sensitivæ quam appetitivæ realiter distinguuntur ab anima. 
Patet de sensu vel de una potentia; idem est iudicium in omnibus. Sensus non est 
intellectus et loquor de sensu hominis. Igitur. Assumptum patet. Sensatio 
quælibet est extensa. Intellectio nulla est extensa. Ergo habent varia subiecta 
quorum unum est divisibile et extensum et aliud inextensum. Si sensatio sit non 
extensa sequitur hæc conclusio quod anima potest habere duas notitias intuitivas 
specie distinctas simul et semel de eodem obiecto quod est inconveniens.
108 Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; {fol. Nunc videmus quonam pacto
intellectus, voluntas et memoria realiter cum anima identificantur et per 
consequens identificantur inter se. Quicumque identificantur uni tertio 
identificantur inter se. Sensus tamen ab anima distinguuntur tamquam totum a 
parte et sensus realiter distinguuntur. Patet. Licet habeant eamdem animam  
tamquam partem principalem, tamen sunt aliæ partes et dispositiones requisitæ 
ad singulos sensus; sunt tamen homogeneæ essentialiter inter se hethrogeneæ et 
alterius rationis accidentaliter. Et licet sensus entitative sit perfectior intellectu 
quia intellectum continet et cum hoc aliquid aliud tamen intellectus est perfectior 
quam sensus. Quicquid sensus sentire potest id idem intellectus intelligere
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The senses, or sensitive powers, were com m only taken to be a pre­
condition for the appetitive powers which are nothing other than 
inclinations towards an object based on the apprehension o f that object 
by means o f the senses. Mair continues:
Moreover, there are as many appetitive powers as there are 
cognitive powers and they are identical with them. This is 
obvious. The intellect is really the will. Therefore, in the 
same way the power o f sight is its appetitive power, and the 
power o f hearing is its appetitive power. M oreover it is 
obvious that though there are some powers that are not the 
mind, nevertheless the principal powers are to be identified 
with it. The first part is obvious: Anything whatsoever is 
able to be a power, for example, heat. Anything you like 
effectively  m oves the mind to produce a created notion 
which it has or is able to have concerning it. The second 
part [is obvious] from what has been said. And though the 
[principal] powers are identical with it; the acts o f  these
powers are distinct in kind as much from the mind as from
the powers in-them selves and among themselves. Though
the w ill is the in te llec t, vo litio n  is neverth eless
distinguished from intellection even in relation to the same 
object. And in the familiar way o f speaking we say that the 
will and the intellect are different powers o f the mind on 
account o f diverse functions and on account o f the diversity 
o f their acts. In what way the powers are distinguished by 
means of acts is obvious from the preceding question where 
it said that fire ascends, dries and heats and nevertheless 
there is one sm all fire acting by means o f  d iverse  
instruments. Though powers are distinguished by means of 
acts nevertheless there are not as many powers as there are 
acts. Otherwise, it would be necessary to multiply powers 
endlessly which is against all manner o f speaking.
potest. Sensus solum sensibile sentire potest. Omne tale intellectus intelligit et 
cum hoc impartibilia quae nullo modo sunt obiecta sensus.
Mair. In secundum, d. 16, q. 1; \Jol. 97^1 ]^. Insuper. Tot sunt potentiæ 
appetitivæ quot cognitivæ et cum ci s identificatæ. Patet. Intellectus realiter est 
voluntas. Ergo eodem modo potentia visiva est sua appetitiva et auditiva sua 
appetitiva. Amplius patet. Licet aliquæ sunt potentiæ quæ non sunt anima.
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The opening lines o f this passage are, to say the least, cryptic. The 
difficulty originates in the highly com pressed nature o f  the above  
argument. It is an argument with which the contemporaries o f  Mair 
would have been familiar. In the first instance the sentence “there are 
as many appetitive powers as there are cognitive powers and they are 
identical with them” is sim ply claim ing that sensitive cognition and 
sensitive appetite are identical. The identity o f the cognitive and 
appetitive powers is asserted in virtue o f an analogy with respect to the 
identity that Mair has argued for between the intellect and the w ill.
More importantly it is consonant with his doctrine o f the unity o f forms 
which, as we have seen, argued that there is only one substantial form  
that is for the human composite. Hence it is necessary to preserve this 
identity o f the sensitive and appetitive powers. Paradigmatically, sight
tamen potentiæ principales animæ cum ea identificantur. Prior pars patet. 
Quicquid aliquid potest esse potentia; ut calore. Res quælibet mo vet effective ad 
productionem creatæ notitiæ quæ habetur de ea vel haberi potest. Secunda pars 
ex dictis. Et licet potentiæ animæ cum ea identificentur: actus illarum  
potentiarum distinguuntur specie tam ab anima quam ab potentiis ipsis et inter se. 
Licet voluntas sit intellectus: volitio tamen specie distinguitur ab intellectione: 
etiam respectu eiusdem obiecti. Et in famato modo loquendi dicimus voluntatem  
et intellectum esse varias animæ potentias propter diversa officia  et actuum  
diversitatem. Quomodo potentiæ distinguuntur per actus patet ex questione 
precedenti (viz., d. 15, q. 2): ubi dictum est ignis ascendit, desiccat, et calefacit. 
Et tamen est unus parvus ignis mediantibus diversis instrumentis. Licet potentiæ 
per actus distinguuntur non sunt tot potentiæ quot actus, alioquin, oporteret in 
abyssum  m ultip licare  poten tias contra om nem  m odum  loq u en d i. 
Cf., Manderston. Bipartition, [sig. k4^^]. Sed ulterius quæreret aliquis an sicut 
est una et eadem anima in eodem  homine et non plures distinctæ realiter, an 
etiam sit solum unica potentia animæ et non plures distinctæ realiter in eodem  
homine. D ico pro nunc breviter usque ad libros D e Anim a  quod pure 
nominalisando in homine est solum una potentia animæ principalis et essentialis 
quæ nihil aliud est quam ipsamet anima diversa tamen nomina propter suas 
diversas operationes quas nata est exercere sed sunt multæ potentiæ animæ 
instrumentales in eodem homine realiter distinctæ, puta, tôt quot sunt sensus et 
præviæ dispositiones prærequistæ ad operationem animæ producendam.
110 While it is always a risk to identify the provenance of an argument it is almost 
certainly the case that Mair was following the lead of William of Ockham in his 
discussion of whether a diversity of operations was sufficient to infer a diversity 
of powers. It is therein that I have garnered several insights into the above 
argument. See W illiam  of Ockham [Guillelmi de Ockham]. Qiuestiones in 
Librum Secundum Sententiarum (Reportatio), eds. Gedeon Gal and Rega Wood; 
(Bonaventure, 1981): q. 20; [pp. 425 line 4  to 447 line 19].
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and hearing were said to exist subjectively in their respective appetites.
This is also true for the other external senses. W hile it is the case that 
diverse external senses are responsible for a range o f sensitive appetites 
it is not the case that one must admit diversity on the part o f a thing in 
virtue o f a diversity in the kinds o f acts. The diverse nature o f mental 
acts is not due to a diversity o f powers intrinsic to the substance o f mind.
The powers o f mind are differentiated on account o f the diverse nature 
of their objects. W hile the intellect is the will it is not the case that 
intellection is the same as volition. The intellectual grasping o f an 
object is different from freely choosing that same object. The distinction 
that is made in respect o f the powers o f intellect and will is due to their 
different kinds o f  acts.
In order to clarify this it will be useful to provide definitions o f the 
terms “intellect” and “w ill”. The intellect is the power to apprehend, to 
remember, to abstract and to judge species  that are transmitted to it and 
give rise to a notion. Qualities of the objects conveyed to the senses by 
way o f species in the medium (species in medio) naturally result in an 
act o f understanding (actus intelligendi). This implies that there is a 
correspondence between the mental term and the external object to 
which it refers. Intellectus est voluntas-The  intellect is the will. The 
will is the power to act freely in the light o f notions. Nihil volitum nisi 
-’’nothing w illed unless already known” was a popular 
phrase which Mair sometimes employed. No act is willed unless the end 
or purpose of the act is known. It is singularly important in the medieval 
conception o f free causation that one must have knowledge o f the ends 
of the action if that action is to be described as freely caused. W illiam  
Manderston writes that without any fore knowledge o f its objects the 
will is said to be blind in its operations and its counsel is the intellect. In 
this way the will neither flees nor pursues any object unless it is revealed
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by the intellect as to be pursued or to be avoided. H ence, that the 
intellect reveals to the w ill that something is to be sought or is to be 
avoided is for the intellect to have judged or at least understood that it 
should be pursued or should be a v o i d e d . I t  is simply not possible to 
develop an adequate theory o f action without providing a com plete  
theory o f knowledge. The question o f the relationship o f the powers of 
intellect and w ill to each other and their connection with to the 
information provided by the senses is intim ately linked with a 
consideration o f the relationship o f theoretical and practical knowledge 
the discussion o f which, as was stated above, will be undertaken from a 
distinctly theological perspective—“How is the pilgrim able to acquire 
faith?”.
Manderston. Bipartitum, [sig. a 2^ "^ ]. Conveniunt et differunt appetitus
sensitivus et rationalis. Conveniunt quom odo quemadmodum appetitus 
sensitivus non potest elicere actum suum sine obiecti præcognitione neque etiam  
voluntas ideo voluntas dicitur cæca in suis operationibus et eius consul est 
intellectus quomodo nullum prosequitur aut refugit obiectum nisi ostensum ab 
intellectu prosequendum aut fugiendum. Unde intellectum ostendere voluntati 
aliquid esse prosequendum aut fugiendum est iudicare illud esse prosequendum  
aut fugiendum vel saltem apprehendere.
Ch a p t e r  3
N o t io n s
INTRODUCTION
In the first chapter a detailed account o f the metaphysical nature o f  
the pilgrim was undertaken in order to provide a suitable understanding 
of the powers that enable the pilgrim to acquire the virtue o f faith. This 
starting point was justified on the grounds that the Commentary on the 
Sentences o f  P e ter  Lom bard  as a consideration o f the concept o f  
acquired relig iou s faith was osten sib ly  an exploration o f  the 
m etaphysical and epistem ological framework o f the pilgrim. The 
pilgrim as mind informing body (anima informans corpus), specifically, 
as a human com posite whose principle o f operation is the intellective 
soul (anima intellectiva), is best understood as a set o f powers, or 
capacities for performing intellective, volitive, sensitive and appetitive 
acts. These acts express different ways in which the pilgrim is able to 
relate to different objects. The elaborate discussion o f the nature o f the 
mind was necessary in order to introduce the set o f intellective powers in 
virtue o f which the pilgrim is said to be capable o f performing a variety 
o f cognitive acts. In this chapter I wish to introduce and explore the 
late-m edieval ep istem ological concept notitia  a term w hich was 
employed to refer to numerous kinds o f cognitive acts. First, there will 
be a general discussion o f the term notitia. Second, an account will be 
given o f the cognitive process according to the theory which posits the
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existence o f species in the medium. In the final section o f this chapter I 
will exam ine the distinction between sensory and intellectual notions.
NOTIONS SIMPLICITER
The term notitia  is a technical m edieval term which is often  
translated as “cognition” but this does not adequately convey the 
particularly late-m edieval pre-occupation with clarifying the precise 
meaning o f  the term notitia and its function within the epistem ological 
framework o f the pilgrim. I will therefore translate the term notitia as 
“notion” in order to preserve the technical manner in which the term was 
em ployed in late-medieval philosophy. It is arguably the single most 
important concept o f  late-medieval epistem ology and George Lokert,
David Cranston, Gilbert Crab, and Gervaise Waim are among those who 
devoted entire and significant treatises to its elucidation. John Mair 
writes that “an actual notion is a quality inhering in the subject by which 
the subject formally k n o w s . ”  1 1 2  Lokert gives the following definition “a
notion is a quality immediately representing something or in some way
to a cognitive p o w e r ” . Gilbert Crab defines a notion as follows:
a notion is a quality inhering in a cognitive power, vitally 
changing the power and representing something or some 
things to that cognitive power. First, it is posited in the
genus o f quality and I say “inhering in a cognitive power”
in order to exclude other qualities which cannot inhere in a 
cognitive power such as material qualities. Hence, if  an 
actual notion was in a subject other than in a cognitive  
power i t  would cease to be a n o t i o n .
Mair. In primum, proL, q. 3; \Jol. 6^ 1^ ]. [Notitia] actual is est qualitas subiecto 
inhærens per quam ipsum formaliter cognoscit.
Lokert. Scriptum  in m ateria notitiarum, [5zg. a 2^^]. Notitia est qualitas 
potentiæ cognitivæ aliquid vel aliqualiter formaliter repræsentans.
Gilbert Crab. Tractatus notitiarum m agistri G ilberti crab , (Paris, ca., 1503); 
[sig. a 2^^]. Unde notitia est qualitas potentiæ cognitivæ inhærens vitaliter 
immutativa potentiæ aliquid vel aliqua eidem  repræsentans. Et ponitur primo 
qualitas loco generis et dico inhærens potentiæ cognitivæ ad excludendas alias
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It was universally accepted that in virtue o f the absolute power o f  
God a notion could be posited in a material object, for exam ple, in a 
stone. However, it is explicitly rejected that a quality inhering in the 
stone is a notion. Material qualities are not n o t i o n s . M a i r  makes it 
clear that w hile a notion is essentially and intrinsically a quality the 
converse, that a quality is essentially and intrinsically a notion is not 
true. Analogously, if God according to his absolute power were to 
suspend all the activity o f the intellect without nevertheless destroying 
the quality inhering in the intellect, then that quality w hich was 
previously a notion will no longer be a n o t i o n .  H7 It was unanimous, the
qualitates quæ potentiæ cognitivæ  minime inhærent sicut sunt qualitates 
materiales. Unde si notitia actualis esset in alio subiecto quam in potentia 
cognitiva desinere[t] esse notitia.
11^  Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, [5zg. a 2 ^a-rb] Crab significantly amends his 
definition when he grants that some notions are material and divisible, sc., the 
notions of animals; others are immaterial and indivisible, sc., the notions of 
human beings. This addition is necessary because o f the medieval distinction 
between the material intellect of animals and the immaterial intellect of human 
beings.
^^ 6 John Mair. In primum, proL, q. 3; [ fol .  gra-rbj Nam primo ponatur extra 
subiectum in uno loco et in alio loco tunc sic: hæc notitia in anima est notitia, 
hæc notitia in anima est qualitas in lapide; ergo qualitas in lapide est notitia. 
Secundo hæc notitia essentialiter et intrinsece est qualitas; ergo qualitas 
essentialiter et intrinsece est notitia. Consequentia tenet per conversionem per 
accidens... Ad aliud argumentum dicitur admittendo quod ilia qualitas lapidi 
inhæreat et concedo quod qualitas in lapide est notitia, sed non est notitia in 
lapide. Ad tertium dico non esse bonam conversionem... Ex his liquet falsitas 
huius: Hæc qualitas essentialiter et intrinsece est notitia de potentia Dei absoluta, 
de potentia enim Dei ordinata et naturaliter loquendo hæc qualitas est 
essentialiter et intrinsece notitia. Hector Boece defines accidental conversion as 
“the conversion of two categorical propositions with the same terms though in 
reverse order, with the same quality but different quantity, and one a conclusion  
of the other in a formally valid consequence for example “Every man is an 
animal. Therefore some animal is a man”, where the quality is not changed but 
the quantity is.” Boece. Explicatio, [.szg. c 3^^]. Conversio per accidens est 
duarum propositionum categoricarum utroque termino participantium ordine 
converso manente eadem qualitate sed mutata quantitate unius ad alteram  
formalis consequentia ut: Omnis homo est animal ergo aliquid animal est homo, 
ubi non mutatur qualitas sed quantitas. See A. Broadie. The Circle o f  John 
M air, [p. 231].
Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, [sig. a 2^^]. ...si Deus omnem activitatem ipsius 
intellectus suspenderet et remanente tamen ilia qualitate quæ prius erat notitia 
non amplius erit notitia et sic non magis implicat ipsa existente in intellectu  
ipsam desinere esse notitiam quam si esset in aliquo subiecto non vitaliter 
immutativo.
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cooperation o f a cognitive power was a necessary condition for the 
production of a notion.
The most intriguing claim is that a notion is responsible for “vitally 
changing the power” (vitaliter immutativa potentiæ). Crab writes that 
this can be understood in two ways. First, formally which is only true of 
actual notions. Second, e ffectively  which is true o f dispositions  
(habitus) and species. Hence while it is common to divide notions into 
the actual and the dispositional, only the former are truly and properly 
notions. He writes: “...dispositions though they are subjectively in a 
cognitive power are nevertheless not notions since they do not vitally  
change the cognitive power”. He continues: “a dispositional notion is 
not a notion and thus it remains a division o f the analogous into its 
analogates”. Similarly, John Mair thought that a dispositional notion 
could be defined correspondingly in relation to the definition o f  an 
actual n o t i o n .  George Lokert claims that not all qualities inhering in a 
cognitive power are notions since the key characteristic o f notions is the 
ability to vitally and formally change a cognitive p o w e r ,  i n  fact, the 
cognitive act qua notion is itself the modification. Lokert therefore 
claim s that acts o f w ill, dispositions, species and passions are not 
notions. The inclusion o f acts o f will among those which do not vitally
Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, [sig. a 2 ^^ "^ b] Dico signanter vitaliter immutativa 
potentiæ ad excludendos habitus quæ licet sunt in potentia cognitiva subiective 
non tamen sunt notitiæ cum non vitaliter immutant. Unde aliquid dupliciter 
dicitur vitaliter immutare; formaliter, et sic sola notitia actualis vitaliter mutat. 
Alio modo effective et sic habitus et species immutant et licet notitia dividatur in 
actualem et habitualem habitualis tamen notitia non est notitia et sic remanet 
divisio analogi in sua analogata.
Mair. In primum, proL, q. 3; [fol. 6^h-vaj Notitia scinditur in actualem et 
habitualem. Actualis est qualitas subiecto inhærens per quam ipsum formaliter 
cognoscit. Dicitur subiecto et non intellectui propter notitias sensitivas hominis 
et brutorum... Habitualis potest proportionabiliter definiri.
Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [5zg. a 2 ^h] Ad primum dubium [viz., 
utrum quælibet qualitas inhærens potentiæ cognitivæ sit notitia.] respondetur 
negative. Instantia est de actibus voluntatis secundum communiorem opinionem  
similiter de habitibus, speciebus, et passionibus de quibus in processu videbitur.
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and formally change a cognitive power is at first glance suspect since 
Lokert in the same vein as John Mair claimed that the power o f  intellect 
and the power of will qua appetitive powers are really one and the same 
power. Lokert is explicit on this matter: “volitions and nolitions vitally 
change an appetitive power in the same way that cognitions vitally  
change a cognitive power though any cognitive power is an appetitive 
p o w e r . ”  121 Lokert explains that this claim is in agreement with Aristotle 
who claims, that in living things, sense agrees with appetite, because 
those things appertain to pleasure and pain. The act o f  pursuing 
something pleasurable or the act o f avoiding something painful is not 
itself a cognition. If this were the case then it would be superfluous to 
posit cognition as a pre-requisite for an appetitive act. N otions qua 
cognitions must precede all other intellectual acts.
THE ASSIMILATION OF KNOWLEDGE— SPECIES IN THE MEDIUM
It has long stood as a challenge, to those who wish to provide a 
comprehensive theory of knowledge, to explain how we perceive objects 
at a distance. This challenge was a part o f the larger problem o f giving 
an adequate account o f how action at a distance was possible. Medieval 
philosophers were continuing an ancient tradition in their speculations 
concerning the issue o f whether or not our knowledge o f the external 
world was mediated by species in the medium (species in medio)  . In 
keeping with the etymological root o f the word species, i.e., speculum, 
species were generally understood to be mirror images or likenesses 
(similitudines) o f their objects. According to those who postulated the
2^1 Lokert. Scriptum in m ateria notitiarum, [5zg. a 2 ^^ »] Volitiones et nolitiones 
immediate vitaliter immutant potentiam appetivam sicut cognitiones potentiam  
cognitivam licet quælibet potentia cognitiva sit appetitiva ut videtur velle  
Philosophus secundo De Anima [414hl-6] dicens omnibus habentibus sensum  
convenit appetitus quia omnibus talibus insunt delectatio et tristitia actus tamen 
prosequitivus vel fugitivus alicuius non dicitur cognitio illius alias videtur 
superflu ere cognitio prærequisita ad talem actum appetitivum producendum.
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existence o f species in the medium as part o f the cognitive process, for 
example, John Duns Scotus and Walter Chatton, it was the species of the 
objects that caused objects to be perceived. It was thought that species 
radiated from their objects through the intervening distance between the 
object and the perceiver. It was also postulated that in the first instance 
it was the sensible species (species sensibilis) o f an object that radiated 
to the perceiver and activated the appropriate sense receptor. However, 
the existence o f the sensible species o f an object was insufficient to 
explain the possibility o f intellectual knowledge. After all, the human 
intellect was said to be immaterial; hence, it was also necessary to posit 
the existence o f an intelligible species (species intelligibilis) in order to 
account for intellectual knowledge o f objects. It is W illiam of Ockham, 
who in the history o f medieval philosophy, is associated with one of the 
most extensive and radical critiques of epistemology; and his lectures on 
the Sentences o f  Peter Lombard  are said to have “articulated a new 
theory o f k n o w l e d g e ” . ^22 Qckham thought that he had eliminated the 
need for both intelligible and sensible species in an account o f the 
cognitive process. He was convinced that, in all instances, it was 
superfluous to posit the existence o f species in the cognitive process 
since it was possible to explain how, even without them, objects are 
perceived and are known. In the place o f sensible species he postulated 
impressed qualities (qualita tes  impressce). He thought that the 
impressed qualities were sufficient to explain the various stages o f the 
cognitive process. The debate between the follow ers o f John Duns 
Scotus who had argued in favour o f the existence o f species in the 
m edium  and thinkers such as Hugh o f N ovocastro w ho were
122 Katherine H. Tachau. Vision and Certitude in the Age o f  Ockham: Optics, 
Epistem ology and the Eoundations o f  Sem antics 1250—1345, (Netherlands, 
1988); [p. 113].
R. N. Wood Chapter 3: Notions in General 85
sympathetic to the enterprise o f W illiam  o f Ockham was still a lively  
one at the time that Mair and the members o f his circle were writing.
The paradigm case used to defend or reject the existence o f species in 
the medium was the seeing o f colour; and since with minor adjustments 
what can be said o f  colour can be said o f the other sensory receptors, it 
is here that we begin our discussion in the context o f determining the 
ontological status o f species.
Mair singles out two opponents o f the existence o f species in the 
cognitive process, to whom he directs his argument in favour o f their 
existence. The names o f Durand de St. Pourçain (Durandus de Sancto 
Portiano) and W illiam o f Ockham are given in the margin o f the text, 
presumably by the editors. Opposed to the existence o f species, Durand 
de St. Pourçaini23 and W illiam  o f Ockham thought that if  species 
existed then they were o f a very particular nature. They suggested two 
possibilities. The first was that the species o f the object were o f the 
same nature as the object they represented. The second was that the 
species were altogether different in kind from the object they 
represented. However, if they were o f the same kind, it can be argued 
that “no formally contrary and opposed individuals” (nulla individua 
form aliter  contaria et repugantia)  are able to co-exist in the same 
s u b j e c t .  1 2 4  Yet, in relation to the same part o f  the medium it would be 
true to say that white and black, which according to Ockham are
123 Durandus de Saint Pourçain. Domini Durandi a Sancto Portiano in Sententias 
theologicas P e tri Lom bardi Commentarium libri quattuor, (Lyons, 1560); 
{fols. 118va-ll9va; n.b. /o/v. 118vb-H9ra]
124 John Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; {fol. 3 4 ^hj Improbant opinionem [viz., 
against the existence o f species visibiles in medio] secundum duo doctores [in 
marg., Durandus, Ockham] quorum alter [sc., Ocldiam] sic argumentatur. Aut 
illæ species sunt eiusdem rationis cum obiecto, aut alterius. Si eiusdem rationis, 
tunc sic, nulla individua formaliter contraria et repugnantia possunt se compati in 
eodem subiecto, sed respectu eiusdem  partis medii potest albedo et nigredo 
æqualiter approximari. Et per consequens in nulla parte recipiuntur species 
albedinis et nigredinis.
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“formally opposed”, are equally proximate. This is to say that the white 
and black patches o f  colour occupy the same spatial location in the 
intervening space between the object and the perceiver which is 
impossible. As a result, it fo llow s that the species o f whiteness and 
blackness are received in no part o f the medium. Moreover, on the same 
assumption, i.e., that an object and its species are o f the same kind, the 
opponents to the existence o f species argue that it also follow s that “the 
species o f a colour is no more a cause o f seeing than is the colour itself, 
since they are o f the same nature and species”. 125
The opponents continue their attack on species on the grounds that 
“that which immediately causes the seeing is that which is immediately 
seen” and granted that, on the account o f many, species are o f  the same 
nature as the object, then it fo llow s that it is the species that is 
immediately perceived and not the object. For example, if the species of  
whiteness are o f the same nature as the whiteness of the object, and they 
imm ediately cause the act o f seeing then it is the species that are 
immediately seen and not the object. This however is m anifestly  
false. 126 In this context Ockham mentions that it is vain to posit more 
than is necessary. In his mind the intellect and the thing seen were 
sufficient to explain the cognitive process without postulating the 
existence o f species since the existence o f species is neither known from 
experience nor suggested by self-evident truths.127
125 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \foL 34^^]. Item si sic. Species colons non esset 
plus ratio videndi quam color cum sint eiusdem rationis et eiusdem speciei per te.
126 Mair. In primum, d. 3 , q. 3; {fol. 34^^)]. Item quando sunt aliqua eiusdem  
rationis, illud quod immediatius causat visionem  immediatius videtur; ergo si 
species albedinis sint eiusdem rationis cum albedine et immediatius causant 
actum videndi per te, ergo species immediatius videntur. Quod est manifeste 
falsum.
127 The details o f Ockham’s arguments against the existence of species in the 
medium are contained in William of Ockham [Guillelmi de OcVh3iVc{\.Quœstiones 
in Librum Tertium Sententiarum (Reportatio), eds. Francis E. Kelley and Gerard 
Etzkorn. (Bonaventure, 1982); [pp 43-97; n.b. p. 43 line 1 to p. 64  line 16]. 
Katherine H. Tachau. Vision and Certitude in the Age o f  Ockham  offers the
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However, it can be argued, that if  the species were o f  a different 
nature than their objects then they would belong to the genus o f quality 
and it is obvious by means of induction that this could not be the case 
since no species is posited in the genus o f q u a l i t y .  128 Mair replies that 
the term signifying such species is to be found in the third Aristotelian 
kind o f quality, namely, affective qualities and affections. Mair is 
referring to those qualities whose origin in affection makes them “hard
IS
to change” and “permanent”. Though it| possible to give a variety o f  
descriptions to account for the fact that a wall is white, all such 
descriptions aim at clarifying what it is about the nature o f the wall that 
enables one to say truly that it is white. Granted that species belong to 
the third kind o f quality they are, according to Mair, o f  a different nature 
than say, colour itself. 129 That “species produced by objects are 
different in nature than their objects” is affirmed by Lokert who explains 
that there is “nothing absurd in a cause producing an effect o f  a different 
nature.” 130 Lokert thought this was obvious from our experience o f  
many different agents. One illustration o f this point is the ability o f the 
mind to perform acts o f intellect and acts o f will, another is the ability o f  
intuitive notions to cooperate in the production o f cognitive dispositions 
which are different in kind than their cause. In the light o f such claims 
Mair and the members o f his circle were able to assert that while  
“species are the means and the cause o f seeing they themselves are not
most authoritative discussion of various aspects of the epistemology of William  
of Ockham in its historical context.
128 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \fol. 34^1 ]^. Si sint alterius rationis tunc essent in 
genere qualitatis et patet inductive quod non cum in nulla specie eius ponantur.
129 Mair. In prim um , d. 3, q. 3; \fol. 3 4 ^h] Ad istud dicitur [See fn. 128] (sicut 
dicendum est) terminus talis species significans ponitur in tertia specie qualitatis 
et illæ species sunt alterius rationis a colore. See Aristotle. Categories, [9^29- 
lO^lO],
130 Lxjkert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [«g. c 5™]. De speciebus productis ab 
obiecto conceditur illas esse alterius rationis ab obiecto, nec inconvenit aliquam 
producere effectum alterius rationis hoc patet de multis agentibus.
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able to be seen”.i^i It fo llow s from what has been said that the 
distinction between the species o f the object and the object in-itself is 
destroyed. The cognitive power is no longer able to differentiate 
between the species and the species o f the o b j e c t .  122 Consequently, the 
ability o f  the cognitive power to have direct knowledge o f its objects is 
threatened since the cognitive power would not be able to determine 
whether what was being experienced was the species o f the object or the 
object tout court.
Mair reports several arguments advanced by, but not particular to, 
Ockham who denied the existence o f species on the grounds that the 
existence o f species did not explain a variety o f sense-experiences. The 
first objection he reports states that in the case of the sense o f touch no 
species is posited, rather, one posits the presence o f heat or some similar 
quality. Similarly, the light caused by a light is o f the same species as 
the light. Therefore, the colour that is caused by colour is of the same 
species as it. 1^2 Xhus, the redness caused by a red object is the same as 
the red particular to the object. There are no reasonable grounds to posit 
the existence o f something o f a different kind, viz., species in the 
medium, in order to account for the cognitive process. The truth o f this 
conclusion rests on the fact that the experiences o f touch and o f seeing  
light are analogous to that o f seeing colour. It is obvious that in the case 
of light and colour, since they both rely on what is seen, the analogy 
holds. The analogy between the sense o f touch and the seeing o f  colour
121 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \fol. 3 4 '^ h] licet sint medium et ratio videndi, 
videri non possunt.
2^2 Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [sig. c 5^^]. Nec oportet quod potentia 
possit discerne re inter obiectum et talem speciem postquam species non sunt 
perceptibiles sensu.
Mair. In prim um , d. 3, q. 3; [fol. 34'^ )^]. Sed contra hoc argues. In sensu 
tactus non est ponenda aliqua species, sed calor vel alia similis qualitas. Similiter 
lumen causatum a luce est eiusdem speciei cum luce. Ergo quod causatur a 
colore est eiusdem speciei cum eo.
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is certainly suspect. Mair responds that “this argument by analogy  
hobbles on a fourth foot (claudicat quarto pede)  . In the absence o f  an 
odoriferous, or a warm body, there is a smell, or there is warmth; but in 
the absence o f coloured body there is no whiteness. Indeed, the 
assumption is d e n i e d . ”1^ 4 jt is obvious by appeal to on e’s personal 
experience that the scent o f a rose lingers in a room for some time after 
the rose has been removed. A similar case can be made concerning the 
warmth o f human contact. However, if  the white sheet o f paper that I 
am now writing on is either destroyed or removed from my presence, I 
no longer see its whiteness; no whiteness endures.
Moreover, Ockham further argues the case against species in the 
medium “by proving that something which is o f the same nature as the 
object is caused in the m e d i u m . ” ^ 2 5  This runs counter to the claim put 
forward by Mair and his contemporaries that species belong to a 
different category o f quality than their objects. Ockham advances his 
argument by appealing to the experience o f a light beam (radius) passing 
through a red or green window. His argument is reported as follows:
The light beam passing through the window causes a true 
colour on the opposite wall by means o f the colour in the 
window as if a partial mediating cause, and that colour is o f  
the same species as the colour in the glass since, otherwise, 
between that colour and the colour o f the window there 
would not be as much agreement as there i s .  1 ^ 6
1 4^ Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \fol. 3 4 '"h_3 5 ra] Respondetur. [ See fn. 133] 
Argumentum a simili frequenter claudicat quarto pede. In absentia corporis 
odoriferi vel calidi percipitur odor vel calor, non autem albedo in absentia 
colorati. Etiam assumptum negatur.
135 Mair. In primum, d. 3 , q. 3; \fol. 35i'4 ]. Secundo arguit probando quod 
aliquid eiusdem rationis cum obiecto causatur in medio per experientiam de radio 
transeunte per vitrum rubeum vel viride.
2^6 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; [Jol. 35^^ ]. Radius enim transiens per vitrum 
causat verum colorem in pari etc opposito mediante colore in vitro tamquam 
mediante causa partiali et ille color est eiusdem speciei cum colore in vitro quia 
aliter inter colorem ilium et colorem vitri non esset tanta convenientia sicut est.
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The claim which immediately strikes the reader is that the light 
passing through a red or green window causes a “true colour” on the 
opposite wall. This is immediately denied by Mair because the question 
that is raised by such a claim is: W hat is the subject o f this “true 
colour”? It is not the colour on the wall since the light hitting the wall 
has been modified as it passes through the window. Mair, therefore 
states that the colour o f the light as it passes through the window, and 
the colour as it appears on the wall are, in fact, opposed to each o t h e r .  
However, it might be argued that the “true colour” is caused in the air in 
the intervening distance between the window and the wall.^^^ Mair’s 
response is that on that account several white beams o f light travelling 
through the same medium would cause several whitenesses. Thus, air 
could become white like s n o w . ^ ^ 9  ^ j g  possible, according to Mair, that 
Ockham would accept such consequence. However, Mair rejects this 
consequence because “it is counter to experience”. He amplifies this by 
claiming that having accepted this position it follow s that there would  
the most intense whiteness in the air over the island o f C r e t e . ^ 4 0  The 
force o f the rejection is as follow s: if one grants that there is a “true 
colour” caused in the air then one must grant that it is possible for an 
infinite number o f w hitenesses to travel through the same medium. 
Hence, light radiating from something white would produce not one 
whiteness but an infinite number o f whitenesses in such a way that air
3^7 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; [fol. 35^4 ]. Respondetur negando quod causetur 
vera rubedo quia quæritur de subiecto illius, non potest dici quod sit in pariete 
opposito. Stat quod illi colores sibi repugnent.
138 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; [fol. 35^4 ] arguens dicit quod causatur in
ære.
1 9^ Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3, [fol. 35^^]. Sed contra hoc arguitur. Tunc plura 
alba causarent per idem medium plures albedines et sic ær potest tantum albefieri 
sicut nix.
149 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; [fol. 35^^ ]. Prima solutio [See fn. 138] non valet 
quia est contra experientiam. Tunc in insula Cretæ esset intensissima albedo in 
ære.
R. N. Wood Chapter 3: Notions in General 91
would be rendered opaque. This is clearly false since there is no 
experience o f air being rendered opaque by colour, true or otherwise.
Secondly, Ockham might claim that the “air determines definite 
degrees (certos gradus) which it is able to sustain and not more”. i4i The 
response Mair gives to this second contention o f Ockham is more 
complicated. Mair begins his argument by explaining that, according to 
the more probable opinion, since accidents such as whiteness inhere in 
matter, and the matter o f snow and the matter of air are the same in kind, 
then it follow s that the matter o f air is able to support as many degrees o f  
whiteness as the matter o f s n o w .  142 This follow s, according to Mair, 
because if it is accepted that the whole composite o f  matter and form is 
able to support an infinite number o f individual whitenesses from the 
beginning, then, in the same way that redness is present in the generation 
o f a rainbow, it ought to be granted that redness is present in the 
medium. However, according to Mair, we are wrong (fallimur) when 
w e judge that there is no redness in the m e d i u m .  143 H owever the 
difficulty still remains to explain how the same medium can support and 
radiate different visible qualities. It was mentioned above that Ockham  
thought that if there are species in the medium then there w ill be 
moments when it is necessary for properties o f objects that are “formally 
contrary and opposed” qualities to inhere in the same part o f the medium  
as they radiate from the object to the cognitive power. Since whiteness
141 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \Jol. 35^^ ]. Ad hoc [See fn. 140] dicit arguens 
hoc non inconvenire vel forte ær déterminât certos gradus quos potest suscipire et 
non plures.
142 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \Jol. 35i’4]. Secunda [See fn. 141] etiam non 
valet. Albedo et huiusmodi accidentia inhærent materiæ ut probabilior tenet 
sententia et materia æris est eiusdem speciei cum materia nivis; ergo potest tot 
gradus suscipere quot nix.
143 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \fol. 35i'4]. Item si totum compositum esset primo 
susceptivum albedinis; si duo individua potest suscipere et infinita, quantum est 
ex parte eius et potissimum quando ilia accidentia non sunt corruptiva formæ 
substantialis. Fateor quod putamus esse rubedinem in medio sicut in generatione 
iridis, sed nulla est, sed ibi fallimur iudicando.
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and blackness are incompatible forms, how could the w hiteness and 
blackness o f an object radiate by means o f the same medium? He 
thought that they could not. Either postulating that the m edium  
supported the different colours at different times, or granting that the 
species radiated at the same intensity from their objects still does not 
show how the doctrine o f the existence of species in the medium can do 
the job that is required o f it. First, the forms are simply incompatible 
and the same medium could not support such an occurrence. Second, 
because the forms are o f  equal intensity, they cancel each other out. As 
a result, Ockham would argue, the whole doctrine o f species in the 
medium must be abandoned. Mair, a proponent o f the existence o f  
species in the medium, counters that it does not fo llow  that forms o f  
equal intensity cancel each other since there will be redness and some 
other colour after the beam o f light has passed through the red 
w i n d o w .  144 There is a mixture o f colour that radiates through the 
window. Perhaps, under an intense light there will be scarlet red while 
under a dim light there will be more o f a red ochre. It is even plausible 
that the light passing through the window is already coloured, perhaps a 
pale shade o f green. In such a case the light passes through the window  
and mixes with the redness o f the window, and thus might be tinged 
with a slight hint o f greenness. It still might be objected, “a quibble” 
(proterviendo) according to Mair, that there will be nothing other than 
r e d n e s s . 1 4 5  H owever, having placed colour in the third species o f
144 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \Jol. 35i'4]. Insuper, duæ qualitates contrariæ 
erunt in eadem parte medii per eum cuius oppositum utrobique tenet ut patet. 
Videmus albedinem et nigredinem, tunc albedo producit albedinem et nigredo 
nigredinem per idem medium. Sed dices, si albedo primo produxit albedinem, 
nigredo non potest producere nigredinem  per idem  m edium  propter 
contrarietatem illarum formarum inter se. Sed contra. Quando simul applicantur 
et sunt agentia æqualiter fortia dices quot tunc nihil producetur. Contra. Adhuc 
erit rubedo per vitrum rubrum et aliquis color præcedens.
145 Mair. In primum, d. 3 , q. 3; \fol. 351*^ ]. Sed proterviendo diceres quod stante 
rubedine nullius erit alius color.
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A ristotelian quality, and since colour is classed specifically  as an 
affection, Mair asserts that “colour is a permanent thing but that the 
redness or any such colour [in the medium] does not endure in the 
absence o f the o b j e c t ” . 146 it is insufficient to claim, as Ockham might, 
that not every colour is something permanent, because the redness 
caused by bashfulness or anger lasts only briefly. As Mair suggests, this 
does not counter the claim that colour is something permanent: “if one 
colour is permanent after its production by means o f an effective cause 
then it seems that so also will be any given colour through a small or 
large duration since colours are o f the same nature.” 147
The greatest controversy that occurred in the debate over the 
existence o f species in the medium concerned how to account for action 
at a distance without any action occurring on that w hich was 
intermediate between the cognitive power and the object from which the 
species were radiating. If one were to ask Lokert why it is necessary to 
posit the existence o f species in the medium he would answer that it is 
necessary to bridge the cognitive gap that exists between the subject and 
object. Against his critics he explains that it is not absurd that an agent, 
such as the species in the medium, should act on something distant and 
not proximate because that which is proximate is o f a different nature 
than that which is remote. 148 The exact nature o f the cognitive contact
146 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; {fol. 35^^]. Sed contra totum istud arguitur. 
Color est res permanens sed ilia rubedo vel talis color remoto obiecto non durât.
147 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; {fol. 3^^]. Sed dices. Non omnis color est 
permanens et potes in stare de rubedine causata ex verecundia. Sed istud 
sufficere non videtur, si unus color est permanens post productionem suæ causæ 
effectivæ, ita videtur de quolibet per parvum tempus vel magnum cum sint 
eiusdem rationis.
148 Lokert. Scriptum in m ateria notitiarum, [.y/g. c ...ubi quæritur quare
ponuntur species potest dici ut dicebatur arguendo ponunutur ne agens naturale 
agat in distans non agendo in propinquum, nec oppositum probat aliqua ratio vel 
experientia, sed solum quod non sim ilem  producit effectum  in propiquum et 
distans, illud non inconvenit, stat propinquum non esse susceptivum sim ilis 
effectus sicut distans. Cf., Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [sig. c 4 ^h] 
Tum etiam secundum illam opinionem vel poneretur species propterea quod
R. N. Wood Chapter 3: Notions in General 94
possible by means o f species in the medium is explored by Gervaise 
Waim when he distinguishes between mathematical and virtual contact:
It is not universally true that the mover and the moved are 
together according to m athem atical contact but it is 
sufficient that they are together by means o f virtual contact.
For the proof of this proposition I at first posit definitions o f  
terms. And I say that things whose ends are together, that is 
the surfaces, so that between them no body, true or 
imaginary, mediates are said to touch each other by means 
o f mathematical contact. And this is to have said nothing 
other than that the bodies are contiguous. But it is said that 
something is present to another thing by means o f  virtual 
contact when it is present in such a way that it is able to 
cause an effect there, granted that it is not in the same place 
essentially or through mathematical contact. Granted this, I 
say with Ockham that for an agent to act on something 
passive it is not required that the agent and the passive thing 
are im m ediate by the im m ediacy corresponding to 
mathematical contact, but it is sufficient that they are 
immediate by the im m ediacy corresponding to virtual 
contact. W hy the im m ed iacy  corresponding to 
mathematical contact is not required is easy to see, first 
when the proximate is not susceptible to the effect o f the 
same nature that the distant thing is fitted by nature to 
receive. For exam ple, the sun produces warmth in the 
lower regions o f the air and not through the sky around the 
m oon, because the sky is not receptive o f primary
qualities. 149
obiectum non potest agere in distans quin agat in propinquum, vel quia obiectum  
materiale non potest immediate agere in substantiam immaterialem sicut in 
intellectum vel aliqua alia ratione. Non videtur alia ratio assignanda nec sufficit 
aliqua illarum. Non inconvenit agens agere in remotum et non propinquum (ut 
superius dicebatur) quando propinquum non est susceptivum  effectus talis 
agentis. Idem patet de magnete attrahente ferrum remotum et non lignum  
propinquum.
149 Waim. Tractatus notitiarum Gervasii Waim suevi eiusdem quæstiones in libros 
Posteriorum resolutionum Philosophi, (Paris, 1528); [sig. d Non est
universaliter verum quod movens et motum sint simul secundum contactum  
mathematicum, sed sufficit quod sint sim ul contactu virtuali. Pro cuius 
propositionis probatione suppono primo definitiones terminorum. Et dico quod
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Mair also directs this exam ple against those thinkers like  
Ockhami^6 who deny the existence o f species on the grounds that there 
are moments when species do not affect what is proximate w hile  
affecting that which is distant:
You might say that a magnet m oves iron at a distance and 
not the medium. [To this] it is said that it [viz., the magnet] 
produces something o f a different nature in the medium, or 
granted that it is o f the same nature as the quality that 
attracts the iron, it does not attract other things. For its 
power by nature is to attract iron to the place o f the magnet 
and not other things o f a different nature. If one posits that 
the iron is destroyed, this argument does not help the 
arguer, since I ask o f him to which place it will have been 
moved since experience teaches us that the magnet is 
moved towards the iron. And it is as easy to attract the 
magnet with the iron as it is to draw the magnet without the 
iron. The reason is because the magnet attracts the iron and 
the man only draws the magnet.
contactu mathematico dicuntur se tangere quorum ultima puta superficies sunt 
simul, sic quod inter ipsa nullum verum vel imaginarium mediet. Et hoc nihil 
aliud est dictu quam corpora esse contingua. Sed contactu virtuali dicitur aliquid 
præsens et immediatum alteri quando sic est præsens quod potest ibi causare 
effectum  dato quod non sit ibidem  per essentiam  sen per contactum  
mathematicum. Isto supposito dico cum Ockham quod ad hoc quod agens agat 
in aliquod passum non requiritur quod agens et passum sint immediata 
im m ediatione correspondente tactui mathem atico, sed sufficit quod sint 
immediata immediatione correspondente tactui virtuali. Quare non semper 
requiratur immediatio correspondens tactui mathematico facile est videre, primo 
quando propinquum non est susceptivum effectus eiusdem rationis cum effectu 
quem distans natum est recipere, ut sol producit calorem in infima regione æris 
non producendo calorem in cælo, eo quod cælum non est receptivum qualitatum 
primarium. Quoted by Broadie. Notion and Object, [pp. 17-18].
One of the objectors is clearly William of Ockham. See Ockham. Quæstiones 
in Librum Tertium Sententiarum (Reportatio) ’, [p 48 line 16 to p. 56 line 5; n. b. 
p 48 line 16 to p. 49  line 15].
Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \fol. 35%^ ]^. Sed dices magnes mo vet ferrum 
distans et non medium. Dicitur quod producit aliquid alterius rationis in medio 
vel dato quod eiusdem rationis cum qualitate quæ attrahit ferrum, non trahet alia, 
ilia enim virtus est nata trahere ferrum ad locum magnetis et non alia alterius 
rationis a ferro. Si ponatur ferrum corruptum argumentum non iuvat arguentem 
quia quæro ab eo ad quem locum movebitur cum experientia doceat quod 
magnes movetur ad ferrum. Et ita facile est trahere magnetem cum ferro sicut 
magnetem sine ferro. Et ratio est quia magnes trahit ferrum et homo solum  
magnetem.
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This and similar illustrations are, in the opinion o f Mair, among the 
most powerful reasons by which Durand de St. Pourçain and Ockham  
deny the existence o f species in the medium. However, these are not the 
only objections. One o f the challenges relies on the claim  that more 
should not be posited where fewer suffice: since it is possible to explain 
the process o f cognition without positing the existence o f species, it is 
more reasonable not to posit them. There is no doubt that the principle 
o f econom y is both accepted and often deployed by Mair himself. He 
reaffirms this commitment but explains that this principle does not 
threaten his claim  that the existence o f  species in the medium is 
necessary: their existence is confirmed by a whole range o f experiences 
and by the authority o f  others . ^^2 The m ost interesting o f  the 
illustrations Mair gives aims to show that species are required to give an 
account o f how it is possible for someone to see his face in a mirror. 
Species are necessary conditions for the possibility o f  this seeing, but 
they are not sufficient; it is also necessary that the agent has the required 
instruments that permit this seeing—eyes. The eyes o f the agent and the 
species in the medium are partial causes in the act o f  seeing. It is 
possible to complicate this illustration: Two mirrors could be made to 
face each other in such a way that the face o f the agent was visible in 
one and the back o f the agent’s head in the other. This, and the former 
illustration, raise some interesting questions since in each case the agent 
is in a special relation to the object o f vision. In all the other examples 
that have been considered the species o f the object radiated through the
152 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \foL 3 5 ^^] Non est ponenda pluralitas sine 
necessitate, hoc est, non est ponenda plura ubi paucitas æque rationabiliter 
sufficit. Modo sunt experientiæ et auctoritates sapientium ut patet 2 De Anima 
Commento 70 et 71. Averroes. In Arisotelis De anima. Averrois Cordubensis 
Commentarium Magnum, ed. F.S. Crawford, in Aristotelis De Anima Libros 
C orpus in Com m entarium  A verro is in A ristotelem  , Volumen 6, Pars 1, 
(Cambridge, 1953); [pp. 236-239].
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medium in such a way that the seeing was both immediate and direct.
Thus, to claim that the species were the cause o f seeing w hile not 
them selves v isib le , though controversial w as, in relative terms, 
straightforward. Now the images are reflected: Where do we locate the 
species o f the object? D oes the species, as a likenesses of the object, 
really inhere in the mirror? Or, is there really a likeness o f the object in 
the mirror? Or, it may even be asked, are the species somewhere in the 
air proximate to the mirror? Mair gives the following solution:
The likeness [of the object] is not in the mirror, rather, the 
visible thing produces its species towards the mirror which 
are reflected all the way from the mirror to the power o f  
sight. It is not necessary to posit such a likeness in the 
mirror or in the air, but it is the visible thing itself that is 
seen by means o f a reflected line.i^3
These examples remind us that the origin o f the term “species” is the
term "’"‘speculum'^ and that the implication is that the species o f objects
are reflections qua mirror images o f their objects.
Are the species o f the same nature in the medium as they are in the
corporeal organs o f sight? Mair thought that they are and “that it is vain
to posit a specific distinction between them”.i^4 He also thought that it
was probable that the vision caused by the species inhered in the
sensitive soul which is distinct from the intellective soul. After having
caused a sensitive notion in the outer sense a notion is caused in inner
sense. Then, granting that there is only one soul in a human being, a
third notion is caused in the intellect. Now, Mair indicates.
153 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; {fol. 3 5 va-vbj ...dicitur quod illud simulachrum  
non est in speculo, sed visibile producit species suas ad speculum usque quæ 
reflectuntur a speculo ad potentiam visivam . N ec oportet ponere tale 
simulachrum in speculo vel in ære, sed est ipsum visibile per lineam reflexam.
1 4^ Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; {fol. 3 5 ^hj ...dicitur quod species sunt eiusdem  
speciei in medio et in organo naturali, incassum est ponere discrimen specificum.
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it seems perhaps that it is superfluous to posit three intuitive 
notions, or two, one sensitive and the other intellective, that 
are distinct in species and which inhere in the same subject.
For it seems that the intellective notion alone would be 
sufficient to cause a judgment and for knowing the object....
And thus in the intellect two intellective notions are posited 
in relation to the object. One is the disposition (habitus) or 
species, and the other the act, which are o f different kinds 
since one actually represents while the other does not. The 
act is more perfect than the other [viz., the disposition], this 
is obvious from Books 1 and 10 o f the Ethics. But it is not 
the case that on account o f this the species is superfluous 
since in the absence o f the object it will cooperate in the 
production o f (conprincipiat) the actual notion, nor does the 
durability o f the species imply that it is superior to the act.
This is obvious concerning stone, and man, and whiteness 
and the seeing o f it. And though the species present to the 
intellect is intelligible, nevertheless it does not cause a 
notion o f itself before it causes a notion of the object. On 
the contrary, it takes the places o f the object. For cognition 
first moves to love o f the object which is loved before it 
m oves to love o f itself. And vision in the outer sense 
causes a cognition not o f  itself but the object o f which it is a 
cognition. So that there are as many species left behind in 
the intellect as there are things sensed. Second, it follow s  
that some species intensify each other and constitute one 
quality. This is obvious concerning species o f the same 
kind inhering in the same subject from the beginning.
Third, it is obvious that no species are mutually opposed in 
the intellect. This is obvious since Socrates now has an 
actual notion o f whiteness seen elsewhere, now an actual 
notion o f blackness. Therefore, in his intellect there are 
first species cooperating in the production o f these notions, 
and if the species o f whiteness and o f blackness are not 
opposed, then there w ill be no fierce fighting between any 
species.
155 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3; \JoL 35^^]. Videtur forte superfluum ponere tres 
notitias intuitivas, vel duas, unam sensitivam et aliam intellectivam  specie
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Species are partial efficient causes in the production o f  actual notions.
When it is written that there are two intellective notions in respect o f an 
object “one a disposition or species and the other an act” with the 
explanation that only one actually represents the cognized object, the 
comparison is between dispositional notions and actual notions. In the 
same way that a disposition is a partial efficient cause o f an actual notion 
yet is not itself properly and truly called a notion since a cognitive power 
is not “vitally and formally changed” by such a notion, the same can be 
said concerning species. W hile species are the cause and the means by 
which something is known, they themselves cannot be known. They are 
present, according to Mair, in every stage o f the cognitive process. 
Species radiate from an object in the medium and activate any one o f the 
sense receptors, they then become known as the sensible species (species  
sensibiles), next they are known as the species o f the inner sense, and 
finally as intelligible species (species intelligibiles).
S e n s o r y  a n d  i n t e l l e c t u a l  n o t i o n s
Consistent with the Aristotelian claim that “there is nothing in the 
intellect unless it will have been first in the sense” (nihil est in intellectu 
quin prius fuerit in sensu) it was a universally accepted proposition that
distinctas inhærentes eidem subiecto. Videtur enim quod notitia intellectiva sola 
sufficeret ad causandum iudicium et ad cognoscendum obiectum... Et sic in 
intellectu ponuntur duæ notitiæ intellectivæ respectu obiecti, una habitus vel 
species et actus quæ sunt alterius speciei, cum una actual iter repræsentat non 
autem alia. Actus est alia perfectior; patet 1 et 10 Ethicorum  sed non propterea 
species superfluit quia in absentia obiecti conprincipiat notitiam actualem, nee 
diutumitas speciei arguit cam præstare actui. Patet de lapide et homine, albedine 
et eius visione, et licet species sit intelligibile præsens intellectui non tamen prius 
causat notitiam sui quam obiecti, immo econtrario supplet vicem  obiecti. 
Cognitio enim prius mo vet ad dilectionem obiecti quod diligitur quam sui, et 
Visio in sensu exteriori causat cognitionem non sui sed obiecti cuius est. Quo sit 
ut quot sunt res sensatæ tot sint species derelictæ in intellectu. Secundo sequitur 
quod aliquæ species sese intendunt et constituunt qualitatem unam. Patet de 
speciebus eiusdem speciei inhærentibus eidem subiecto primo. Tertio patet quod 
nullæ species mutuo adversantur in intellectu. Patet quia Sortes nunc habet 
notitiam actualem albedinis visæ alias nunc nigredinis. Ergo in eius intellectu 
sunt species primæ conprincipiantes istas notitias et si species albedinis et 
nigredinis non pugnent, nullæ inter se digladiantur.
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outer and inner sensory notions preceded intellectual ones. George 
Lokert writes that “as regards the production o f notions everyone agrees 
on this matter. In man the first notion o f a sensible thing, indeed, the 
first notion without qualification (simpliciter)  is an outer sensory one, 
after that, an inner sensory notion is produced and after that an 
intellectual n o t i o n . I t  was also generally agreed that the priority o f  
notions was a natural ordering and not a temporal priority. Mair writes 
“sensory notions are prior to intellectual ones as regards a priority o f  
nature and o f generation though not prior as regards a priority in time or 
o f an i n s t a n t . I t  is a natural priority and not a temporal one because 
the generation o f a sensory notion could occur simultaneously with the 
generation o f an intellectual one.
George Lokert provides the follow ing definitions o f sensory and 
intellectual notions:
I say that a sensory notion is a notion which vitally changes 
the sense according as it is a notion o f that kind and an 
intellectual notion is one which vitally changes the intellect 
according as it is o f the intellect.
Gilbert Crab gives the follow ing criteria in order to distinguish  
between outer sensory and intellectual notions. Intellectual notions are 
different from out sensory notions because
every outer sensory notion is singular but o f intellectual 
notions some are singular and others common. Secondly, 
they differ because every outer sensory notion is intuitive
Lokert. Scriptum in m ateria notitiarum, [sig. a 7 ta-rb] Ulterius adverte pro 
ordine production!s talium notitiarum omnes in hoc conveniunt in homine prima 
notitia rei sensibilis immo prima simpliciter est sensitiva exterior postquam  
producitur sensitiva interior et post illam intellectiva.
Mair. In primum, d. 3 q. 4; \Jol. 36^^]. Sensitiva est prior intellectiva 
prioritate naturali et generationis licet non prior prioritate temporis vel instantis.
Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [sig. a b^h] Voco notitiam sensitivam  
illam  quæ vitaliter est immutativa sensus secundum quod huiusm odi et 
intellectivam  illam quæ vitaliter est immutativa intellectus secundum quod 
intellectus.
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but not every intellectual notion is intuitive; som e are 
abstractive. Thirdly, they differ because an outer sensory 
notion is incom plex but not every intellectual notion is 
incomplex but some are com plex. Fourthly, they differ 
because there can be an intellectual notion o f everything in 
the world but there cannot be a sensitive notion o f  
everything in the world since there cannot be a sensitive  
notion o f the insensible. Fifthly, they differ because more 
things are required to form a sensitive notion than an 
intellectual one.i^^
In light o f what has been said about the order o f their generation we
shall begin our discussion with a consideration o f sensory notions.
Mair gives the following definitions o f sensitive notion: “a sensitive
notion is a quality by which the sense formally s e n s e s ” , Sensory
notions are divided into outer sensory notions and inner sensory notions.
Outer sensory notions are partitioned into five modes o f external
sensation, viz., visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory. The
external senses are m odified when impressed upon by species in the
medium (species in medio). This impression, as we have seen, is not the
result o f a material migration o f the species from the object o f cognition
to the cognitive power. Rather, the cognitive power is vitally and
formally changed by means o f the production and multiplication o f
immaterial species in the medium. Outer sensory notions give rise to
mental terms. In light o f  this previous assertion Mair claims that “it is
Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, b 6^^]. Notitia intellectiva prius definitur
[See fn. 168] et differt a sensitiva exteriori quia omnis talis est singularis, sed 
aliqua intellectiva est singularis et aliqua communis. Secundo sic differunt quia 
omnis notitia sensitiva exterioris est intuitiva, sed non omnis intellectiva est 
intuitiva, sed aliqua abstractiva. Tertio differunt quia notitia sensitiva exterior est 
incomplexa, sed non om nis intellectiva quia aliqua est complexa. Quarto 
differunt quia omnium rerum mundi potest esse notitia intellectiva, sed non 
omnium potest esse transitiva [=sensitiva] quia non potest esse insensibilium. 
Quinto differunt quia plura requiruntur ad notitiam sensitivam formandam quam 
intellectivam.
John Mair. Posteriora, [i'/g. Ji 5^%]. Notitia sensitiva est qualitas qua 
formaliter sensus sentit.
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clear that the power o f sight (visus) and the act o f seeing (visio) are not 
the same. The power o f sight is the instrument o f seeing. Seeing is the 
act by means o f which the eye sees.”i^i It was agreed by the members 
o f the circle o f John Mair that outer sensory notions are intuitive, 
categorem atic, singular, incom plex, and absolute. G ervaise W aim  
asserts that it follow s from these features o f outer sensory notions that it 
is not possible for the power o f external sense to be deceived.
The powers o f  inner sense are so called because they are not 
modified by sensible things (sensibilia) unless, in the first instance, the 
external senses have first been modified by sensible things. Moreover, 
an interior notion is o f  such a nature that it endures for a longer time 
than one o f the outer s e n s e .  ^^ 3 There are four kinds o f  powers o f  
inner sense, nam ely, com m on sense (sensus communis)^ fantasy  
(phantasia), e stim ative  pow er (v is  œ s tim a tiv a )  and m em ory  
(m em oria)A ^  “Common sense”, Mair writes, “is so called because it 
knows the sensible, viz., things pertaining to the external senses and the 
acts o f the external senses and judges among them.” ^^  ^ In the same way
John Mair. Posteriora, [sig. n  5^%]. Et ita est duplex, scilicet exterior quæ 
iterum est quintuplex. Quædam est visio. Quædam est auditio. Quædam tactio. 
Quædam olfactio. Quædam gustatio. Ita quod quælibet harum est terminus 
mentalis. Ex quo perspicuum est non idem est visus et visio. Visus est 
instrumentum videndi. V isio actus mediante quo oculus videt. Et eodem modo 
de auditu et auditione et aliis potentiis et earum accidentibus dicatur.
162 Waim. Tractatus notitiarum, [5/^ .  c 3 v b ]  Prima propositio. Sensus exterior 
inquantum talis solum format notitias categorematicas, singulares, incomplexas, 
et absolutas. Unde sequitur quod sensus exterior non potest decipi quia non 
potest formare iudicium et tantum iudicium est deceptio. See also Lokert. 
Scriptum in m ateria notitiarum, [sig. a 7^^]. Dicitur primo potentia sensitiva 
exterior solum format notitias singulares, incomplexas, et absolutas.
163 Mair. Posteriora, [sig. ji 5^%]. Alia est notita sensitiva interior et talis est 
diutumior exteriori.
Mair. In secundum, d 8, q. 3; [fol. 55^^]. Quattuor sunt sensus interiores qui 
interiores dicuntur quia non immutantur a sensibilibus nisi prius sensus exteriores 
a sensibilibus immutentur, scilicet, sensus communis, phantasia, æstimativa, et 
memoria.
165 Mair. In secundum, d 8, q. 3; [Jot. 55i'b]. In primo est sensus communis et 
dicitur communis quia cognoscit sensibilia videlicet sensuum exteriorum et 
eorum actus et inter ilia iudicat.
R. N. Wood Chapter 3: Notions in General 103
that sensible species do not ordinarily inhere in the external senses it is 
also the case that the common sense is not fitted by nature to retain 
species for any length o f  time. It is the function o f  fantasy to judge o f  
present, sensible species and both to retain and to judge species  
reservatæ\ i.e., species that are preserved in the absence o f the sensible 
object. Fantasy is a-historical and is not able to discriminate between 
species in relation to their occurrence in time. The cogitative power 
{potentia cogitativa) in human beings which is the estim ative power 
(potentia æstimativa) in animals elicits species o f the insensate on the 
basis o f the sensible, for example, the sensible species o f a w olf inform a 
lamb that a w olf is present to the senses and this elicits fear in a lamb 
and this fear is not present in the sensible species. The memorative 
function, or the power o f inner sense known as memory, preserves 
species and, like fantasy, it is a container (area) o f  species. Memory is 
the power to judge by means o f preserved species not only things 
previously sensed but it is also able to judge o f these same things in 
time. Memorative notions are abstracted from present existence, that is, 
it is in virtue o f these notions that w e judge o f past existence and no 
evident judgm ents, other than the evident judgm ent concerning the 
existence o f the memorative notion itself, can be made in respect o f such 
notions. M em ory’s ab ility  to d iscrim inate temporal priority 
differentiates the memorative power o f inner sense from fantasy.
That notions o f inner sense are not intellectual notions is obvious 
because the notions o f inner sense have their origin in the powers o f  
inner sense which are said to have physical properties such as being 
more or less humid and are also said to be spatially located in different 
regions o f the head, for instance, memory is located in the occiput (in 
occipite).  The power o f inner sense is capable o f intuitive and 
abstractive notions, categorem atic and syncategorem atic notions.
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absolute and connotative notions, com plex and incom plex notions, 
apprehensive and judicative n o t i o n s . I t  was also maintained that these 
notions of inner sense were singular and discrete notions o f the sensibles 
which are, or were, intuitively known by means o f the outer senses.
In virtue o f this it was affirmed that the power o f inner sense is not 
capable o f forming a common notion. This is not without qualification.
It is stated that this does not rule out the ability o f inner sense to form “a 
common com plex notion composed o f  singulars”. However, it is not 
possible for the power o f inner sense to form an incom plex notion  
composed o f singulars i.e., a universal notion which presupposes an act 
of will and hence o f necessity an act o f intellect.
In contrast to sensory notions intellectual notions are not limited to 
sensitive intuitive notions. Crab explains that “an intellectual notion is a 
quality which form ally changes the intellect and which does not 
presuppose the external organs”.!^  Crab does not deny that it is not 
possible for the intellect to be separated in this lifetim e, but he does 
think that the body hinders the mind from knowing its objects, Mair 
makes the point that “sometimes the intellect has an intellectual notion 
of something without a sensitive notion o f it. This is obvious as regards
166 Waim. Tractatus notitiarum, [5 /g. c 3 vb] Secunda propositio. Sensus interior 
tarn in homine quam in bruto format notitias com plexas et incom plexas, 
absolutas et connotativas, categorematicas et syncategorematicas, apprehensivas, 
et iudicativas. Non tamen potest formare notitiam communem. See also Lokert. 
Scriptum in m ateria notitiarum, [5'/ .^ a 7^%]. Secundo dicitur potentia sensitiva 
interior potest formare notitias complexas et incomplexas sed non communes.
Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, [5 /^. b 2^%]. Sensus interior habet notitias 
singulares discretissimas illorum sensibilium  quæ a sensu exteriori intuitive 
cognoscuntur vel aliquando cognoscebantur.
Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, [sig. b Hb] Notitia intellectiva est qualitas 
formaliter immutativa intellectus non præsupponens organum exterius.
Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, [sig. b Ex isto sequitur quod licet intellectus
pro statu isto non possit cognoscere sensibilia intuitive sine organo corporeo ipsa 
tamen separata cognoscere potest sine quocumque organo. Corpus enim impedit 
animam ad perfecte cognoscendum obiectum.
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the notion we have o f God o f whom we have no sensitive notion.”!^ ® 
Hence, the intellect is not only able to form all the notions o f inner and 
outer sense notions but it is also capable o f  forming com m on and 
incom plex singular notions as w ell as connotative and absolute 
notions. In light o f these characteristics o f notions it is difficult to see 
how the notions o f inner sense are to be differentiated from intellectual 
ones. Indeed Crab points out that “it is difficult to assign a distinction 
between a inner sensitive notion from an intellective one, but such a 
distinction can be assigned because sometimes the intellect corrects the 
inner sense”. 172 For example when the intellect reveals to someone who 
is dreaming that what he is dreaming is not true.
At this point I report only the most general features o f sensory and 
intellectual notions since a more com plete and unified account w ill 
emerge as our discussion progresses. I will consider, in turn, the 
distinction between intuitive and abstractive notions, apprehensive and 
judicative notions, evident and inevident notions, and theoretical and 
practical notions.
170 Mair. Posteriora, [.yfg. Jt 5 ^b] Dicitur quod nonnumquam habetur notitia 
intellecttiva alicuius rei sine sensitiva eiusdem. Patet de notitia de Deo de quo 
nullam sensitivam habemus.
171 Waim. Tractatus notitiarum, c 3 ^h] Tertia propositio. Intellectus 
qualescumque notitias sensus format. Potest formare et cum hoc notitias 
communes. See also Lokert. Scriptum in m ateria notitiarum, [sig. a 7^^]. 
Tertio dicitur. Potentia intellectiva format notitias singulares et communes 
complexas et incomplexas, connotativas et absolutas.
172 Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, [.y/g. b 6^^]. Difficile est assignare discrimen inter 
notitiam sensitivam interiorem et intellectivam sed talis potest assignari quia 
nonumquam intellectus corripit sensum  interiorem unde in som nialibus 
intellectus iudica[n]s illud quod somniatur non esse verum.
C h a p t e r  4  
In t u it iv e  a n d  a b s t r a c t iv e  N o t io n s
INTRODUCTION
The members o f the circle o f John Mair maintained that knowledge, 
in the strict sense, is acquired in virtue o f  intuitive notions but 
knowledge is not o f the contingent, it is o f the universal. Knowledge 
concerns the knowable and treats o f propositions which are by nature 
fitted to becom e necessary and evident by means o f  sy llog istic  
reasoning. Moreover, scientific propositions are said to be open to 
question since they are not self-evident propositions (propositiones per  
se noîæ)X^^ Mair thinks that why a singular notion is known prior to a 
universal one is clear from the following:
Every intuitive notion is singular and the abstractive notion 
caused by it is, in the same way, singular. Any notion that 
w e have is either intu itive or abstractive, or one  
made up (fictum) by the intellect but any given made up 
notion (notitia f ic ta )  presupposes other prior singular 
notions. This is obvious from the Philosopher and the 
C om m entator (see  M eta p h ys ic s  12, C om m ent 4): 
Universals are drawn (collecta) from parts to the intellect 
which perceives (accipit) the similarity among them and 
forms a single intention. This itself is obvious from the first
173 Mair. In primum, p r o l ,  q. 4; \fol. 9^^]. Primus terminus est scientia quæ est 
circa propositionem scibilem . Propositio scib iiis est propositio necessaria 
dubitabilis nata fieri evidens per propositiones necessarias évidentes per 
discursum syllogisticum ad ipsam applicatas. Per primum terminum excluditur 
propositio contingens ut paries est al bus quod licet mi hi sit evidens non tamen est 
scibiiis scientia proprie dicta de qua loquitur Aristoteles primo Posterioruni et 5 
Ethicorum. Dicitur “dubitabilis” per hoc namque excluduntur propositiones per 
se notæ.
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book o f the Physics, Comment 5 that though the individual 
is not a principle in dem onstrative know ledge it is 
nevertheless a principle o f acquisition o f the universal 
w hich is the foundation o f  dem onstrative know ledge  
(doctrina). Moreover, a good many have singular notions 
o f external sensible things, and o f intellig ib les in the 
intellect, who do not form common notions. 174
In this passage there are several issues fundamental to the late-medieval
understanding o f  the nature o f the relationship o f know ledge o f the
singular to know ledge o f  the universal that w ill require further
elucidation. In a moment, detailed attention will be paid to the nature o f
the relationship o f the singular to the universal. However, I shall first
attend to some key features o f intuitive and abstractive notions. It will
be useful to begin our study o f intuitive and abstractive notions by
introducing some definitions.
INTUITIVE AND ABSTRACTIVE NOTIONS DISTINGUISHED
W hile it is implicit in all o f the definitions provided by the circle o f  
John Mair that sensitive intuitive cognitions are required for evident 
judgments it is only Gilbert Crab who renders this explicit. Crab gives 
the following account o f intuitive and abstractive notions:
174 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; [fol. 36^^]. Omnis notitia intuitiva est singularis, 
et abstractiva causata ab ilia est eodem modo singularis. Quælibet notitia quam 
habemus est intuitiva vel abstractiva vel una ficta ab intellectu, sed ilia fieta 
præsupponit aliquas notitias singulares priores. Hoc patet per Philosophum  
[M etaphysics, 980^26-981 ^ 7] et Commentatorem 12 M etaphysicæ Commenta 4  
[Averroes, Juntina 8, 292D]: Universalia sunt collecta ex parti bus ad intellectum  
qui accipit inter ea similitudinem et facit unam intentionem. Hoc ipsum patet 1 
Physicorum Commenta 5 [Aristotle, Physics, 18946-8 and Averroes Juntina 4, 
8FG] quod licet individuum non sit principium scientia demonstrativa est tamen 
principium acquisitionis universalis quod est principium doctrinæ demonstrativæ. 
Item plerique habent notitias sigulares sensibilium ad extra, et intelligibilium in 
intellectu, qui non formant notitias communes. References to Averroes are given 
in Gregory of Rimini. G regorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super primum et 
secundum sententiarum, [Volume 1, p. 397]. Juntina: A ristotelis omnia quæ 
extant opera et Averrois Cordubensis... commentarii, ed. Venetiss apud lunctas. 
Volumes 1-9, Suppl. 1-3, (1562-1574; Repr., Frankfurt, 1962).
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an intuitive notion, according to Ockham in the Prologue, is 
described as follows: it is an incomplex notion of something 
in virtue o f  which som e contingent truth especially  o f  
something present, can be evidently known; for exam ple, 
the outer vision by which I see Socrates is an intuitive 
notion o f  Socrates. Through it I judge evidently that 
Socrates exists when he exists; and if that same notion were 
preserved without that object, I would by the same notion 
judge Socrates not to exist as w ill be clarified in what 
follows. But an abstractive notion is a notion o f something 
in virtue o f which some truth o f something present cannot 
be known and it is different from an intuitive notion since 
an intuitive notion is always singular. Some abstractive 
notions are singular and some common and such a notion is 
had in the absence o f the object and it is never o f an outer 
sense since the outer sense always knows i n t u i t i v e l y .  175
The first feature o f intuitive notions is that they produce evident
assents. In contrast, abstractive notions; whether they are sim ply
abstractive in the sense o f abstracted from existence, or abstractive in the
sense that the abstractive notion is abstracted from the intuitive notions
o f many s i n g u l a r s  176; do not produce evident assents to the contingent
truths o f an object. The latter o f these is that which nominalists properly
175 Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, b 8^4] Notitiarum alia est intuitiva et alia est 
abstractiva unde notitia intuitiva, secundum Ockham in prologo, sic describitur: 
est notitia incomplexa alicuius rei virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci aliqua 
veritas contingens maxime de præsenti ut visio exterior qua video Sortem est 
intuitiva Sortis. Per illam iudico evidenter Sortem esse quando est et si 
conservaretur ilia eadem notitia sine obiecto per eandem iudicarem Sortem non 
esse ut in sequentibus declarabitur. Sed notitia abstractiva est notitia alicuius rei 
virtute cuius non potest evidenter cognosci aliqua veritas de præsenti et differt ab 
intuitiva quia intuitiva est semper singularis. Abstractiva aliqua est singularis et 
aliqua communis et talis notitia habetur in absentia obiecti et numquam est 
sensus exterioris quia sensus exterior semper intuitive cognoscit. See William of 
Ockham [Guillelmi de Ockham]. Opera Theologica. Scriptum in librum primum  
sententiarum, Prologus et Distinctio Prima (Ordinatio.), eds. Gedeon Gal and S. 
Brown (Bonaventure, 1967); [p. 31 line 25 to p. 32 line 5].
176 Waim. Tractatus notitiarum, [sig. e 6^4-rbj Duplex est abstractiva. Quædam 
vocatur abstractiva quia a pluribus singularibus abstracta et sic quælibet notitia 
communis est abstractiva et de tali non oportet quod sit productiva iudicii de 
fuisse. A lia est abstractiva quæ videlicet est singularis et synonym a cum  
intuitiva producta a specie vel habitu derelicto et talis est productiva iudicii de 
fuisse.
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understood as the universal and this sense o f abstractive is particularly 
important in developing a coherent understanding o f demonstrative 
knowledge {scientia demonstrativa). This will be the topic o f discussion  
in the next section. In this section our attention w ill be focussed on 
clarifying the sense o f abstractive notion explicitly contrasted, by the 
members o f the circle o f John Mair, with intuitive notions as the grounds 
for evident assents concerning the contingent truths o f an object. In later 
chapters the concept o f evidentness will occupy a central position in our 
discussion, but at this point it is necessary only to note that the essential 
features o f an evident assent are that it is naturally caused, unhesitant 
and t r u e .  177 M oreover, assent is given only to the objects o f a 
proposition and in the case o f intuitive notions, Mair writes that what is 
at issue is evidentness in a certain respect (evidentia secundum quid) or 
relative evidentness. Relative evidentness is the kind o f evidentness 
caused by intuitive notions o f the things signified by the extremes of a 
proposition, for example, assent to this “Socrates is white”i78. The fact 
that intuitive notions give rise to experiential knowledge or knowledge 
o f the fact is emphasized by George Lokert who writes :
It is said that an intuitive notion is that through which a 
contingent truth o f the object itself can be known, for 
example, that it is white or sitting, distant or near, or that 
the object exists or that it does not exist. In the opposite 
way, it is said that an abstractive notion is that through 
which a contingent truth o f the object itself cannot be 
known, and consequently, it is asserted that an experiential 
judgment (iudicium expérimentale) is caused by means o f  
an intuitive notion or by several intuitive notions and on
177 See Chapter 6: Evident Notions and Scientific Knowledge, n. b. pp. 150-155.
178 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 3; {fol. 6^4-vbj Evidentia secundum quid causatur 
ex notitia intuitiva rerum significatarum per extrema propositionis. Cf., Mair. 
Posteriora, [5 /^. a 5^4] Evidentia secundum quid est assensus sine formidine 
naturaliter causatus quo non est possib ile stante Dei influentia generali 
intellectum assentire et in sic assentiendo decipi.
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account o f this the term “to know” (scire), taken broadly, 
understood as experience, is called knowledge (scientia)
Mair gives substantially the same account o f intuitive notion but
renders explicit that judgments established on intuitive cognitions are
necessarily free from ampliation. He gives the following account:
an intuitive notion is that which is causative o f a judgment 
o f the accidental predicates o f  a thing from w hich  
am pliation is excluded. The fo llow in g  description is 
posited: An intuitive vision o f Socrates naturally causes the 
judgm ent o f the follow ing: “Socrates is large and has a 
given colour”. And this seeing is called seeing face to face 
(visio facia lis).  The other [notion] is abstractive and 
enigmatic. St. Paul mentions (tango) this distinction in the 
First Epistle to the Corinthians Chapter 13: “Now w e see 
through a mirror darkly (in ænigmate)', then, however, face 
to face. Now I know only in part (ex parte) , then, I know 
as I am known.” In virtue o f an abstractive notion I do not 
make a judgment o f the accidental predicates by means o f  a 
copula concerning the present [but] I judge correctly that 
Socrates, who was seen by me, was w hite. 8^0
179 Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [.s/g. c ?ra-rbj Notitia intuitiva dicitur 
per quam potest sciri aliqua veritas contingens de ipso obiecto ut quod sit album 
vel sedens, distans vel propinquum, vel quod illud obiectum existit aut quod 
ipsum non existit. Et opposito modo dicit notitiam esse abstractivam per quam 
non potest sciri aliqua veritas contingens de ipso obiecto, et consequenter asserit 
iudicium expérimentale causari mediante notitia intuitiva vel pluribus intuitivis et 
propterea capit large li scire ut experientia dicatur scientia.
180 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 32'^4-vbj Notitia intuitiva est ilia quæ est 
causativa iudicii de prædicatis accidentalibus rei de qua est seclusa ampliatione. 
Ponitur hæc descriptio naturaliter visio intuitiva Sortis naturaliter causat iudicium  
huius Sortes est magnus taliter coloratus. Et vocatur visio facialis. A lia est 
abstractiva et ænigmatica. Hanc distinctionem  tangit Apostolus primæ ad  
Corinthios 13; Videmus nunc per speciem in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad 
faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte tantum, tunc autem sicut cognitus sum. Virtute 
notitiæ abstractivæ non habeo iudicium de prædicatis accidentalibus medietate 
copula de præsenti bene iudico Sortes a me visus fuit albus. Cf., Mair. 
Posteriora, [sig. dd 2^4] Notandum est quod notitia intuitiva est quæ 
immediate aliquid in se cognoscere ut facialis visio quam de Sorte habeo. Notitia 
quæ est tactio in sensu tactus, olfactio in sensu olfactus, et ita in aliis, et quælibet 
talis est discreta suum obiectum cuius est intuitio præcise repræsentans et 
perfectissimum genus notitiarum est. Quælibet alia notitia vocatur abstractiva. 
Ista distinctio ex verbis apostoli elicitur: nunc autem per speculum in ænigmate 
cognoscim us in patria facie ad faciem , facialis et ænigmatica cum istis
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A n intuitive notion p e r  se  g ives rise only to present tensed  
contingent judgments which necessarily excludes ampliative terms from 
such judgments since ampliation “is the supposition o f a term for its 
significate or its significates in relation to terms im plying several 
different t e n s e s ” i 8 i _  Mair continues that in respect o f the term “tense” 
there are five kinds o f temporal difference: “is”, “was”, “w ill be”, “can 
be” and “is imagined to be”, Hence in virtue o f an intuitive notion it 
is possible to judge that the present tensed proposition “Socrates is 
white” is true but it is not possible, in virtue o f an intuitive notion, to 
judge that the proposition was true, will be true, or can be true. It is 
obvious then that intuitive notions represent their objects discretely and 
more clearly than other notions and therefore are said to be “the most 
perfect genus o f n o t i o n s ” . 1 8 3
Mair thought that it is obvious that it is more probable than not that 
intuitive and abstractive notions are essentially different in kind (specie 
essentiali différé). He explains: granted that there is an intuitive and an 
abstractive notion o f equal intensity, nevertheless, one notion represents 
its object more clearly than the other. Therefore, he concludes, they are 
different in kind.i^^ Similarly, intuitive and abstractive notions are 
essentially different in kind because they originate in different kinds o f  
cause. An intuitive notion naturally requires the presence o f the object
coincidunt. Cf., Gregory of Rimini. Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super 
primum et secundum sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3; [ Volume 1, pp. 390-391].
1^ 1 John Mair. De am pliatione  in In Petri H yspani summulas, (Paris, 1505);
[sig. gg 6^h] [Ampliatio] est suppositio termini pro suo significato vel suis 
significatis respectu terminis importantis diversas differentias temporum.
1 8 2  Mair. De ampliatione, [sig. gg 7 i‘4], ...quinque sunt differentiae temporales est, 
fuit, erit, potest esse, et imaginatur.
1 8 3  Mair. Posteriora, [sig. dd 2^4] ...et quælibet talis est discreta suum obiectum
cuius est intuitio præcise repræsentans et perfectissimum genus notitiarum est.
For more o f the relevant passage see fn. 180.
184 Mair. In prim um , d. 3 , q. 1; [Jol. 32rb]. Positio tamen ilia nobis apparet 
probabilior quæ tenet illas [viz., notitia intuitiva et abstractiva] specie essentiali 
differre. Quod patet quia illæ notitiæ supposita æquali intensione diversimode 
repræsentant suum obiectum una clarius quam alia. Ergo specie distinguuntur.
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and depends on it in the same way that light (lumen) depends on the 
luminous (luminosus). M oreover, from these features o f  intuitive 
notions, it is clear that it is not in our power to determine which intuitive 
notions w e have.i^^ It is not possible to positively w ill against the 
generation o f intuitive knowledge. The relation o f the cognitive power 
to the object o f perception is immediate, and it is only when this relation 
is destroyed that it is not possible to have an intuitive notion o f an 
object. Thus, it is possible to will against the generation of an intuitive 
notion only insofar as it is possible to destroy the relationship between 
the cognitive power and the object o f perception. For exam ple, the 
evident judgment “Socrates is white” can be willed against by closing  
on e’s eyes but is not possible to prevent the generation o f an intuitive 
notion without breaking the contact between perceiver and perceived. In 
contrast, the existence and the kind o f abstractive notions that we have, 
since they are caused by a species o f the object and an inner power, can 
be modified by acts o f intellect and acts o f will. Abstractive notions can 
be manipulated. Unlike intuitive notions which naturally require the 
presence and existence o f their objects, the existence o f the object in 
respect of abstractive notions is not required (peregrina)^^^ The use of 
the term "'perigrina” is interesting since it brings to mind the journey of 
the pilgrim. In the same way that the pilgrim moves away, so too is it 
possible for existence o f the object o f  an abstractive notion to move 
away without affecting the status o f the notion.
Intuitive notions prepare the way for abstractive notions. Intuitive 
notions in cooperation with the cognitive power produce a disposition
1 8 5  Mair. In prim um , d. 3, q. 1; {fol. 32^^]. Item causantur a causis diversis. 
Intuitiva naturaliter exigit præsentiam obiecti et dependet ab eo sicut lumen a 
luminoso, nec est in potestate nostra sufficienter ex his quæ sunt in nobis.
1 8 6  Mair. In prim um , d. 3, q. 1; {fol. 32i‘h]. Abstractiva causatur a specie et 
potentia interiori et est in potestate nostra cui existentia obiecti est peregrina.
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which, as experience teaches, facilitates the formation o f  abstractive 
notions o f objects previously intuitively known. H ow ever, this 
disposition neither facilitates, nor cooperates in, the production o f  
intuitive notions. This is the case because intuitive notions give rise to 
evident judgments concerning the contingent truths of an object in the 
presence o f the object. For example, I judge in virtue o f an intuitive 
notion that an object is white and that it exists. However, in light o f an 
abstractive notion no such judgment is f o r t h c o m i n g . ^ ^ 7  Abstractive 
notions, since they make no claim as regards the accidental predicates or 
contingent truths o f  objects require neither the presence nor the 
continued existence o f their objects. Abstractive notions abstract from  
existence.
There is, o f  course, the issue o f the relationship o f sensitive  
intuitive notions which cause judgments such as “ “Socrates is white” to 
abstractive notions like “Socrates, whom I have just seen, was white”” 
which are essentially intellective notions that abstract not only from  
existence, but also include am pliative terms. Are such judgm ents 
effectively caused by sensitive or intellectual intuitive notions? Mair 
responds that there are instances when intellectual judgments are caused 
solely in virtue o f intellectual intuitive notions, “as is obvious from the 
judgment that w e have concerning acts o f intellect or acts o f will where 
there is no sensitive intuitive notion and this will be the case in a mind 
separated (sc., from body)”. However, “a sensitive intuitive notion in 
the case o f contingent truths is not superfluous since it is a prior 
disposition or the cause o f the intellectual intuitive notion.”^^  ^ It is only
^^ 7 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 1; I/o/. 32^4] Notitia enim intuitiva producit unum 
habitum quiquidem habitus facilitât nos ad eundem in notitias abstractivas obiecti 
prius intuitive cogniti ut experientia docet sed non producit notitiam intuitivam 
cum non possumus iudicare de obiecto sicut dum erat in præsentia.
188 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 1; \fol. 3 2 ^h] Quando iudicium est intellectivum  
causatur a notitia intuitiva intellectiva, ut patet de iudicio quod habemus de
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in virtue o f the sensitive intuitive notion that it is possible to have an 
intellectual intuitive notion in respect o f the contingent truths o f an 
object.
INTUITIVE AND ABSTRACTIVE NOTIONS TERMINATE AT THE SAME
OBJECT
The question “Whether an abstractive notion terminates at the same 
object as an intuitive notion?” was the subject o f detailed consideration 
because o f  its implications for the possib ility o f having immediate 
knowledge o f the external world. Mair writes that on this matter there 
are two opinions. The first response, which is attributed to Gregory o f  
Rimini in the margin o f  the text, denies that intuitive and abstractive 
notions terminate at the same o b je c t .  189 Mair reports Gregory’s position 
as follows:
Intuitive notions terminate im m ediately at their objects 
while abstractive notions terminate at two different objects: 
the first object o f an abstractive notion is the species in 
relation to which there is an intuitive notion, and the second 
object o f an abstractive notion is the object first known 
intuitively at which the abstractive notion terminates 
secondarily, and in relation to which the notion is said to be 
abstractive. And though the species is known through that 
cognition, nevertheless we do not experience, nor do w e  
know evidently in virtue o f that abstractive cognition, that 
the species is o f such a thing. That is, w e experience the 
thing which is a species. But we do not experience it as a
actibus intellectus vel voluntatis ubi nulla est notitia intuitiva sensitiva, et ita erit 
in anima separata, sed notitia intuitiva sensitiva nunc non superfluit, quia est 
dispositio prævia, vel causa notitiæ intellectivæ.
1^  ^ Gregory of Rimini. G regorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super prim um  et 
secundum sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3; [Volume 1, p. 392]. Similiter, si notitia non 
immediate terminetur ad rem sed ad eius representativum [sc., species], sive ilia 
res existât sive non, abstractive cognoscitur. Et ideo, si significationem vocabuli 
quis velit ponderare, talis notitia videtur dicenda abstractiva, non quia abstrahat 
ab existentia rei, quasi ipsa existentia non possit abstractive cognosci, nec quia 
quodammodo abstrahit a præsentialitate obiectiva rei cognitæ. Nam in tali 
notitiæ modo non obicitur ipsa res immediate menti secundum se, ut dictum est, 
sed aliquod eius representativum et ideo quasi absens videtur cognosci res ipsa.
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species, but w e conclude that this is the case only probably
and discursively. 190
A notion is called abstractive not because it abstracts from  
ex istence, nor because it abstracts from the contingent truths o f  
singulars. It is called abstractive, according to Gregory, because the 
cognition terminates at a representative o f the object.
Opposed to this position Mair argues:
Through an abstractive cognition naturally follow ing an 
intuitive notion [the object] is known directly. And in the 
first instance that which was first known was known  
intuitively; but that was not the species enduring in the 
mind. Therefore [an abstractive notion does not terminate 
at the species]. The major premise is proved since there is 
no particular (propriam )  sim ple abstractive notion o f  
anything unless the thing was first known intuitively  
because experience teaches that my thinking is indifferently 
about things I have seen or heard since I think directly 
about such things.i9i
Mair continues:
it is vain to posit that we know two objects by means o f the 
same notion, one intuitively and the other abstractively, 
since everything can be preserved (salvari) by means o f a 
notion o f an external object. Again, either the species
1^ ® Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; \fol. 33*’^ ]. Circa hanc quæstionem duæ sunt 
opiniones. Una negative respondens tenens [in marg. Hactenus Grego. in 
secundo] quod notitia intuitiva immediate terminatur ad obiectum, abstractiva 
autem habet duo obiecta. Unum est species respectu cuius est notitia intuitiva, 
alterum est obiectum prius intuitive cognitum ad quod secundario terminatur 
respectu cuius dicitur notitia abstractiva. Et licet species per illam cogitationem  
cognascatur non tamen experimur nec evidenter cognoscim us virtute illius 
cognitionis quod ilia sit species talis rei, hoc est, rem quæ est species experimur 
non tamen experimur illam esse speciem sed hoc solum discursive et probabiliter 
concludimus.
Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; [fol. 33i‘h], Contra istam opinionem arguitur sic. 
Per cognitionem abstractivam naturaliter consequentem intuitivam cognoscitur 
directe, et primo illud quod primo fuit cognitum intuitive. Sed illud non fuit 
species manens in anima. Ergo. Maior probatur quia nullius rei naturaliter 
habemus propriam simplicem abstractivam nisi prius fuerit cognitum intuitive 
quia experientia docet quod cogitatio mea fertur indifferenter super ea quæ vidi 
vel audivi quia directe de re tali et tanta.
R. N. Wood Chapter 4: Intuitive and Abstractive Notions 116
would terminate at something imm ediately or not. The 
second alternative should not be maintained by you. If the 
first alternative is held; then, in the sam e w ay, an 
abstractive notion ought to terminate im m ediately at an 
external thing. Thus, it is superfluous to posit an actual 
notion terminating immediately at the species and mediately 
at the external object. 192
This is, as Mair points out, a position untenable by anyone, especially
Gregory o f Rimini.
Despite Mair’s rejection o f Gregory’s position, he is not averse to
adopting certain elements o f his opponent’s system which though true
are assumed falsely in the course o f Gregory’s p r o o f .  193 in other words,
Mair explicitly adopts only those propositions which he thinks actually
refute the position Gregory is attempting to advance. In the first
instance Gregory
supposes something which anyone is able to experience in 
them selves, namely, that whenever someone thinks about 
som e sensible thing not then present that he has seen  
elsewhere, for example, something which is a lion or is like 
a lion is an immediate object o f his cognition. Just as when 
som eone sees with his eyes the colour on the wall that 
colour is the im m ediate object o f  his seeing so also, 
therefore, I always experience with certainty.... Gregory in 
his reasoning argues as follows: there is no reason why a 
person sees that som e thing exists (esse)  through the 
external sense and sees other contingent truths about the 
thing except that he knows the thing in itself immediately.
1^  ^ Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; \fo l  3 3  Præterea frustra ponitur quod per
eandem notitiam cognoscamus duo obiecta, unum intuitive et aliud abstractive 
cum omnia possint salvari cognoscendo solum per illam notitiam obiectum ad 
extra. Rursus vel species terminatur ad rem ad extra immediate vel non. 
Secundum non est dicendum per te. Si primum ergo eodem  modo notitia 
abstractiva debet immediate terminari ad obiectum ad extra. Et sic supervacanee 
ponitur notitiam actualem terminari ad speciem  immediate et mediate ad 
obiectum ad extra.
193 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 3 3  ^4j Ponit Gregorius aliquas conclusiones
quas reputo veras licet in probatione (opinione mea) falsa assumat. Et assumo 
solum aliqua quæ conclusioni positæ repugnare videntur.
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So therefore this would be the case in the foregoing if the 
internal cognition itse lf terminated im m ediately at the 
external object. To this position his contemporary [sc..
Rathe Scotus] answered saying that there was another 
reason since the seeing by the external sense is an intuitive 
notion in virtue o f which such contingent truths are able to 
be known. But the cognition o f an absent thing is an 
abstractive notion by which such truths cannot be known.
But he himself [sc., Gregory] argues against this by asking 
which notion and on what basis som ething is called an 
intuitive notion o f something. Either you might say that an 
intuitive notion is that which terminates immediately [and] 
objectively at that thing and therefore you say that it is 
intuitive since it terminates im m ediately. And then it 
fo llow s that if  the interior cogn ition  is im m ediately  
terminated at the external thing that cognition is an intuitive 
notion. And further the inference fo llow s [viz., that the 
cognition is an abstractive notion]. Or you might say that 
the notion is intuitive since (as some say) that by means of  
an intuitive notion one is able to know that the thing is if it 
is and know that the thing is not if it is not and other 
contingent truths concerning the thing. And when it is said 
that this cannot be known by means of such a notion since it 
is it not intuitive and through it can because it is intuitive, 
that is no different than saying that through it [sc., 
abstractive notion] one is not able [to know such truths] and 
at the same time to say that one is able to [know such 
truths] since, by means of it [sc., an abstractive notion], one 
is able to [know such truths]. And this is to resolve the 
question by itself. Similarly, another person could have 
said that it can be known through cognition, and not 
through seeing, therefore, it would be called intuitive and 
the outer seeing a b s t r a c t i v e .  ^ 9 4
194 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; \JoL 33^4] g t primo supponit unum quod 
quilibet experiri potest in seipso, videlicet quod quandocumque aliquis cogitat de 
aliqua re sensibili non tunc præsente quam alias vidit, verbi gratia, de leone ita 
suæ cognitioni immediate obiicitur aliquid quod est leo vel simile leoni. Sicut 
cum quis intuetur oculis colorem in pari etc immediate sue visioni obiicitur color 
ille sic ergo pro certo semper experior... Arguit ratione Gregorius sic. Quia nulla 
ratio est propter quam videns rem aliquam immediate per sensum exteriorem
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The critics o f Gregory o f Rimini draw to our attention that if  you accept 
G regory’s position and grant that intuitive and abstractive notions 
terminate at their objects with different immediacy then you must accept 
that there is an unbridgeable gap between abstractive notions and the 
external object. Both Rathe Scotus 195 and Ockham thought that it was 
necessary for abstractive notions and intuitive notions to terminate with 
the same immediacy at the external object. Rathe Scotus preserves the 
distinction between abstractive and intuitive notions by claiming that 
intuitive notions are contingent upon the presence o f the object to the 
senses. Similarly, Ockham argues that intuitive notions allow judgments 
about the existence and non-existence of the object where abstractive 
notions do not. If one accepts Gregory’s claim that an abstractive notion 
terminates immediately at the intuitive notion and only mediately, or 
secondarily at the external object, then one is effectively claiming that 
an abstractive notion is simultaneously abstractive and intuitive. This is
novit illam esse, et alias veritates contingentes de ipsa nisi quia illam in seipsa 
immediate cognoscit. Ita igitur esset in proposito si cogitatio ipsa interior ad rem 
extra immediate terminaretur. Ad hoc respondebat {in marg., loannes Scotus) 
eius concurrens dicens quod alia ratio erat, scilicet, quia visio sensus exterioris 
est notitia intuitiva cuius virtute tales veritates contingentes cognosci possunt. 
Cogitatio vero rei absentis est notitia abstractiva per quam non possunt tales 
veritates cognosci. Sed contra hoc arguit ipse quærendo quam notitiam et qua 
ratione vocabat intuitivam alicuius rei, aut enim cam que immediate terminatur 
obiective ad illam  rem, et ideo dicis cam intuitivam quia sic immediate 
terminatur. Et tunc sequitur quod si cogitatio interior immediate terminatur ad 
rem ad extra, ipsa est notitia intuitiva. Et ulterius sequitur illatum. Vel dicis 
intuitivam quia (ut aliqui dicunt) potest per illam sciri esse si est, et non esse si 
[non] est, et alias veritates contingentes de ilia. Et cum dicitur hoc non potest 
sciri per huiusmodi notitiam, quia non est intuitiva et per illam potest quia est 
intuitiva, non est aliud quam dicere per illam non potest et per illam potest, quia 
potest per illam. Et est solvere quæstionem per seipsam. Similiter poterat alius 
dicere per cogitationem potest illud cognosci et non per visionem eo quod illam 
dicet intuitivam et visionem  exteriorem abstractivam.
It is certain that the loannes Scotus to whom a reference appears in the margins 
is John Rathe Scotus. John Rathe, is reported by Gregory to have been one of his 
opponents who had aligned him self with W illiam of Ockham in his bid to 
eliminate species in the medium from the cognitive process. Alphonsus Vargas 
de Toledo, to whom we are indebted for our knowledge of Rathe's philosophical 
position, refers to Rathe’s arguments as both “beautiful and subtle”. See 
D. E. R. Watt. A Biographical Dictionary o f Scottish Graduates to A.D. 1410, 
(O xford, 1977); [pp. 465-466 ] and Tachau. Vision and C ertitude,
[pp. 368-371].
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tantamount to claiming that by means o f an abstractive notion one can 
and cannot make judgments about the existence and non-existence o f  
object. An abstractive notion cannot be both not abstractive and 
abstractive. Mair responds to these various positions which are opposed 
to Gregory o f Rimini’s position by favouring the response o f John Rathe 
Scotus and Ockham but indicates his preference for the latter position.
This is despite the fact that both these thinkers had denied the existence 
of species in the medium as part o f the cognitive process. He explains:
I answer by denying that the given response is not valid.
And when he argues in the course of his inquiry I grant the 
second part o f the argument since, naturally, by reason o f an 
intuitive notion w e form a judgm ent concerning the 
existence o f  the thing and concerning the accidental 
predicates o f it, not that the intuitive notion causes a notion 
concerning the non-existence o f a thing, though by the 
definition o f “intuitive notion” and its judgment we know 
discursively that the thing is not present; just as, by the 
deprivation o f light the intellect knows shadows. And when 
he says that this is to solve the question by itself, because 
the other [sc., Gregory] said that by means o f an abstractive 
notion a judgment is generated by which we judge o f the 
accidental predicates o f  the thing and not through the 
intuitive [notion], this should not be said. It is well known 
that we have two notions and in virtue o f one we are able to 
judge much that w e are not able to judge in virtue o f the 
other. The former w e call intuitive and the latter 
abstractive. The abstractive immediately terminates at the 
external thing and nevertheless in virtue o f it w e are not 
able to judge o f the accidental predicates of the thing.196
196 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; \fol. ggva-vb^ Respondeo negando quod 
responsio data non valet. Et quando arguit inquisitive do secundum membrum 
quia naturaliter ratione notitiæ intuitivæ formamus iudicium de existentia rei, et 
de prædicatis accidentalibus eius, non quod ilia notitia causat iudicium de non 
existentia rei licet per definitionem notitiæ intuitivæ et eius iudicii discursive 
cognoscim us rem non esse præsentem sicut per defectum luminis intellectus 
cognoscit tenebras. Et cum dicit hoc est solvere quæstionem per seipsam quia 
alius (sc., Gregorius Ariminensis) diceret per notitiam abstractivam generatur 
iudicium quo iudicamus prædicata accidentalia de re et non per intuitivam. I stud
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The impact o f  Gregory o f  Rimini as a critic o f  Ockham ist 
epistemology could not be ignored by Mair who derived a number o f his 
insights from W illiam of Ockham. The second argument o f Gregory to 
which Mair responds is reported as follows:
Second, he argues by inquiring into how through that which 
you call intuitive such truths can be known. It does not 
seem that there is any reason except this, namely, that it is 
terminated im m ediately and objectively at the external 
thing. Therefore, similarly it should be said concerning 
cognition  if  it terminated im m ediately at the thing.
Afterwards, if you wish, you may call it either intuitive or 
abstractive since it does not matter what words you use.
Therefore, what is left is that at which such a cognition is 
immediately and objectively terminated is not something
external. 197
Mair answers that “the reason (causa) is because cognition is itself 
of such a nature”. 198 He explains that “we experience in the presence o f  
an object that we have a notion which causes in us an evident judgment 
that it is o f  such a colour and shape”. 199 Mair envisages the follow ing
nihil est dictum. Pal am enim est a nobis habere duas notitias et virtute unius 
multa possumus iudicare quæ non possumus iudicare virtute alterius. Priorem 
intuitivam vocamus et posteriorem abstractivam. Abstractiva terminatur 
immediate ad rem ad extra et tamen virtute illius non possumus iudicare de 
prædicatis accidentalibus illius rei.
197 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; [Jol. 33^^]. Secundo arguit quærendo quare per 
illam quam dicis intuitivam possunt tales veritates cognosci. Nec videtur quod 
ratio aliqua reddi potest præter hanc scilicet quod immediate obiective terminatur 
ad rem ipsam igitur similiter dicendum erit de cogitatione si immediate ad rem 
terminetur. Si cam postmodum velles vocare intuitivam sive abstractivam quia 
de vocabilis non debet esse cura. Relinquitur ergo quod illud ad quod cogitatio 
talis immediate obiective terminetur non est res aliqua ad extra. See Gregory of 
Rimini. G regorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super prim um  e t secundum  
sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3; [Volume 1, 390]. Si quis autem non velit tales notitias 
simplices voeare intuitivas vel abstractivas sed aliter, et alias velit his nominibus 
nuncupare, liberum ei est nec de nomine debet fieri contentio, dummodo constet 
de re, scilicet quo quædam est notitia sim plex qua res immediate in se 
cognoscitur, et quædam qua mediante aliquo repræsentativo cognito.
1^  ^ Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; [fol. 3 3 ^^ ]^. Ad secundum dico quod causa est 
quia talis ipsa est talis naturæ.
199 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; [fol. 3 3 ^hj Quæro ab eo quare ignis calefacit. 
Experimur quod in præsentia obiecti habemus unam notitiam quæ in nobis causat 
iudicium evidens quod res præsens est talis coloris, talis figuræ.
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kinds o f situation: when we experience a fire we might judge that it is 
small or large, and that it is either warm or hot. Mair continues: “The 
situation is different as regards a notion that we have in the absence of  
the object”.200 in the absence o f an object it is not possible to have 
evident judgments regarding its contingent properties. Hence, in the 
absence of a fire, it is not possible to judge that a fire is large or small or 
that it is warm or hot. Mair agrees that the terms em ployed to refer to 
intuitive and abstractive notions are simply conventions but this does not 
make them any the less legitimate.^oi pie concludes that “the com plex  
judgment follow ing that intuitive notion is also called an intuitive 
notion”.202 Undoubtedly, the complex judgment to which Mair refers in 
this instance is the proposition to which the intuitive notion itself gives 
rise. The judgment is therefore com plex by extrinsic denomination.203 
Mair infers from the above that it is obvious that intuitive and 
abstractive notions are not differentiated on account o f their terminating 
at an external object with different immediacy since “each terminates 
equally immediately at the external object”. 0^4
Thirdly, Mair reports, that it is argued that intuitive and abstractive 
notions terminate at different objects on the basis that it is possible for 
someone who has never sensed a given thing by means o f the external 
senses to have that thing as an object o f thought in the same way as 
som eone who has experienced that thing by means o f  the external 
senses. He writes:
200 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; [Jol. 33^^]. Secus est de notitia quam habemus in 
absentia rei.
201 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; [fol. 33^^]. Quocumque nomine non refert, sed in 
modo loquendi una vocatur intuitiva et altera abstractiva.
202 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; [fol. 33^^]. Et potest dici quod iudicium  
complexum sequens illam notitiam intuitivam etiam vocetur notitia intuitiva.
0^3 For a discussion of extrinsic denomination see pp. 147-149.
^04 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 2; [fol. 3 3 ^h] gx  isto patet quod non est propterea 
quia terminatur ad obiectum ad extra cum utraquæ æque immediate ad obiectum  
ad extra terminetur.
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someone who has seen an elephant describes to someone, 
who has never seen one, that it is o f such a shape or that its 
limbs are organized in a certain way. There occurs in the 
listener a likeness o f the elephant which occurs to the 
speaker especially if he describes the elephant distinctly and 
perfectly and this description stimulates the internal powers 
o f the listener. It is agreed that on hearing this description 
the notion would not terminate at a true elephant outside the 
mind since it is not universal, since such is not granted, nor 
is it any or every singular. This is clear. Nor is there any 
reason why it should be one singular than another, since no 
elephant will ever have been seen by the hearer. Therefore, 
no real elephant is an immediate object for the listener, nor 
therefore for the s p e a k e r .  2 0 5
Mair begins resolving this objection by indicating the issues that 
require clarification:
according to him (sc., Gregory) an abstractive notion  
terminates immediately at the species and mediately at the 
external thing. I ask at which species this abstractive notion 
terminates. It does not terminate at the species o f elephant 
“a” since this elephant is not sensed. And as a result no 
simple and singular notion is had o f an elephant “a”. In the 
same way this would be true o f any other e l e p h a n t . 2 0 6
Hence, according to Mair, Gregory’s position fails to show in what way
the notion caused by the description is simple and singular granted since
an intuitive notions is by its very nature simple, singular, and true. The
2 0 5  Mair. In primum, q. 3, d. 2; \Jol. 34^4] ...aliquis qui vidit elephantem narrat 
alicui qui numquam vidit, qualis figuræ sive dispositionis membrorum sit, 
audienti occurrit sim ile eius quod occurrit narranti præsertim si ille distincte 
narrat et perfecte, et audiens bene viget potentiis interioribus et constat quod 
audienti non obiicitur verus elephans extra animam, quia non universalis, cum  
non sit dare talem, nec quælibet vel omnis singularis. Hoc est clarum. Nec est 
ratio quare unus singularis potius quam alius, cum ipse numquam aliquem  
viderit. Igitur nullus verus elephans obiicitur immediate tali audienti, igitur nec 
narranti.
2 0 6  Mair. In primum, q. 3, d. 2; \Jol. 34^4] Quia secundum cum notitia 
abstractiva terminatur immediate ad species et mediate ad rem ad extra tamen 
quæro ad quas species ista notitia terminatur. Non ad species “a” elephantis quia 
talis non est sensatus. Et per consequens nulla sim plex et singularis notitia 
habetur “a” elephantis. Et eodem modo respectu cuiuslibet alterius elephantis.
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second difficulty is that in the position espoused by Gregory the 
“abstractive notion terminates mediately at the object according to him  
and the mediate object is the elephant. I ask at which elephant does the 
abstractive notion terminate? And this seems o f equal weight against the 
advocate o f this position as it is against its opponents. Therefore, 
whether it is solved or not, no one ought to be led by this argument to 
hold this opinion with him.”207 On the basis o f these claims Mair writes:
And I say to his argument two things. The first response is: 
whatsoever species is discovered, at which that cognition is 
terminated, that species is o f  some object or o f  som e  
objects. Moreover, the cognition terminates at that object 
or at those objects o f which it is a or o f which they are a 
species, but never at the species. Secondly, I say that he has 
no notion which has terminated at a given elephant but he 
has a notion which terminated at sensed things. I have been 
told that an elephant is an animal with a big, curved nose, is 
white in color, is carrying a castle on its back. Prior to 
having seen the elephant I have seen noses, and white 
horses, and castles. I form notions o f these other things 
sensed by me. I think about a white horse seen by me, and 
about a stony skin nose which I have seen depicted. And 
likewise with the castle. Moreover the intellect is able to 
unite th ese s im p le  n o tion s and to apply them  
interchangeably believing that those notions represent that 
elephant though they represent no particular elephant’.
Perhaps one believes that one has a concept o f an elephant 
just as a man having a concept o f a human being and a 
donkey unites the concepts in an incom patible manner 
(modo incompossibili). For example, as is obvious in the 
case o f someone dreaming and this someone is able to do 
while awake. Som etim es som eone is able to unite the 
concepts o f  things sensed together which agree with a 
possible being. Now, I m yself have never in fact seen the 
city which is called St. Andrews but through those who 
report to me about its | castle , the monastery, the ocean, the
^07 Mair. In primum, q. 3, d. 2; \Jol. 34^4] Rursus notitia abstractiva terminatur 
mediate ad obiectum per eum. Et obiectum mediatum est elephans. Quæro ad 
quem elephantem terminatur. Et sic hoc videtur æqualis ponderis contra 
factorem sicut contra adversarios. Ergo sive solvatur sive non nemo debet duci 
hoc argumento ad opinandum cum eo.
R. N. Wood Chapter 4: Intuitive and Abstractive Notions 124
college, and other things I form my idea about those other 
things sensed by me and this idea is terminated at those 
th ings seen  before and it is term inated  at the 
conglom eration o f  these things which are able to be 
combined simultaneously into the composition o f a city and 
thus this composition is o f possible t h i n g s . ^ ^ 8
It is beyond a doubt that, according to Mair there is simply no possible
justification for the claim that intuitive and abstractive notions terminate
at different objects: Intuitive and abstractive notions terminate at the
same external object with equal immediacy.
A b s t r a c t i v e  n o t i o n s  a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  d e m o n s t r a t i v e
KNOWLEDGE
In the first section we canvassed various aspects o f  intuitive notions 
and limited our discussion o f abstractive notions to the sense o f being 
abstracted from existence. In this section we will explicitly consider the 
relationship o f the singular intuitive notion and abstractive notion to the 
formation o f universal abstract notions; for it is in virtue o f intuitive and 
abstractive notions that universal notions are possible. It will be helpful 
to recall Mair’s definition o f a universal notion.
208 Mair. In primwn, d. 3, q, 2; [foL 34^^]. Et dico ad argumentum duo. Primum 
est. Quacumque specie reperta ad quam ilia cogitatio terminatur ilia est species 
alicuius obiecti vel aliquorum. Cogitatio autem terminatur ad illud obiectum vel 
ilia obiecta cuius vel quorum species, sed nullatenus ad species. Secundo dico 
quod nullam notitiam habet terminatam ad aliquem elephantem sed habet 
notitiam terminatam ad res sensatas. Narratur mihi elephantus est animal magno 
et curvo naso, albi coloris, ferens castellum in dorso. Ante ea vidi nasos et equos 
albos, et castellum. Formo notitias illarum rerum alias a me sensatarum. Cogito 
de equo albo a me viso et de naso lapideo quem vidi depictum. Et ita de Castro. 
Intellectus autem potest unire illas notitias sim plices et cas applicare mutuo 
credens quod illæ notitiæ repræsentent elephantem quæ nullum repræsentant. 
Forte credit se habere conceptum elephantis sicut homo habens conceptum  
hominis et asini unit illos conceptus modo incompossibili ut patet in somniante et 
hoc facere potest in vigilia. Interdum quis potest unire conceptus rerum 
sensatarum mutuo quod enti possibili conveniant. Ego iam de facto numquam 
vidi urbem nomine Sanctum Andream per cos qui mihi referunt de arce, cenobio, 
oceano, et collegio, et reliquis fingo cogitatum meum super res alias a me 
sensatas quæ cogitatio ad res illas ante visas terminatur et ad illarum rerum 
congeriem quæ possunt simul colligi ad urbis compositionem et sic compositio 
rerum possibilium.
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Any notion that we have is either intuitive or abstractive, or 
one made up (fictum) by the intellect but any given made up 
notion (notitia  f ic ta )  presupposes other prior singular 
notions. This is obvious according to the Philosopher and 
the Commentator (see  M etaphysics  12, C om m ent 4):
Universals are drawn (collecta) from parts to the intellect 
which perceives (accipitur) the similarity among them and 
forms a single intention. This itself is obvious from the first 
book o f the Physics, Comment 5 that though the individual 
is not a principle in dem onstrative know ledge it is 
nevertheless a principle o f acquisition o f  the universal 
which is the foundation o f  dem onstrative know ledge  
(doctrina) Moreover, a good many have singular notions 
o f externally sensible things, and o f the intelligible in the 
intellect, who do not form common n o t i o n s .
H owever, it might be objected that the proper interpretation o f
Aristotle’s remark in the Physics  is to imply that the natural way (via
innata) o f knowing proceeds from that which is more universal to that
which is less universal. This was the position favoured by A q u i n a s ^ i o
who in support o f it borrowed the fo llow ing from the Physics:^^^
Children at first call all w om en— “mother”, and in the same way, they
initially call all m en— “father”. It is only after they have become
accustomed to calling by name that they determine which refer to this
person or that person as “mother” or “father” .212 This position is
209 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36^^]. For the Latin see fn. 174. Cf., Gilbert 
Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, c 4 rb-vaj ...prima notitia sensus est notitia 
intuitiva. Sic similiter prima notitia intellectus. Modo omnes tales notitiæ sunt 
singulares unde pro universale in proposito intelligas conceptum communem  
pluribus rebus aut signum aliquid significans. Hoc supposito, sic arguo. 
Antequam universale formetur ab intellectu aliquod singulariter est cognitum. 
Igitur. Singulariter est prius cognitus ab intellectu quam universale. Antecedens 
patet quia implicat abstrahere conceptum universalem ab aliquibus rebus nisi illæ 
res fuerint prius cognitæ vel ergo cognoscuntur in seipsis et tunc habetur 
propositum quod intuitive cognoscuntur quia quælibet talis est singularis aut in 
specie et iterum habetur intentum.
210 Aquinas. Summa Theologiœ, Prima Pars, q. 85, a. 3.
211 Aristotle. Physics, [184^12-14].
212 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36i’^ ]. Sed contra istam conclusionem  
arguitur a magis universalibus ad minus universalia innata est nobis via, primo 
Physicorum. Hoc probat Philosophas a signo: pueri primo appellant omnes
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strengthened by the argument that when something is perceived at a 
distance it is first known under the concept o f being and afterwards we  
know that, that being is a body and are uncertain as to whether it is a tree 
or an animal. Later still it is known to be an animal but there is doubt as 
to its species. Finally, it is known that it is a human being and that it is 
neither Socrates nor Plato. Therefore, the opponents o f Mair concluded 
that the origin o f notions proceeds from the universal to the particular.2i3 
In response to this position  Mair cla im s that this is to 
misunderstand the doctrine for which A ristotle was arguing. His 
response draws our attention to the fact that one must distinguish  
between the order in which knowledge is acquired (ratio cognoscendi)  
and the order in which know ledge ought to be expounded (ratio 
docendi). Mair writes “Aristotle intends to show that having to teach 
som e doctrine to the community one ought to begin from the more 
universal and gradually descend to singulars w hich he h im self  
undertakes in that part o f the Physics  writing (tradens), in the first 
instance, about being in motion (de ente Mair continues that
it is obvious that the illustration em ployed by his opponents does not 
advance their position granted that a lamb, which has never formed a 
universal, judges that this white sheep is its mother and afterwards that it 
this one or that one. This originates in the fact that in the beginning they 
have notions that are imperfect in kind or in degree. Or, on account o f
feminas matres, postea hanc vel illam; sic omnes viros patres, postea determinate 
hunc vel ilium appellitant.
213 Mair. In primum, d. 3 , q. 4; \Jol. Et confirmatur. Quando aliquid
sentitur a remotis primo cognoscitur sub conceptu entis et scimus illud esse ens, 
postea corpus, dubitantes an sit arbor an animal. Postea cognoscitur esse animal 
dubitando de qua specie animalis et post[ea] cognoscitur esse homo et non Sortes 
neque Plato. Ergo origo notitiæ provenit ab universalioribus procedendo ad 
singularia.
2N  Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \Jol. 361*4]. Philosophas enim vult ostendere quod 
habens tradere aliquam doctrinam communitati debet prius incipere ab 
universalioribus et gradatim descendere ad singularia quod ipse in ilia parte facit 
in primis de ente mobili tradens in libris Physicorum.
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the abundance o f humours the notion is insufficient to cause a judgment 
concerning the proposition: “This is mother”. N evertheless that notion 
causes a judgment through which the lamb judges that this is its mother 
and not an ass. Afterwards, having a more perfect dispositional notion, 
it judges better. This is similar to the way that little children judge
wrongly.215
In a similar way, the claim that something perceived at a distance is 
first known under the universal concept o f being and then under the less 
universal concept o f species, etc., is almost solved. Mair explains that 
while someone who sees something at a distance has a singular intuitive 
notion o f that which the notion represents, that notion is not in-itself  
sufficient to cause a judgment concerning a proposition such as “This is 
Socrates.” or “This is Plato.”. It is, however, quite sufficient to cause a 
judgment concerning a proposition such as “This is this.” It is only when 
one draws nearer to the object that a more perfect notion is had o f the 
object and this notion causes a judgment that this object is Socrates or 
that this object is a human being .216 It is obvious that Mair is indicating 
that we do not judge an object under the concept o f being because 
knowledge o f the universal precedes knowledge o f the singular; rather, 
he is claiming that we place distant objects under common or universal
215 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 361*4]. quod signum Philosophi 
assumptum non iuvat adversarios patet de agno qui nullatenus format universalia 
qui in primis quamlibet ovem  albam quam iudicat esse matrem postea hanc vel 
illam. Hoc provenit propterea quod in principio habent notitias imperfectas sive 
in specie sive in gradu, sive propter abundantiam humorum qui non eausat 
indicium suffciens de hoc complexo, “hæc est mater”. Ilia notitia tamen eausat 
indicium per quod agnus iudicat ovem esse matrem et non asinum. Postea habita 
perfection notitia melius iudicat sic est de puerulis sinistre iudicantibus.
216 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \foL 36i*4-rb] Confirmatio ferme solvitur quia 
dum quis videt aliquid a remotis habet notitiam intuitivam de illo quae est 
singularis repraesentans rem demonstratam, sed ilia notitia non sufficit causare 
indicium de hoc complexo “hoe est Sortes” bene eausat tale indicium “hoc est 
hoc”. Accedente obiecto habetur perfectior notitia illius quae eausat indicium  
quod hoc est Sortes vel homo.
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concepts in virtue o f the fact that at a distance we are able to have only  
imperfect notions of those objects.
An opponent o f the solution Mair proposes might ask on what basis 
one is more likely to form a judgment concerning the proposition “This 
is a body” rather than assenting to the proposition “This is an animal” or 
“This is a human being”.2D The reason, according to Mair,
is that it is more to difficult to judge difference among 
anim als them selves o f am ong human beings than to 
apprehend that this is a body. It is easier to know the whole 
than the parts. Now the superior is a kind o f whole, but 
here vague singular notions are had first which are united 
by means o f demonstrative pronoun and a common term, 
or, this aggregate takes the place o f a singular term not yet
imposed. 218
This is challenged on the grounds that “since universals are better known 
to us it would follow that metaphysics is prior to other sciences in the 
way o f  expounding doctrine since m etaphysics concerns the most 
u n i v e r s a l . ” 2 1 9  Mair declares that “this consequence is null but claims 
that the difficulty with m etaphysics does not arise with respect to 
universals; rather, the d ifficu lty  originates because it repeatedly 
descends to the most specific things quidditatively considered and 
touches upon God and separated intelligences which are difficult to
217 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36rb], Sed rogabis quid causæ est quare 
magis format iudicium de hoc complexo, “hoc est corpus”, quam de isto, “est 
animal vel homo”.
218 Mair. In primum, d. 3 , q. 4; \Jol. 36^^]. Respondetur id causæ est quia 
difficilius est iudicare differentiam animalium inter se vel hominum quam 
deprehendere hoc esse corpus. Facilius est cognoscere totum quam partem. 
Modo superius est quoddam totum sed hie prius habentur notitiæ singulares vagæ 
quæ conflantur ex pronomine demonstrativo et termino communi vel istud 
aggregatum supplet vicem termini singularis nondum impositi.
219 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \foL 36^^]. Sed tunc dicis cum universalia sint 
nobis notiora sequeretur quod metaphysica esset prior aliis scientiis via doctrinæ 
cum ipsa sit de universalissimis.
R. N. Wood Chapter 4: Intuitive and Abstractive Notions 129
g r a s p . ” 2 2 0  They are difficult and interesting issues because they are not 
im m ediately available to human cognition. Indeed, though not 
m entioned in this context, our know ledge o f  God and separated 
in te llig e n ce s  such as an g e ls, is by a n a lo g y  through their  
accomplishments.
The exchange over the cognition o f objects at a distance, and the 
debate over the priority of singular notions with particular reference to 
the cognition of objects at a distance, continues when Mair is challenged 
to explain why, given that there are two individuals approaching at equal 
distances from the observer and only one of them, namely “a”, is known 
to the observer while the other is com pletely unknown to the observer 
both in appearance and by name, the observer is no more certain about 
“a” than about the other.221 According to the opponent there are already 
two notions o f the same kind in relation to these objects and nevertheless 
one notion is sufficient to cause a judgment that one o f the individuals is 
“a” w hile the other notion is n o t .222 The objection appears to be 
claiming that in virtue o f my prior awareness and hence notion o f “a” I 
should be in a privileged position to judge that this individual is “a” and 
the other is not. This is simply not the case. Mair replies that the notion 
I have of Socrates is insufficient to cause the judgment that this thing, 
which I see at a distance, is called “a” but through that notion which I 
have understood from others or on my own I grasp that this thing is to be 
called in such a way. It is possible in the first instance to judge “This is
220 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36rh], Consequentia est nulla sed eius
difficultas non provenit quia tractat universalia sed quia crebro descendit ad 
specialissima quidditative considerata. Tractat etiam de Deo et intelligentiis quæ 
sunt difficilis cognitionis.
221 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; [fol. 361* ]^. Sed dices. Si duo æqualiter 
appropinquentur quorum unum novi et eius nomen scilicet “a” alium non
cognovi ante accessum nec sum certioratus de eius nomine.
222 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; [fol. 3 6 i*h] lam habeo duas notitias eiusdem
speciei de istis duobus obiectis et tamen una sufficit causare iudicium quod hoc 
est “a”, alia notitia non sufficit causare tale iudicium.
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“a”” and ‘T his is “b”” granting that “b” signifies the other individual.
This is similar to the way “Socrates” signifies “Socrates” in the nature 
things (i.e., in reality) before he is called “Socrates”. Mair provides the 
follow ing syllogism  to illustrate his claim: “I knew Socrates at a 
distance, as is obvious since I intuitively knew this thing at a distance.
This thing is Socrates. Therefore, I knew Socrates at a distance. 
However, it is not possible by means o f this notion to distinguish  
Socrates from Plato. It is otherwise when he is close to me.”223
It is also objected that the intellect does not know singularly but 
only universally since according to Aristotle the intellect is o f  the 
universal and the senses are o f the singular. According to Averroes 
Aristotle had maintained such a position in Book 3 o f  the De Anima  
Comment 5224 and this is reported by Mair in this passage:
the material intellect is different from prime matter in this, 
that it is in potency to all intellections o f universal forms.
Prime matter, however, is in potency to all sensible forms.
And it follows, moreover, that it is the cause of this intellect 
making distinctions and knowing. Prime matter neither 
distinguishes nor knows since it receives a wide range o f  
forms, namely, individual forms. However, the intellect 
receives universal forms. Therefore, on the basis o f this 
authority, it is obvious that the intellect does not receive an 
individual form from matter as matter does, since then it 
would neither distinguish nor know. On account o f these 
authorities and others some deny that the intellect is able to
223 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; [fol. 36rb], Respondetur quod notitia quam habeo 
de “a” non eausat tale iudicium iste vocatur “a” sed per hoc quod ego intellexi ab 
aliis vel a meipso sic vocari taliter apprehendo; sed habet duo iudicia de istis hoc 
est “a”, hoc est “b”; supposito quod “b” significet illam rem sicut Sortes prius est 
in rerum natura quam vocetur Sortes. Sortem a remotis cognovi, ut patet quia 
hanc rem a remotis cognovi intuitive, hæc res est Sortes; ergo Sortem a remotis 
cognovi sed per illam notitiam nesciebam discemere ilium a Platone. Secus est 
quando est mihi vicinus.
224 Averroes. In Arisotelis De Anima, [pp. 387-413, n.b. p. 387]. Aristotle. De 
Anima, [Book III, Chapter 4  at 429421-24 and Book II, Chapter 5 at 417hl6].
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know a singular thing except indirectly (per lineam
reflexam).'^'^^
This position, whose main proponent is named as Thomas Aquinas, 
in the words o f Mair, is “beyond reason”. Aquinas had thought that 
since the principle o f individuation in material things is individualized  
matter, and that the intellect is o f  an immaterial nature, that it was not 
possible for the intellect to know material things directly. The intellect 
com es to understand something material by abstracting in tellig ib le  
species from individualized matter. This abstracted intelligible species 
is the universal. Hence the intellect knows the universal directly and 
only indirectly, as if  through a reflection, is it able to know the 
s i n g u l a r . 226 Mair writes, as he does on a number o f occasions that 
“when there are two subordinate powers whatsoever an inferior power is 
able to know the superior power is also able to know. Now, the power 
o f sense is a power which is inferior to the intellect and sense knows a 
singular thing. Therefore the intellect is able to know a singular 
t h i n g . ”227 He broadens the scope o f his statement in saying that this is 
not true only o f subordinate powers such as the intellectual powers and 
the sensitive powers but also among powers that are not subordinate one 
to another other. For example, the power o f hearing perceives sound
225 Mair. In primum. d. 3, q. 4; \Jol. 36^'h]. Item Tertio De Anima Commenta 5: 
Intellectus materialis differt a materia prima in hoc quod iste est in potentia 
omnes intellectiones formarum universalium. Prima autem materia est in 
potentia omnes istæ formæ sensibiles. Et sequitur causa autem propter quam iste 
intellectus est distinguens et cognoscens. Prima autem materia neque distinguens 
nec cognoscens quia materia prima recipit formas diversas, scilicet, individuates. 
Intellectus autem recipit formas universales. Ergo, ex ista auctoritate, patet quod 
intellectus non recipit a materia formam individualem sicut materia facit quia 
tune non esset distinguens neque cognoscens. [in m arg., Sanctus Thomas] 
Propter istas auctoritates et alias aliqui negant intellectum posse cognoscere  
singulare nisi per lineam reflexam.
226 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiœ, Prima Pars, q. 85 and q. 86.
227 Mair. In primum. d. 3 , q. 4; [Jol. 36^4] Quando enim sunt duæ potentiæ 
subordinatæ quicquid potest potentia inferior cognoscere potest potentia superior. 
Modo sensus est potentia inferior quam intellectus et sensus cognoscit singulare. 
Ergo intellectus.
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and not colour and the converse, that sight perceives colour and not 
hearing, is also true. However, it is not right to claim that the they know 
in the same way. In order to strengthen his position he appeals to the 
metaphysical nature o f the m i n d . 2 2 8  R  will be recalled that on Mair’s 
account the intellect and the w ill, as powers o f the mind, are distinct 
only by way o f reason. However, the claim that “The intellect is the will 
in every w ay” did not prevent Mair from also claiming that they are 
differentiated by reason on account o f our perception o f their different 
relations to various objects. It is clear that he understood that the powers 
o f intellect and w ill were not related to one another as superior to 
inferior but were on equal footing. This having been granted it follow s 
that there is no implication that the intellect has the ability to act 
volitively. The intellect is the power o f understanding, the will a power 
o f choice: the will w ills, the intellect understands. Thus Mair’s 
contention that the claim , “since if the will chooses something, the 
intellect does not choose, but u n d e r s t a n d s ” ,2 2 9  supports his position 
seem s reasonable. In the same way that different powers o f sense are 
able to relate to sense-objects in different ways, the powers o f intellect 
and will are able to relate to thought-objects in different ways.
Singular intuitive notions precede universal notions since “the 
intellect remembers having had this or that act, therefore it first has a 
singular and intuitive notion o f such an o b j e c t . ” 2 3 0  The intellect, on this 
account, knows intuitively that it has performed an act o f understanding 
or an act o f will. Moreover, Mair concedes that the intellect understands
2 2 8  Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36^%]. Dixi subordinate secus est de non 
subordinatis. Auditus percipit sonum et non colorem, visus autem econverso. 
Non tamen oportet quod eodem modo, quia si voluntas aliquid vult, intellectus 
non vult illud, sed intellegit.
229 For the Latin see fn. 228.
230 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; [Jol. 36^%]. Rursus intellectus recordatur se 
habuisse hunc actum vel ilium actum. Ergo prius habuit notitiam singularem  
intuitivam talis obiecti.
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both universal and singular things w hile the sense knows only  
s i n g u l a r s . 2 3 1  He thinks that this is sufficient to counter the claims o f the 
authorities (e.g., Aquinas) who seem to say the opposite, maintaining as 
was shown above, that the intellect is able to know only the universal 
directly and the singular indirectly which is the true and proper object o f  
the senses. Knowledge o f the singular, according to Aquinas and many 
others, though possible for the intellect was thought to be mediated by 
the species intelligibilis.
How are universal notions formed? Mair gives this account: In the 
case o f a coloured object there are three intuitive notions. One is an 
external sensation which depends upon the existence o f the object as 
regards what it is and what it will become. However, the outer sense is 
not aware o f its own operations. The second is an intuitive notion in the 
inner sense o f fantasy or the com m on-sense. It is at this level o f  
intuition that there is an awareness o f having an intuitive notion. The 
third intuitive notion is an intellectual n o t i o n . 2 3 2  Thus, in seeing  
something white, or hearing a shrill cry the perceiver is not aware o f  
these intuitive notions by means o f the outer sense, such awareness 
begins only with fantasy whose function is to judge o f present, sensible 
species and both to retain and to judge the species that are preserved in 
the absence o f the object from which they emanated. Mair claims that 
this can be argued on the basis o f someone who has sensitive notions o f  
things previously sensed. In this instance two species are caused in the 
fantasy, a species o f the known object and a species o f the notion o f the
231 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36^4] Propterea conceditur quod intellectus 
intelligit universale et singulare, sensus solum singulare et hoc sufficit pro 
auctoritatibus quæ videntur sonare oppositum.
232 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; [fol. 36^4} Bene presentato aliquo obiecto, puta 
colore, ibi sunt tres notitiæ intuitivæ: una est sensatio exterior dependens ab 
existentia obiecti, tam quoad esse quam quoad fieri; altera est notitia intuitiva in 
sensu interiori, phantasia vel sensu communi de eodem  obiecto; tertia est 
intellectiva.
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outer sense. The third kind of intuitive notion originates in the fantasy 
which som etim es forms a notion o f a notion acquired by means o f the 
outer sen se , for exam ple, w hen som eone dreams that he w as  
d r e a m i n g . 2 3 3  The third notion, as in the case of someone sleeping, is an 
intellectual intuitive notion by means o f  which everything that is known 
by m eans o f  the outer and inner sense is known. It is with this 
intellectual intuitive notion that the intellect forms universal c o n c e p t s . 2 3 4  
It might be objected that “there is nothing in the intellect unless it was 
first in the sense,” a proposition to which all late-medieval philosophers 
assented, but with one crucial qualification: “when someone has a notion 
o f the intellect itself or o f its act, for this is to be understood in relation 
to a sensible o b j e c t ” . 2 3 5  The force o f  the qualification is as follows: 
Intellectual intuitive notions have objects. The objects o f intellectual 
intuitive notions are the acts of w ill and acts o f understanding and the 
way in which they relate to their objects.
The third argument, that is o f interest in building an understanding 
of the relationship o f singular notions to universal notions, is reported as 
claiming that since there are no universals which exist in the nature o f  
things, it fo llow s that there are no such things as universal or common 
concepts. This position was supported by suggesting that if it was 
indeed possible to form a universal concept of that which is not, then
233 Mair. In prim um , d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36^4]. Sed sensus exterior non cognoscit 
suas operationes ut visus videns albedinem non cognoscit illam visionem , nec 
auditus audiens sonum cognoscit illam  notitiam auditivam. Ista phantasia 
cognoscit. Argumentum est de somniante qui habet notitias sensitivas rerum ante 
sensatarum, sic in phantasia causantur duæ species: una obiecti cogniti, alia 
notitiæ sensus exterioris. Tertio phantasia interdum format notitiam suæ notitiæ 
quam habet de sensatione exteriori ut cum aliquis somniat se somniasse.
234 Mair. In prim um , d. 3, q. 4; \Jol. 36^4] Tertia notitia est intellectiva intuitiva 
qua cognoscitur omne cognitum a sensu exteriori et interiori et cum hoc format 
conceptus universales.
235 Mair. In prim um , d. 3, q. 4; [fol. 36^4] si dicas nihil est in intellectu quin 
prius fuerit in sensu, hoc utrobique non habet verum. Patet. Quando quis habet 
notitiam ipsius intellectus vel actus eius hoc enim intelligitur de obiecto sensibili.
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something white would cause a notion o f black and Socrates would 
cause a notion of P l a t o . 2 3 6  The thrust of the objection is that since it has 
been denied that there is any universal nature inherent in things ad extra 
it follows that universal concepts are pure fictions of the mind. And if 
this is the case there is nothing to prevent the imposition of universal 
terms on anything whatsoever. In addition the objector argues that since 
there is no basis to universal concepts there is absolutely nothing 
regulating the signification of terms. This simply will not do. Mair 
denies the inference because “one thing never causes a proper notion of 
another t h i n g ” . 2 3 7  However, as he explains, “the intellect having a 
notion of one thing is able to apprehend that thing and compare with it 
other things that essentially agree with it.”238 The details of his account 
are as follows:
The intellect, having a notion o f Socrates, considers 
Socrates ordered (in ordine) to other complete beings 
(supposita) having likeness in matter and likeness in form, 
and abstracts essential similarities from these and abstracts 
one concept in which these individuals agree. When that 
concept agrees with things differing only numerically, it is 
said to be a most specific species. Sometimes the intellect 
considers one individual ordered to other things in respect 
of some property in which those individuals agree, as in 
having a body and a sensitive soul, and such a concept is a 
kind (genus) , and so on. For, it does not seem that many 
complete beings are required to form a most specific 
concept. This is obvious in the case of the concept of God 
or an angel o f God’s, if several are not posited that are 
distinct in species. In the same way, for the formation of a
236 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36^%]. Tertio arguitur. Nihil est universale 
ad extra. Ergo nullus potest esse conceptus communis. Consequentia patet. 
Quia si posses fingere conceptum illius quod non est tunc albedo causabit 
notitiam nigredinis et Sortes causabit notitiam Platonis.
237 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. A,\fol. 36^4] For the Latin text see fn. 239.
238 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; [Jol. 36^4] For the Latin text see fn. 239.
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concept o f a genus, a notion o f all animals is not
r e q u i r e d . 2 3 9
Som e might object that it follow s from this position that anyone 
having a notion o f an individual is able to have, with the assistance of  
the in te llect, a com m on notion o f  the sp ec ie s  spec ia lis s im a .  
Analogously, it follow s from what has been said that one is able to form 
a concept o f the genus o f  things based on two animals o f distinct 
species. This is rejected by Mair as being contrary to that which has 
already been s a i d . 2 4 0  The objector explains:
Since a notion o f  Socrates and the intellect which are 
sufficient to have a specific notion are natural causes in 
relation to the notion which is to be produced they therefore 
produce that notion. And similarly, the notion o f Socrates 
and o f Brunellus produce with the assistance o f  the 
[cognitive] power a generic notion o f animal. In the same 
way, this will be proved for the notion o f all superior
things.241
239 Mair. In prim um , d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 36^4-vb] Respondetur. Negando 
consequentiam. Numquam enim una res causal notitiam propriam alterius rei 
sed intellectus habens notitiam unius rei potest illam apprehendere ad alias secum  
essentialiter convenientes comparando ut habendo notitiam Sortis intellectus 
considérât Sortem in ordine ad alia supposita habentia similem materiam et 
similem formam et ab ilia convenientia essentiali abstrahit unum conceptum in 
quo ilia individua conveniunt. Et quando ille conceptus solum convenit rebus 
solo numéro differentibus dicitur esse species specialissima. Nonnumquam  
intellectus considérât unum individuum in ordine ad aliqua alia considerans 
aliquam proprietatem in qua ilia individua conveniunt, ut in habere corpus et 
animam sensitivam et talis conceptus est genus et ita in aliis. Non enim videtur 
quod requirantur multa supposita ad formationem conceptus specialissimi. Patet 
de conceptu Dei aut huius angeli, si non ponantur plures distincti specie. 
Quemadmodum ad formationem conceptus generis non requiritur notitia omnium 
animalium.
240 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \foL 3 6 ^^] Sed contra istud arguitur. 
[See fn. 239] Ex ea sequitur quod quilibet habens notitiam unius individui 
haberet notitiam communem saltem specialissimam. Pariforma quilibet habens 
notitiam duorum animalium specie distinctorum habebit notitiam genericam. 
Consequens est falsum, et contra dicta.
241 Mair. In primum, d. 3, q. 4; \fol. 3 6 ^h] Probo tamen consequentiam, quia 
notitiæ Sortis, et intellectus quæ sufficiunt ad notitiam specificam habendam sunt 
causæ naturales respectu illius notitiæ producendæ ergo producunt illam  
notitiam. Et similiter notitia Sortis et Brunelli producunt cum potentia notitiam 
genericam animalis. Eodem modo probabitur de notitia omnium superiorum.
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M oreover, the interlocutor suggests, “if  a notion o f  Socrates 
cooperates in producing a notion o f Plato, then similarly it follow s that a 
notion o f  Socrates could cooperate in producing a notion o f  a donkey.
This, it seems, should not be s a id .” 242 Mair writes:
this is answered by denying that Socrates and intellect are 
sufficient causes for the production o f a common notion.
The attention, reflection, and consideration o f the intellect 
or o f the w ill to the application o f these causes are also 
required, just as it was said above as regards the production 
o f reflexive notions and as regards abstractive notions in the 
presence o f many species.243 And it is conceded that a 
notion o f one thing cooperates in the production of a notion 
o f another thing, provided that, that notion represents the 
thing itself, as happens in the case o f a common concept. It 
is therefore not necessary that a notion o f Socrates produces 
a disparate notion, for example, an adequate notion o f an 
ass. Nevertheless, it can indeed produce a generic notion 
[viz., a notion o f the genus animal] which represents both 
an ass and Socrates.244
It is important to note that universal notions like singular notions are
categorematic: they represent their objects directly. Therefore, universal
notions cannot adequately sign ify  som ething which is essentially
different from or disparate from the concept they signify. In short, the
adequate significate o f a universal notion is that which it is imposed to
242 Mair. In primum, d. 3 , q. 4; [Jol. 3 6 ^h] Præterea si notitia Sortis concurrit ad 
productionem notitiæ Platonis, eodem modo concurrit ad productionem notitiæ 
unius asini. Quod non videtur esse dicendum.
243 For some definitions of reflexive notions see fn. 82.
244 Mair. In primum, d. 3 , q. 4; \fol. 3 6 vh] Respondetur negando quod Sortes et 
intellectus sint causæ sufficientes ad productionem notitiæ communis. Requiritur 
enim  advertentia et reflexio et consideratio intellectus vel voluntatis ad 
applicationem  illarum causarum, sicut supra dictum est de productione 
reflexarum notitiarum et de notitia abstractiva in præsentia multarum specierum. 
Et conceditur quod notitia unius rei concurrit ad productionem notitiæ alterius 
rei, dummodo ilia notitia ipsammet rem repræsentet, sicut contingit de conceptu 
communi. Non propterea oportet quod notitia Sortis producat notitiam  
disparatam ut puta notitiam adæquatam asini. Bene tamen potest producere 
notitiam genericam quæ repræsentat asinum et Sortem.
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signify. Hence a notion o f Socrates cannot adequately signify Plato, nor 
can a notion o f a donkey adequately signify a human being. But this 
does not mean that one or more notions cannot produce a generic notion, 
since two notions considered co llectively  may cause som eone who  
attends to them to form a notion o f the genus, as happens in the case of, 
say for example, the notion o f Socrates and the notion o f an animal.
The importance o f this entire discussion cannot be overestimated.
The main implication regards the acquisition o f human knowledge. 
Knowledge is acquired through the particular which serves as the basis 
for our ability to know the universal. The universal is made up by the 
intellect drawing together the sim ilarities o f many singular notions. 
Universal notions thus acquired are based on these singular notions. The 
intellect attends to both the sim ilarities and the differences o f these  
notions. The voluntary imposition o f the signification o f a universal 
notion by the intellect though arbitrary is not random or undetermined.
It is arbitrary since a myriad o f terms can be imposed to signify any 
given concept, but it is not random because the voluntary imposition o f  
the signification is grounded in the real similarities and the differences 
of notions. Universal notions are the basis for demonstrative knowledge 
and it is clear that it is their abstractedness from the particular that 
results in the kind o f necessity required to take their place in system o f  
demonstrative knowledge.
C h a p t e r  5  
A p p r e h e n s iv e  a n d  j u d ic a t iv e  n o t io n s
INTRODUCTION
In the third question of the Prologue  to the Commentary on the 
Sentences o f  Peter Lombard  Mair sets out to determine “Whether it is 
possible to have evident notions o f theological truths?” N ow , it has 
already been mentioned that an evident notion is characterized by the 
unhesitant assent that one gives to a truth having apprehended what the 
nature o f  that truth is. Thus, a judicative notion pre supposes an 
apprehensive in relation to the proposition to which assent is given. In 
this chapter consideration w ill be given to the d iv ision  between  
apprehensive and judicative notions.
A p p r e h e n s i v e  a n d  j u d i c a t i v e  n o t i o n s  d e r n e d
It was thought to be a matter o f definition to establish that the 
division between apprehensive and judicative notions was both jointly 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive. John Mair writes
It is well known that there is an apprehensive notion which 
is in respect of incomplex things. An apprehensive notion 
is in relation to anything whatsoever which is capable of 
terminating an act o f  a cognitive power whether it is 
complex or incomplex. A judicative act, or adhesive act, is 
an act by which one assents to or dissents from  a 
proposition truly or falsely and it is only in relation to the
same com plex.245
245 Mair. In primum, prol. q. 3; [fol. V^hj Palam est quod est aliqua notitia 
apprehensiva quæ est respectu incomplexorum. Notitia apprehensiva est
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Apprehensive notions have as their objects not only the com plex, 
e .g ., ultim ate mental propositions and sy llog ism s, but also the 
incomplex, for example, the likenesses o f objects. Lokert writes
An apprehensive notion is one by means o f w hich  
som ething, som ethings, or in som e w ay is known  
com plexly or incomplexly, judging in no way by means o f  
it, for example, all natural likenesses o f objects and ultimate 
mental propositions. But a judicative notion is that through 
which w e judge in some way apprehending nothing by 
means o f it. 246
In brief, apprehensive notions may be had in relation to everything 
received by the intellective power. This is true o f propositions and 
syllogism s because it is often the case that we apprehend propositions 
and syllogism s without either judging them to be true which is called an 
act o f assent, or judging that they are false which is called an act o f  
dissent. In contrast, judicative notions are exclusively in relation to the 
com plex, e.g., propositions and syllogism s. Thus, apprehension and 
judgment are easily distinguished since judgments are always in relation
respectu cuiuscumque potentis terminare actum potentiæ cognitivæ  sive sit 
complexum sive incomplexum. Actus iudicativus, aliter adhæsivus, est actus quo 
assentitur vel dissentitur propositioni vere vel false, et ille est solum respectu 
complexi propositionalis. See also Mair. Posteriora, [jzg. jt 7 ^h] Duplex est 
notitia, quædam est apprehensiva quædam adhæsiva. Apprehensiva est respectu 
cuiuscumque quod potest terminare actum potentiæ intellectivæ , sive sit 
complexum sive incomplexum quia non solum apprehendimus incomplexum sed 
piopositiones. syllogism os, et huiusmodi universaliter omnia quæ recipiuntur a 
potentia intellectiva. Notitia adhæsiva vel iudicativa est notitia per quam 
assentitur vel dissentitur com plexo, solum com plexo assentimus quod verum  
arbitramur. Et sic in respectu com plexi duplicem possumus habere actum, 
sc ilicet apprehensivum et adhæsivum , quia frequenter quis apprehendit 
propositionem nec ei assentiendo nec dissentiendo. Hoc patet de propositione 
neutra, ut astra sunt paria. Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, [5 ig. b 6^4] g t notitia 
intellectiva dividitur quia aliqua est apprehensiva alia vero iudicativa.
246 Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [5 /g. d 4*'h]. Notitia apprehensiva est 
ilia qua mediante aliquid, aliqua, vel aliqualiter cognoscitur com plexe vel 
incomplexe nullomodo iudicando mediante ilia, ut omnes naturales similitudines 
rerum et propositiones mentales ultimatæ. Sed notitia iudicativa est ilia per quam 
iudicamus aliqualiter nihil apprehendendo mediante ilia. For a more detailed 
discu ssion  o f Lokert’s defin ition  See Broadie. N otion and  O bject, 
[pp. 125-126].
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to that which is com plex and never in relation to the incomplex.247 
Waim is brief in his exposition o f the division between apprehensive and 
judicative notions stating that the term “apprehensive notion” is 
convertible with the term “notion”. A judicative notion is that by means 
o f which w e assent to or dissent from any proposition”.248 W aim  
continues that it follow s “that every judicative notion is apprehensive.... 
Though not every apprehensive notion is a judicative notion”.249 it is 
even asserted that “any judicative notion is an apprehensive notion since 
every notion is apprehensive.”250 The motivations for making such 
claim s w ill emerge as w e explore the relationship between acts o f  
apprehension and acts o f  judgment. At the present, it is sufficient to 
report these claim to draw attention to the fact that while all our late- 
medieval masters initially distinguish apprehensive and judicative  
notions in such a way that the division between the two kinds of notions 
is jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive, they did not hesitate to 
explore and develop the kind o f technical apparatus necessary to explain 
the inter relatedness o f these acts.
How apprehensive and judicative notions are to be distinguished in 
relation to the same proposition is a more complicated matter than how 
to distinguish between acts o f apprehension in relation to the non­
com plex and judicative acts which are always o f the complex. Given 
that there is an act o f apprehension and an act o f judgment in relation to 
the same proposition how is it possible, indeed, is it possib le to
247 Crab. Tractatus notitiarum, b 6^4] Apprehensiva est tam com plexi vel 
incomplexi. Iudicativa vero est solus com plexi tanquam obiecti immediate.
248 Waim. Tractatus notitiarum, [sig. g 4^4]. Notitia apprehensiva convertitur cum  
ly notitia. Notitia iudicativa est mediante qua assentim us vel dissentim us alicui 
propositioni.
249 Waim. Tractatus notitiarum, [sig. g 4^4] Ex istis sequitur quod om nis notitia  
iudicativa est apprehensiva... licet non om nis apprehensiva sit iudicativa.
250 W aim. Tractatus notitiarum, [5/g. g 4 vh] H oc non obstante [sc ., that 
judicative notions presuppose apprehensive notions] quælibet notitia iudicativa  
est apprehensiva postquam om nis notitia est notitia apprehensiva.
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distinguish  between the apprehension and the judgm ent o f  the 
proposition.251 Despite this perceived difficulty the members o f the 
circle o f  John Mair were unreserved in their claims that the two acts 
were to be distinguished. For instance, Mair writes “that there is some 
apprehensive notion in relation to the proposition which is distinct from 
the judicative (adhæsiva) notion o f the same p r o p o s i t i o n . ” 2 5 2  This is 
obvious since it is possib le to encounter a proposition without 
apprehending the meaning o f its constituents terms. In the absence o f  
this apprehension the agent is not able to assent to the proposition. 
Hence, it follow s that apprehensive and judicative notions are separable 
from each other in relation to the same proposition. Moreover, when 
one begins to assent to that proposition it does not seem that the prior 
apprehensive notion is destroyed since there is no opposition between 
the apprehensive and judicative notions.253 Jn the case o f self-evident 
propositions there was speculation over whether apprehensive and 
judicative notions were really distinct . Here again no one denied that 
the acts were distinguishable. Though one assents to self-evident 
propositions as soon as they are encountered there are nevertheless two 
notions, first the apprehensive and then the judicative, ordered to each 
other by a priority o f generation. There is no reason to maintain that 
they are not separable in this instance since it has already been shown 
that judgment presupposes the apprehension. Mair writes that this is 
obvious:
251 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 3; \fol. 1^^]. Sed an apprehensivus et adhæsivus 
respectu eiusdem complexi distinguantur est maior difficultas.
252 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \fol. 7^4] g t dicitur in primis, quod est aliqua 
notitia apprehensiva respectu complexi distincta ab adhæsiva euisdem.
253 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \Jol. 7^ *4]. Quod patet quia oblata mihi una 
propositione neutra cam apprehendo, et tamen ei non assentio, ergo una istarum 
notitiarum est ab alia separabilis respectu eiusdem , et quando incipio illi 
propositioni as senti re non videtur quod prior apprehensiva corrumpatur cum 
nulla sit repugnantia inter illas notitias; ergo simul manent. Ex quo apparet quod 
apprehensiva et adhæsiva respectu propositionis per se notæ distinguuntur.
R. N. Wood Chapter 5: Apprehensive and Judicative Notions 143
N o disposition inclines to acts o f  a different disposition  
unless by means o f an act proper to the disposition to which 
it first inclines, just as a disposition towards the premises 
(principii) does not incline toward an act o f knowing the 
conclusion, unless it first inclines to an act regarding the 
premises. But the apprehensive disposition inclines towards 
the judicative act; therefore, at first, it inclines towards an 
appropriate apprehensive act.254
The com plexity o f the discussion is highlighted when Mair, having
shown that there are two notions, one apprehensive and the other
judicative, in relation to the same proposition asks: W hether the
judicative notion is itself a p p r e h e n s i v e ? 2 5 5  it is said that they are. Thus,
it would not be objectionable to claim, like Waim, that every judicative
notion is apprehensive
since otherwise someone would be able to assent to some 
proposition, for example, “A ll rhubarb purges cholera”, not 
having apprehended it, which does not seem possible, since 
if I assent to it, I apprehend it and my intellect is carried 
towards such an object. Therefore, it [i.e., the intellect] 
apprehends it. 256
It is interesting that in light o f this Mair writes :
254 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 3; [fol. Patet. Nullus habitus inclinât ad actus
alterius habitus nisi mediante actu proprio ad quem primo inclinât, sicut habitus 
principii non inclinât in actum sciendæ conclusionis nisi prius inclinet in actum 
circa principia. Sed habitus apprehensivus inclinât ad actum iudicativum, ergo 
primo inclinât ad actum proprium apprehensivum.
255 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \fol. 7^4] rursus hoc præsupposito quod 
respectu eiusdem complexi habentur duæ notitiæ quarum una est apprehensiva et 
alia iudicativa, dubium est an ilia adhæsiva sit apprehensiva.
256 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \Jol. 7^4] g t dicitur quod sic. Probatur quia 
alioquin aliquis possit alicui com plexo assentire puta huic “omne reubarbarum 
est purgativum choleræ”, non apprehendo ipsum quod non videtur possibile quia 
si assentio illi, apprehendo illud, et intellectus meus fertur in tale obiectum. Ergo 
ipsum apprehendit. See also Mair. Posteriora, [jfg. n  7 ^h] Tunc dicitur quod 
omnis notitia adhæsiva est apprehensiva sed non contra. Patet prima pars, quia si 
sit aliqua notitia adhæsiva quæ realiter ab omni apprehensiva distinguitur Deus 
potest hanc notitiam adhæsivam in mente Sortis servare qualibet apprehensiva 
corrupta et sic aliquis assentit uni propositioni quam non apprehendit, quod est 
falsum.
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It is sufficient that w e maintain that every assent is an 
apprehensive notion and in relation to the same proposition 
there are two apprehensive notions distinct in kind, namely 
the pure-apprehensive and the apprehensive-judicative. The 
first can be separated from the second by means o f the 
power o f God, not however the second since the second  
[viz., the judicative notion] is identified with the second  
[viz., apprehensive-judicative notion] not only in reality but 
also through no connotation o f terms is it called judicative 
unless it is also apprehensive. On what account they are 
distinct in kind is obvious since through one we judge that 
something is or is not, through the other we judge nothing.
Therefore, they are different in kind.257
Though it is a difficult doctrine to accept, Mair is not averse to 
granting that pure-apprehensive and apprehensive-judicative notions are 
distinct from one another such that neither is part o f the other. Thus it 
fo llow s that by the absolute power o f God it is possible to destroy the 
pure apprehensive notion while preserving the apprehensive-judicative 
act. Hence it would follow  it would be possible to assent to the 
proposition “A ll rhubarb purges cholera” w ithout know ing the 
signification o f the constituent terms. This is only by means o f  the 
absolute power o f God, since “it does not seem that according to nature 
one is able to assent to something unless he has a notion o f the terms o f  
the proposition to which he is assenting”. Mair explains the situation as 
follows:
The intellect now has notions o f the things signified by the 
extremes o f this ‘T he wall is white” and the verbal act a, b, 
c and along with this the intellect has an apprehensive
257 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3> \{fo l. 7 va-vb] Satius d[i]cimus omnem assensum  
esse  notitiam  apprehensivam  et respectu eiusdem  com plexi sunt duæ 
apprehensivæ specie distinctæ, scilicet apprehensiva pura et alia apprehensiva 
iudicativa. Prior potest separari a secunda de potentia Dei, non autem secunda 
quia secunda identificatur secundæ non modo in re, sed etiam per nullam  
terminorum connotationem dicitur adhæsiva quin etiam sit apprehensiva. Quare 
specie distinguantur patet, quia per unam iudicamus esse vel non esse, per aliam  
nullatenus iudicamus. Ergo specie differunt.
R. N. Wood Chapter 5; Apprehensive and Judicative Notions 145
notion in relation to the whole; but the apprehension cannot 
be distinguished from the notions o f the parts. Still, there is 
an apprehensive-adhesive notion. I concede, therefore, that 
God is able to preserve this [i.e., adhesive-apprehensive 
notion] in the mind of Socrates all the others, namely a, b, c, 
having been destroyed. And thus, by the absolute power o f  
God, som eone assents to a conclusion the signification o f  
whose terms escapes him.258
Judicative acts, that is, acts o f assent and dissent are those acts in virtue
o f which we assign a truth value to a proposition. In assenting to a
proposition the truth o f the proposition is affirmed and in dissenting
from a proposition the truth o f the proposition is denied. The nature o f
the relationship between acts o f assent and dissent is an issue which has
been the subject o f much controversy in the history o f philosophy.
Specifically, the question taken up is: Whether an act o f assent is dissent
from the contradictory proposition? Mair first reports the issue as it was
understood and developed by Gregory o f Rimini who maintained that
“since mental assent is an enuntiatio, dissent will be an enuntiatio o f the
contradictory enuntiatio (opposita)  which also w ill be assent to its
significate which is opposed to the significate o f  the remaining
contradictory enuntiatio''.'^^^ H ence, assent to “The diam eter is
258 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; {fol. 7 ^^] Naturaliter non videtur quod quis 
possit assentire alicui propositioni quin ipse habeat notitiam terminorum  
propositionis oui assentit. Tamen de potentia Dei concedo quod quis assentit 
alicui propositioni et non cognoscit significationes terminorum simplicium, hoc 
est, habet nunc intellectus notitias rerum significatarum per extrema huius “paries 
est albus” et actum verbalem a. b. c. et cum hoc habet intellectus unam  
apprehensivam respectu totius, sed non constat an ilia apprehensio distinguatur a 
notitiis partium, adhuc est adhæsiva apprehensiva. Concedo igitur quod hanc 
Deus potest conservare in mente Sortis aliis omnibus, scilicet a. b. c., corruptis. 
Et sic aliquis assentit uni conclusioni cuius significatio terminorum cum latet de 
potentia Dei absoluta.
259 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \Jol. Si'h], Dissensus non est aliquis actus 
intellectus a quolibet assensu distinctus quinimmo quilibet est assensus quidam 
quod probat quia cum assensus mentalis sit enuntiatio, dissensus erit enuntiatio 
sibi opposita quæ erit etiam assensus sui significati quod est oppositum  
significato reliquæ oppositæ. See Gregory o f Rimini. G regorii Ariminensis 
OESA Lectura super prim um  e t secundum  sententiarum . d. 3 , q. 3; 
[Volume 1, 32] and Gabriel Nuchelmans. Theories o f  the Proposition: Ancient 
and M ed ieva l C o n cep tio n s o f  the B e a rers  o f  Truth an d  F a ls ity ,
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sym m etrical” is nothing other than the judgm ent by w hich “The 
diameter is symmetrical” is affirmed. Therefore, dissent is nothing other 
than the judgm ent by w hich the enuntiatio  “The diam eter is 
symmetrical” is denied.260 Hence, Mair continues, Gregory holds that 
“assent and dissent are nothing other than opposite assents, and any 
assent whatsoever can be called a dissent to the contradictory enuntiatio 
w hose contradictory enuntiatio is an assent.”26i In brief, Gregory denies 
that assent and dissent are really distinct acts o f intellect. There is no 
need to delve into the com plex history o f the term enuntiatio. It is 
sufficient to state that it is defined by Gregory as “an oratio  which is 
either true or false”; it is the equivalent o f the term propositio. The 
response o f Mair to Gregory is brief, but adequate. He rejects the 
position because he thinks that it is possible to assent to “Drinking good 
wine in moderation clarifies thick blood” without dissenting from its 
contradictory. Moreover, he thought that in the same way that it is 
possible for there to be both really distinct acts o f nolition and volition in 
relation to the same object o f the will it is also possible to have acts o f  
assent and dissent that are really distinct in relation to the same 
proposition.262 Mair maintains this position because it does not make 
sense that the assent to a proposition should imply that we are denying 
the contradictory. If assent and dissent are not really distinct, as
(Amsterdam/London: 1973); [pp. 227 - 237]. For a discussion of this in the 
context o f John Mair and his colleagues see Broadie. Notion and Object,
[pp. 140-143].
260 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; [Jol. 8**^ ]. Unde, sicut assensus quo assentit sen 
credit diametrum esse symmetrum, non est aliud quam iudicium quo affirmât 
diametrum esse symmetrum, sic dissensus oppositus non est aliud quam iudicium  
quo negatur diametrum esse symmetrum et ipse est sicut patet assensus sui 
significati, scilicet quod diameter non est symmeter.
261 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \fol. 8^ ^^ ]. Unde assensus et dissensus non sunt 
nisi assensus oppositi et quilibet assensus potest dici dissensus eius oppositus, 
cuius opposita enuntiatio est assensus.
262 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \fol. 8^h] Insuper sicut se habent volitio et 
nolitio circa obiectum voluntatis, sic assensus et dissensus circa obiectum  
complexum intellectus, sed sic est quod velle et nolle circa idem distinguuntur.
Ergo assensus et dissensus circa idem.
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Gregory maintains, then Mair would have to admit that the distinction is 
only a nominal one from which it follow s that assent and dissent are 
logically  inseparable. And clearly they are really distinct since it is 
possible to assent to the truth o f a proposition without having the kind o f  
knowledge required to dissent from that same proposition.
W HETHER THE PROPOSITION IS SAID TO BE THE JUDGMENT?263 _
TH E CONCEPT OF EXTRINSIC DENOMINATION
The relationship o f  an act o f judgment to the truth-value o f a 
proposition prompted many interesting d iscussions attem pting to 
reconcile the simple nature of a judicative act with the complex nature o f  
the proposition. There was no hesitation to say that a judicative act can 
be called true or false, but there was a good deal o f  speculation  
concerning the nature o f this truth value, since it was thought that a 
judgment cannot be true in the same way that a proposition can be true. 
George Lokert sees no reason why one should not grant that an act o f  
assent signifies truly or falsely nor does he think it necessarily true that 
everything which signifies truly or falsely is a proposition.264 Waim  
thinks that the dispute over whether it is the act o f assent that is called 
true or false or whether it is the proposition that is the appropriate bearer 
o f a truth value is a terminological one; but even W aim thinks that, 
properly speaking, an assent is true by extrinsic denomination.265 Mair 
gives this account:
It will not do to say that a judgment is a proposition. For a 
judgment is called true not because it is a true proposition 
but because it is a judgment o f something true. And so it is 
true by extrinsic denomination since the object o f the assent
263 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \fol. 8^^]. An autem iudicium dicatur propositio.
264 Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [sig. e grb-va] jsjon video quin oportet 
concedere assensum vere vel false significare. Nec oportet omne illud quod vere 
vel false significat esse propositionem.
265 Waim. Tractatus notitiarum, h 5^4] Proprie enim assensus non est verus 
vel falsus postquam non est propositio. Sed disputatio est ad nomen.
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is true, that is, the proposition and for that reason the assent 
is said to be t r u e . 2 6 6
In a similar way an act of dissenting from a false proposition can be 
called t r u e . 2 6 7  An act o f assent is the affirmation o f a true proposition, 
and an act o f dissent is the denial o f a false proposition. In both cases 
the judgment expresses a TRUE relationship to a proposition. It is taken 
for granted that assent and dissent are in these instances non-erroneous 
since error is either assent to a false proposition or dissent from a true 
proposition: they are erroneous since the judgments express a FALSE  
relationship to a proposition. A further com plexity as regards the 
precise nature o f the relationship between an act o f assent and its object 
is introduced when Mair writes:
It is called a judgment because it is not sufficient to have a 
true object for the denomination o f anything whatsoever in 
reality. This is obvious since the demonstrative pronoun 
indicating this “gradually and slow ly one must abandon a 
bad habit o f eating” is not called true and nevertheless it 
indicates a true p r o p o s i t i o n . 2 6 8
This raises the question: Is the relationship o f an act o f assent to a 
true proposition the same as the relationship o f the demonstrative 
pronoun to a true proposition? It is difficult to give an adequate account 
of what Mair has in mind, but the claim seems to be that a demonstrative 
pronoun, like judgment, is not an appropriate bearer o f truth, despite the 
fact that it is appropriate to say “This is true”. A demonstrative pronoun
2 6 6  Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \fol. 8rb-va] Non est opus iudicium vocare 
propositionem. Indicium enim vocatur verum, non quia sit propositio vera, sed 
quia est iudicium veri. Et sic est verum denominatione extrinseca quia obiectum  
assensus est vera puta propositio et propterea assensus dicitur verus.
2 6 7  Mair. In primum, p r o l, \Jol. 8^4] Dissensus autem vocatur verus quia est circa 
propositionem falsam.
2 6 8  Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; [Jol. 8^4] Dicitur autem iudicium quia non 
sufficit habere obiectum verum ad denominationem cuiuscumque in veritate. 
Patet quia pronomen demonstrativum demonstrans hanc, “paulatim et lente est 
recedendum a prava consuetudine comedendi”, non vocatur verum et tamen 
demonstrat propositionem veram.
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is not called true or false in isolation, but is said to be true or false  
beeause it indicates a true or false proposition. Hence, the demonstrative 
pronoun “this” is true, only because it points to the true proposition 
“gradually and slowly one must abandon a bad habit of eating”. Mair, in 
another place, writes that form ally, by extrinsie denom ination, a 
practical notion is a com plex judgment.^^^ Undoubtedly a practical 
notion is com plex only in a derivative manner. The judicative act o f  
itself is simple and it is only because a practical notion corresponds to a 
proposition that it can be said to be a complex.
CONCLUSION
The distinction between apprehensive and judicative notions is an 
important division in the theory o f notions since it draws our attention to 
the fact that there is a difference between simply grasping the meaning 
o f a proposition and affirming or denying the truth o f a proposition.
This is important because it is often the case that the meaning o f a 
proposition is grasped without any judgment o f  its truth-value. The 
pilgrim, on the way toward the end, understands many propositions that 
pertain to theology, faith and so on. In fact, the pilgrim is able to 
understand more propositions than he is able to judge true or false. This 
helps clarify why it is important to preserve a distinction between the 
judicative act and the proposition since it is undoubtedly the case that 
the truth-value o f propositions ex ist independently o f the pilgrim  
ability’s to judge.
269 Mair. In prim wn, proL, q. 6; \fol. 1 4 rb-vaj N otitia practica formal iter est 
indicium com plexum  denom inatione extrinseca enuncians qualiter vel per quæ  
aliquid est agendum.
C h a p t e r  6
E V I D E N T  N O T I O N S  A N D  S C I E N T I F I C  K N O W L E D G E
INTRODUCTION— EVIDENT AND INEVIDENT NOTIONS
DISTINGUISHED
A substantial amount o f attention has been devoted to developing a 
eom prehensive picture o f the various kinds o f cognitive acts that are 
present in the cognitive process. The main division, as w e have just 
seen, is between apprehensive and judicative notions. In the case o f  
judicative notions we saw that it is neeessary to maintain that there is 
both an act o f apprehension and an act o f judgment in relation to the 
proposition. The intellect engaged in an act o f judgment understands 
that proposition to be true or false and as a result the intellect either 
assents to or dissents from the proposition as signifying a true state o f  
affairs. In respeet o f assent all o f the members o f the eircle o f John Mair 
distinguished between evident and inevident assent. This distinction is 
crucial to understanding the difference between knowledge in the strict 
sense o f demonstrative knowledge (scientia demonstrativa)  and other 
claims to knowledge sueh as belief (fides) and opinion (opinio). This is 
obvious in the following passage o f Mair:
Of judicative notions (notitiarum adhœsivarum) some are 
hesitant and others not hesitant. If unhesitant this is two­
fold: evident and inevident. If the second, then it is faith.
Faith is a certain and inevident notion. If evident it is three­
fold, either it is a notion o f the premises and then it is o f  the 
intellect. Here “intellect” is not taken for the mind but more 
narrowly for the judicative notion o f the premises. If it is a
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notion o f a demonstrable conclusion acquired through the 
understanding then it is scientific knowledge. If it is a 
judicative notion o f the conelusion and o f the premises then 
it is wisdom. If it is hesitant then it is mere o p i n i o n . ^ 7 0
There is a good deal o f material in this passage that w ill repay
attention, but in this section I limit the discussion to evident assent. In
the next section I will discuss the nature o f scientific knowledge. Once
an analysis o f evident assent has been completed a detailed discussion o f
inevident assent will be undertaken since it is best considered with a
good understanding o f the concept o f  evidentness in place. Before
proceeding it is useful to follow  Lokert’s lead and point out that a
d iscussion  o f evidentness and inevidentness presupposes that “a
judicative notion is said to be true or false by extrinsic denomination,
since it corresponds to a true or false pro position.”271 Having noted this,
the starting point of our discussion is Mair’s definition o f evident assent
(assensus evidens):
“Evident notion”, also called evidentia simpliciter,  is 
defined in this way: it is an assent whieh is true, unhesitant, 
caused by prineiples neeessitating the intellect to which the 
intellect is not able to assent and in so assenting be 
deceived. “A ssent” is posited as the genus since every 
evident notion is an assent and not v ice versa. The 
remaining clauses posit the differenees (differentia). “True 
assent” is said for an erroneous assent, howsoever firm is 
not evident as in the case of the gentiles’ assent to this “God 
is not three persons”. “Unhesitant” is said to exclude
270 Mair. Posteriora, ju 8^^]. Et notitiarum adhæsivarum vero quædam cum  
formidine et quædam sine formidine. Si sine formidine hoc est bifarium, vel cum 
evidentia, vel sine evidentia. Si secundum sic est fides, fides est notitia certa et 
inevidens. Si cum evidentia hoc trifariam, vel est notitia præmissarum, et sic est 
intellectus. Unde intellectus non capitur hic pro anima intellectiva sed crebrius 
pro præmissarum notitia adhæsi va. Si sit notitia conclusionis demonstrabilis 
acquisita per intellectum sic est scientia. Si sit notitia adhæsiva conclusionis et 
præmissarum sic est sapientia. Si cum formidine sic est opinatio.
271 Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [sig. e 8^^]. ...notitia iudicativa dicitur 
vera vel falsa denominatione extrinseca quia respondet propositioni veræ vel 
falsæ.
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suspicion, conjecture and opinion. For though some posit a 
distinction between these three, they are nevertheless  
convertible. The next clause excludes the assent o f faith, 
which is generated by an act o f w ill according to the first 
question o f this [prologue]. The last clause excludes the 
“conditional evident” which is defined in the same way [as 
evident assent], except that the final clause is removed, or it 
is supplem ented by the clause “granted the general 
influence o f God” or “without a m i r a c l e ” . 272
The first o f  the differentiating characteristics mentioned by Mair is
unproblematic. Evident assents, by definition, are always true. They
cannot be false. Error writes Mair is “assent to the false or dissent from
the true.”273 This definition is complemented by Lokert who defines
error as an assent which is fa lse, firm, naturally, and not freely,
c a u s e d . 2 7 4  The second differentiating feature, that an evident assent is
characterized by unhesitance or certainty on the part o f intellect, is
necessary according to Mair to exclude suspicion, conjecture, and
opinion. Opinion {opinio), as it was understood in medieval philosophy,
refers to a judgment that is held only tentatively or hesitantly since the
truth o f the proposition to which it refers is, in a similar way, only
probable. The claim  that suspicion, conjecture, and opinion are
convertible, and presumably not synonymous, relies on the fact that all
272 Mair. In prim w n, proL, q. 3; \fol. 6^^]. Notitia evidens alias evidentia 
simpliciter dicta sic definitur: est assensus verus sine formidine a principiis 
intellectum necessitantibus causatus, quo non est possibile intellectum assentire 
et sic assentiendo decipi. Assensus ponitur loco generis cum omnis evidentia sit 
assensus et non contra. Reliquæ vero particulæ ponuntur loco differentiae. 
Dicitur verus assensus erroneus enim quantuncumque firmus non est evidens 
sicut est in gentili assensus huius Deus non est très personæ. Sine formidine ad 
excludendam supositionem, coniecturam, et opinionem, licet enim aliqui inter 
hæc tria ponant discrimen, tamen convertuntur. Proxima particula seiungit 
assensum fidei qui sponte generatur ex prima questione huius [sc.. Quo modo 
possit viator acquirere fidem ?]. Ultim a particula rem ovet evidentiam  
conditionatam, quæ eodem modo definitur hoc dempto, vel dicatur, stante 
influentia Dei generali, vel sine miraculo. Cf., fn. 278.
273 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 5; [/<?/. 14^^]. Error est assensus falsi vel dissensus 
veri. For a discussion of faith and error see pp. 205-207.
274 Lokert. Scriptwn in materia notitiarum, f  5 ^b] Error est assensus firmus, 
falsus, et non libere dicto modo causatus.
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o f these kinds o f assent refer to assents that lack the epistem ic certitude 
ascribed to evident assent. They are not synonym ous since, in a 
restricted sense, “suspicion”, “conjecture” and “opin ion” connote  
different ways in which it possible to assent with hesitance to different 
propositions. Mair excludes an assent o f faith from the category o f  
evidentness in virtue o f the fact that an assent o f  faith, though 
unhesitant, is not caused by principles necessitating the intellect. Faith, 
according to Mair, is not naturally caused but is “generated by an act of  
w ill” and is an assent, freely caused, to propositions that pertain to 
salvation. Lokert writes that the clause “caused by principles 
necessitating the intellect” is included to exclude faith and other 
inevident assents which are freely c a u s e d . 2 7 5  in brief, a freely caused 
assent is nothing other than an assent which requires and depends upon 
the cooperation o f the will for its certainty.
It is not the case that assent to any necessary proposition  
whatsoever is evident since some such assents are opinative and others 
are assents o f faith. Moreover, “evident notion” and “necessary” are 
impertinent terms. Mair thought that “this is obvious through the 
definition o f impertinent terms, for with either o f these terms, (sc., 
evident assent and necessary) suppositing by means o f a present tensed 
copula the other can be d e n i e d . ” 2 7 6  Neither term is opposed to the other 
nor does either term imply the other. Examples o f impertinent terms
275 Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, [i'/.g. e 8^^] Alia particula [sc., natus 
causari a causis necessitantibus ipsam potentiam cognitivam] excludit fidem quæ 
aliquo modo libere causatur et alios assensus inevidentes (si tales dentur) qui nee 
sunt erronei nee opinativi.
276 Mair. In primum, p ro l, q. 3; \fol. 6^%]. Ex ista propositione sequitur quod [see 
fn. 272] non cuiuslibet propositionis necessariæ assensus est evidentia cum 
alicuius sit opinio et alicuius fides. Notitia autem evidens et necessaria sunt 
termini impertinentes. Quod patet quia nee repugnant nec una infert aliam. Item 
patet per definitionem  terminorum impertinentium nam quocumque illorum  
supponente mediante copula de præsenti alter potest de illo  negari. For a 
discussion of impertinent terms see Broadie. The C ircle o f John M air, 
[pp. 113-114].
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include “purple, crawling” and “red, barking”. Hence, while an evident 
notion is o f a true proposition, it does not follow that since one has an 
evident notion o f a proposition, that proposition is necessary. 
Conversely, given that the proposition is necessary it does not follow  
that the assent is evident.
In respect o f  evident assents some are absolutely evident, some 
contingently, relatively or naturally e v i d e n t . 2 7 7  i n  the Commentary on 
the Posterior Analytics an absolute evident assent is defined as an assent 
which is true, unhesitant, and naturally caused to which it is not possible 
for the intellect to assent and in so assenting be d e c e i v e d . ” 2 7 8  i t  is 
obvious from the definition Mair gives in the P ro logu e  to the 
Commentary on the Sentences that evidentia simpliciter  is nothing other 
than absolute evident assent (evidentia absoluta)  and it should be 
distinguished from an assent which is “evident in a certain respect” 
(evidentia secundum quid) i.e., relatively evident assent, or an assent 
which is “evident according to nature” (evidentia naturalis), or one 
which is “evident according to convention” (evidentia conventionalis).
Mair writes that an “evident notion is really evidentness and assent. And 
it is defined as follows: An “evident notion” is a notion o f some true 
com plex fitted by nature to be caused mediately or imm ediately by 
notions o f the i n c o m p l e x . ” 2 7 9  Moreover, an absolute evident assent 
(assensus evidentia absoluta), sometimes referred to as summa evidentia
277 Mair. Posteriora, [v/g. aa 5*"^ ]. Et notitiarum evidentium quædam est evidens 
evidentia summa sive absoluta sive sim pliciter quædam evidens evidentia 
naturali vel conditionali vel secundum quid.
278 Mair. Posteriora, [sig. aa 5^ ]^. Evidentia absoluta est assensus verus sine 
formidine natural iter causatus quo non est possibile intellectum assentire, et in 
sic assentiendo decipi. Dicitur “sine formidine” ad opinionem reiiciendum. 
Dicitur “naturaliter causatus” ad excludendum fidem quæ libere producitur et 
non ex principiis intellectum cogentibus assentire. Dicitur “quo non est possibile 
intellectum in sic” etc. ad excludendam evidentiam naturalem. Cf., fn. 272.
279 Mair. Posteriora, [5 /^. aa 5i*^ ]. I ta quod notitia evidens realiter est evidentia et 
assensus et definitur sic. Evidentia est notitia alicuius veri complexi ex notitia 
terminorum incomplexorum mediate vel immediate nata causari.
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is an assent to a truth whose extremes (i.e., the subject and predicate 
terms) do not supposit for God. This is obvious, writes Mair, since the 
mind assents to this “I exist” (ego sum) and in so assenting cannot be 
deceived.280 R was thought that it was not possible for one to assent to 
such a proposition and in so assenting to be deceived even by the 
absolute power o f God. However, it must be remarked that it is possible 
for an absolute evident notion to become an inevident notion. O f course, 
this is possible only by means o f the absolute power o f  God but, 
nevertheless, it is a possibility which Mair thought noteworthy because it 
makes the point that simply because an assent is absolutely evident to 
the individual who assents this does not mean that such an assent is 
absolutely evident to others. For instance, John Mair’s assent to the 
proposition “I exist” transferred to Lokert upon Mair’s demise would not 
be absolutely evident to George Lokert. The proposition “I exist” now 
inhering in Lokert’s intellect would continue to refer to its original 
significate, namely, John Mair.281 Hence, the assent that Lokert could 
give in respect o f  the proposition which continues to refer to the 
existence of John Mair would be based on an abstract notion and hence 
could only be inevident.282
280 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \fol. stat aliquem de multis veritatibus
quarum extrema pro D eo non supponunt habere evidentiam absolutam. Patet 
quia anima assentit huic “ego sum” et in sic assentiendo non potest decipi.
281 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \Jol. 6^%]. Evidentia summa erit notitia quando 
non erit evidentia summa. Patet. Capiendo assensum quern ego habeo de me et 
ponendo in Sorte me annihilando. Non valet autem quod dicit A liacensis. 
Probabile est, inquit, quod si mea notitia poneretur a Deo in anima Platonis non 
esset ei notitia. Contra hoc argumenter. Anima Platonis est susceptiva illius 
quantum est de se, scilicet enim albedo naturaliter non migret de subiecto in 
subiectum, tamen Deus potest ponere albedinem papyri in pariete inhæsive et 
naturaliter repræsentabit idem obiectum quod ante repræsentabat ilia notitia.
282 Broadie. Notion and Object, [p. 156].
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TH E NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
The d iscussion  o f  apprehensive and judicative notions was 
introduced in the context o f  answering the question “Whether it is 
possible for the pilgrim to have evident notions o f theological truths?”
Thus far, the discussion has been concerned only with explaining the 
meaning of the complex term “evident notion”. In this section attention 
will be given to the question: whether the pilgrim acquires knowledge o f  
theological truth by means o f discursive reasoning, in the hope o f  
clarifying the concepts o f knowledge and theological truth.
It has already been reported that knowledge in the strict sense 
concerns universal evident notions. Hence, it is not the case that the 
evident assent given to a contingently true proposition, for example,
“This wall is white”, meets the conditions o f universality and necessity 
required for knowledge in the strict sense283: while all knowledge is 
evident, not all that is evident is k n o w l e d g e . 2 8 4  This is obvious from the 
follow ing definition o f the term “knowledge” provided by Mair:
The first term [to be defined] is knowledge which is about a 
know able proposition (propositio scibilis). A “knowable 
proposition” is a proposition which is necessary, dubitable, 
and fitted to becom e evident through the application of  
propositions which are necessary and evident through a 
discursive s y l l o g i s m . 2 8 5
The proposition is said to be dubitable in order to exclude self-evident
propositions. Mair, reports the opening lines o f Book II o f Aristotle’s
283 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 4; \fol. 9^%]. Per primum terminum [viz., 
propositio scibilis] excluditur propositio contingens, ut paries est albus, quod 
licet mihi sit evidens, non tamen est scibilis scientia proprie dicta de qua loquitur 
Aristoteles 1 Posteriorum  et 5 Ethicorum.
284 Mair. Posteriora, [v/g. aa 5^4-rbj ...omnis scientia est evidentia sed non 
econverso.
2 8 5  Mair. In primum, p ro l, q. 4; \Jol. 9^^]. Primus terminus est scientia, quæ est 
circa propositionem scibilem . Propositio scibilis est propositio necessaria 
dubitabilis, nata fieri evidens per propositiones necessarias évidentes, per 
discursum syllogisticum ad ipsam applicatas.
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P osterio r  Analytics, as follows; “knowable questions are equal to those 
things that we truly know (vere scimusff, and interprets it as meaning 
“every/ question is a knowable proposition and every knowable 
proposition is a question”.286 Thus, to have true knowledge is to have an 
understanding as Aristotle claims “o f the fact [quia est], the reason why 
[propter quid], whether it is [an est], and what it is [quid g^f]”.287 The 
nature o f  the doubt is not that there is dubitability inherent in the act o f  
understanding, rather, it is “sufficient that it [sc., the proposition] is 
fitted to be doubted by the intellect using reason having apprehended the 
signification o f terms”.288 fn support o f this Mair quotes the follow ing  
passage from Robert G rosseteste’s Commentary on the P oster io r  
Analy tics  where the first principles o f science manifest the truth o f  
knowable propositions289:
know ledge o f  first principles is not acquired through 
instruction, since we are not taught or acquire knowledge 
unless that which w e first conceive is dubitable to us and 
appears false and after that doubting the truth is manifested
to U S . 2 9 0
The final clause, sc., 'fitted to become evident through the application o f  
propositions which are necessary and evident through a discursive  
sy llog ism ”, excludes principles which are known by means o f the
286 Mair. In prim wn, proL, q. 4; [/<?/. 9^^]. Dicitur (dubitabilis) per hoc namque 
excluduntur propositiones per se notæ, qui non sunt scibiies. I stud patet Secundi 
Posteriorum  Capitulo 1, ubi dicitur, quæstiones scibiies sunt æquales his quare 
vere scimus. Vult dicere philosophas quod omnis quæstio est scibilis propositio, 
et contra.
287 Aristotle. Posterior Analytics, [89b23-24]. My insertions.
288 Mair. In prim wn, proL, q. 4; [Jol. 9^^]. Non oportet quod dubitetur actu sed 
sufficit quod sit apta nata dubitari ab intellectu aliquo utente ratione, apprehensa 
significatione terminorum.
289 See Ockham. Opera Theologica. Scriptum in librum primum sententiarum , 
Prologus et Distinctio Prima (Ordinatio); [p. 77 lines 3 to 10]. The reference to 
Grosseteste is: Robertas Grossetesta. In Aristotelem Analytica Posteriora, I, t. 1.
290 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 4; [fol. 9^%]. ...“scientia principiorum non est 
acquisita per doctrinam, quia non docemur vel addiscimus nisi illud quod cum 
primo concipimus est nobis dubium, et apparet falsum, et post dubitationem  
manifestatur nobis veritas.”
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senses, memory, and experience, for exam ple, “all heat produces 
warmth”; propositions o f this nature cannot be demonstrated by means 
o f syllogistic r e a s o n i n g . 29i Principles known by way o f the senses, 
m em ory, and the exp erien ce  do not con stitu te k n ow led ge. 
“K now ledge”, as understood by medieval philosophers, could not be 
established on generalizations in respect o f  matters o f fact. Mair 
concludes with a second definition: “Knowledge is an evident notion
which is o f  the true and the necessary, caused by the application o f  
prem ises to it through sy llo g is t ic  d iscou rse (per  d iscursum  
syllogisticum) It is not difficult for someone to whom the subject of 
discussion is familiar to suspect that Mair is sim ply adopting the 
definitions o f knowledge that would have been current in his day. If one 
is inclined to accept the claim that Mair is the paradigm representative of 
Parisian nominalism then one might reasonably expect to encounter a 
discussion o f “knowledge” which appears to have been largely adopted 
from the Prologue  o f  W illiam  o f O ckham ’s Commentary on the 
Sentences  .293 H owever, it should be obvious that there is ample 
evidence that such a claim is not, strictly speaking, indicative o f  the 
independent thinking in which Mair was engaged. For having reported 
these definitions of “knowledge” he indicates that some thinkers, namely 
Ockham and Pierre D ’A illy, would put the second definition in slightly 
different terms. In place o f the expression “caused by” (causata)
291 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 4; [fol. 9^^]. Ultima particula excludit quædam 
principia quæ cognoscuntur per viam sensus, memoriæ et experimenti, ut omnis 
calor est calefactivus, quæ non est demonstrabilis per præmissas ad eam  
applicatas, sed bene per viam sensus. Ipsa autem est dubitabilis. Nam si quis 
experimento non cognovit calorem calefacere, non magis assentiet illi quam isti: 
albedo est albefactiva.
292 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 4; [fol. 9 ^^] Scientia, igitur, est notitia evidens 
veri, necessarii, causata per premissas applicatas ad ipsam per discursum  
syllogisticum. The same definition appears in Mair. Posteriora, [xfg. aa 5^ ]^.
293 Compare Mair’s discussion with Ockham. Scriptum in Librum Primum  
Sententiarum Prologus et D istinctio Prima (Ordinatio), prol. q. 2, art. 1 & art. 
2; [p. 76 line 13 to p. 96 line 17; n.b. p. 76 lines 13 to p. 78 line 13].
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Ockham and D ’A illy used the expression “fitted to be caused by” (nata 
causari) as a result the definition: “Therefore, I say that, knowledge is 
an evident notion which is o f the true and the necessary, fitted to be 
caused (nata causari)  by the application o f premises to it through 
syllogistic d i s c o u r s e ” 2 9 4  requires a different interpretation. According to 
Mair, it fo llo w s from  this defin ition  that either experience or 
demonstration can generate evident notions o f the same species. This 
runs counter to Aristotle since, on Ockham’s account, knowledge of the 
reason why (scientia propter  quid) and knowledge o f the fact (scientia 
quia) can be had in relation to the same object and are o f the same 
s p e c i e s . 2 9 5  Mair gives the following definitions o f scientia propter quid  
and scientia quia:
“Knowledge o f the reason why” is an assent to a conclusion  
generated through premises implying the cause why it is the 
way that is signified by the conclusion. “Knowledge o f the 
fact” is an assent acquired by proceeding from effect to 
cause, or from a remote cause to effect. For demonstration 
it is sufficient that the premises are more known than the 
conclusion and necessarily imply the c o n c l u s i o n . 2 9 6
294 Ockham. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio, Prologus et 
Distinctio Prima, prol. q. 2, art. 2; [p. 87 line 20 to p. 88 line 2]. Petrus de 
Alliaco. Quæstiones m agistri Petri de alliaco Cardinalis cam arecensis super 
primum, tertiiim, e t quartum Sententiarum, (Paris, 1499); [Jols. 5 0 ^b_5 ira] 
Tertio declarandum est. Quid sit notitia proprie scientifica vel scientia proprie 
dicta. Unde dico quod est notitia evidens veri necesarii nata causari per 
præmissas applicatas ad ipsam per discursum syllogisticum... D ico autem “nata 
causari” quia non oportet quod de facto causetur per tales præmissas, nam potest 
per experientiam causari. Potest enim aliquis sine syllogism o evidenter scire 
quod luna est eclypsabilis per sol am experientiam sine syllogismo.
295 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 4; \fol. 9 va-vbj Aliqui dicunt “nata causari” quia 
secundum eos notitia eiusdem speciei potest causari per experientiam et per 
demonstrationem... Contra hoc arguitur tunc scientia propter quid et quia de 
eodem obiecto essent eiusdem  speciei, contra Aristotelem  1 Posteriorum  
[78 ^22-30].
296 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 4; [Jol. 10^^]. Dico quod scientia propter quid est 
assensus conclusionis genitus per premissas importantes causam quare ita sit 
sicut significatur per conclusionem . Scientia quia est assensus acquisitus 
procedendo ab effectu ad causam, vel a causa remota ad effectum . Ad 
de mon strati onem etiam sufficit quod premissæ sint notiores conclusione, et 
necessario inferentes conclusionem.
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The distinction between scientia quia est and scientia prop ter  quid  is 
more clearly defined by Mair in the Posteriora  where he explicitly  
identifies Ockham as his opponent on this issue. He writes:
“Knowledge o f the fact” is assent to a conclusion inclining 
toward assent to the conclusion, and it does not give the 
reason why it is thus. “Knowledge o f the reason why” is 
assent to a conclusion generated through premises implying 
the cause, from  w hich  it fo llo w s  that the sam e 
demonstration or understanding inclines immediately to two 
knowledges distinct in k i n d . 297
The claim that knowledge o f the reason why and knowledge o f the fact
are distinct kinds of knowledge rests on an analogy. A s w e have seen,
Mair thought that there were specific differences between various kinds
of notions; for instance, intuitive and abstractive notions are different in
kind since in virtue o f an intuitive notion one is able to have an evident
judgment o f the existence of something which is not possible in virtue o f
an abstractive n o t i o n . 298 “in the same w ay”, according to Mair,
“knowledge o f the reason why inclines to something more clear and
certain than knowledge o f the fact d o e s . ”299
DEMONSTRATION AN D THE GENERATION OF KNOWLEDGE
W hile it is by now clear that knowledge is generated through 
dem onstration w e have yet to d iscu ss the m echanics o f  the 
demonstrative syllogism  which generates the assent to a scientific  
conclusion. There are three “requisite causes” in the production o f  an
297 Mair. Posteriora, [sig. bb S^bj Scientia quia est, est assensus conclusionis 
inclinans ad assentiendum conclusioni, et non dat causam quare ita est. Scientia 
propter quid est assensus conclusionis genitus per præmissas causam importantes 
ex illo sequitur quod eadem demonstratio vel intellectus immediate inclinât ad 
duas scientias specie distinctas.
298 Mair. Posteriora, [sig. cc 1^ %]. Sed variis modis arguimus distinctionem  
specificam. Notitia intuitiva causat indicium evidens de existentia obiecti notitiæ 
intuitivæ, abstractiva quantumcumque intenditur hoc non potest; ergo  
distinguuntur specie.
299 Mair. Posteriora, cc Eodem modo scientia quid est inclinât ad
aliquod clarius et certius quam scientia quia est.
R. N. Wood Chapter 6; Evident Notions and Scientific Knowledge 161
assent to a scientific conclusion. First, there must be assent to the major 
premise. Second, there must be assent to the minor premise. Third 
assent to the valid inference is r e q u i r e d . T h e s e  three causes are 
necessary conditions for the existence o f scientific knowledge. It is 
clear that howsoever intense the assent to the major or minor premise, or 
howsoever intense assent to the valid inference may be in isolation, not 
one o f the assents in-itself is sufficient to permit a scientific conclusion.
It was thought that the whole effect o f a demonstration is not generated 
in an instant, rather, the intensity o f a scientific assent was produced by 
the intensity o f its constituent assents. Hence, if  assent to “b” (i.e., 
assent to the minor premise) and “c” (i.e., assent to the valid inference) 
were left unchanged, but the intensity with which assent was given to 
“a” (i.e., the major premise) was increased, then, the intensity with 
which an assent to the conclusion o f the demonstrative syllogism  was 
given to would be i n c r e a s e d . This is, Mair writes,
because “b” [i.e., assent to the minor premise] and “c” [i.e., 
assent to the valid inference] are two uniform and natural 
causes, and “a” has been increased, therefore the effect will 
be greater. And though there is no subordination in these 
judgments, as there is between the object and the intellect in 
the production o f an intuitive notion, nevertheless there is 
more cooperation o f  the intellect uniformly cooperating
300 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 4; \fol. 10^^]. Sunt autem tres causæ requisitæ ad 
productionem notitiæ scientificæ conclusionis, scilicet assensus maioris, minoris, 
et bonitatis consequentiæ.
Mair. In primum, prol., q. 4; \fol. 10^ ^^ ]. Loquor de iudiciis, præmittendo 
notitiam apprehensivam terminorum. Nam una illarum causarum puta “a” 
assensus maioris non potest producere assensum  conclusionis scientificum  
quantumcumque intendantur per idem, nec “b” assensus minoris ad hoc sufficit, 
nec “c” assensus bonitatis consquentiæ, sed positis tribus iudiciis, quorum 
quodlibet est intensum ut duo generabitur scientia alicuius intensionis gradualis, 
puta ut duo vel citra. Apparet autem quod si “b” et “c” maneant in eadem  
intensione graduai i, adhuc aucta “a” notitia maioris ad tria, assensus conclusionis 
erit intensior.
R. N. Wood Chapter 6; Evident Notions and Scientific Knowledge 162
with the object or the opposite, [and this] reveals (arguit) a
greater n o t i o n . 3 0 2
It is interesting that the assent to the valid inference though held with 
greater intensity in relation to the assents given to the premises o f the 
argument is not straightforwardly the sum of the intensity o f each assent.
This is obvious according to Mair. The first syllogism  he describes is as 
follows: if a value o f two is assigned both to the intensity of the assent 
to the major premise and to the assent to the minor premise, and the 
assent to valid inference is o f the same intensity then the assent to the 
conclusion will be as intense. It also will have a value o f two: "and 
though the assent to the conclusion is as intense as one o f the premises, 
nevertheless the aggregate o f the premises is more intense, and the 
assent to the premises is understood and is both more clear and the cause 
of the o t h e r . ” 3 0 3  Thus, the truth o f the conclusion is contained in the 
premises. The claim that the relationship o f the intensity o f the assents 
to the premises and valid inference o f a syllogism  is proportional to the 
conclusion deserves some consideration, especially given that the second 
syllogism  Mair provides to clarify this issue is not as helpful as one 
might wish. He asserts that in a syllogism  where the assent to the major 
premise has a value o f three, the assent to the minor premise has a value 
of one, and the assent to the valid inference has a value o f two then the 
assent to the conclusion will have a value o f two. The knowledge that 
results from the second sy llogism  has the same value as the first
3 0 2  Mair. In primum, prol., q. 4; [Jol. 10^^]. Ratio est quia duæ causæ naturales 
“b” et “c” sunt uniformes et “a” augetur; ergo totus effectus erit maior. Et licet 
non sit subordinatio in istis iudiciis, sicut inter obiectum et intellectum in 
productione notitiæ intuitivæ, tamen maior concursus intellectus cum obiecto  
uniformiter concurrente vel contra, arguit maiorem notitiam.
3 0 3  Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 4; [Jol. lOr^]. Si assensus maioris sit ut duo, minoris 
ut duo, bonitatis consequentiæ tot graduum, assensus conclusionis erit ut duo. Et 
licet assensus conclusionis sit ita intensus ut præmissæ unius, tamen aggregatum 
præmissarum est maius, et assensus præmissarum est intellectus et clarior et 
causa alterius.
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syllogism. They both have a value o f two. This is the case because "the 
causes are as active as they were before”.
There is a difficulty at this point in determining what is meant by 
the claim that the assents to the premises o f the valid inference and to 
the conclusion are an aggregate o f  partial causes and not sim ply an 
addition o f partial causes. I think that the proper way to understand this 
claim is to understand "the aggregate o f partial causes” to mean the 
average o f the partial causes which generate the assent to the conclusion.
In both syllogism s Mair has provided the total value o f the partial causes 
are the same: the intensity o f the assents to the major premise, minor 
premise, and the valid inference have a total value o f six. The assent to 
the conclusion o f each syllogism  is the same, they have a value o f two.
It is reasonable to maintain that since Mair contends there is no 
subordination among the different assents (i.e., partial causes) he is 
envisaging a mathematically determined average or mid-point. Now, it 
is clear that in order to have know ledge o f the conclusion  o f a 
demonstrative syllogism  one must assent to both the premises and to the 
valid inference. This raises the question of whether it is possible to have 
knowledge o f  the conclusion o f a demonstrative syllogism  without 
reproducing the entire syllogism. This is an important question since if 
such knowledge is not possible then it would be necessary to reproduce 
the demonstrative syllogism  in order to be able to claim knowledge o f  
the conclusion. This is absurd and a distinction was made between 
actual know ledge (scientia actualis)  and d ispositional know ledge  
(scientia habitualis).
A c t u a l  a n d  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  k n o w l e d g e
In the same way that one ought to distinguish between actual and 
dispositional notions Mair thought that it was important to draw a
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distinction between actual and dispositional knowledge. He gives the 
followiing account o f the distinction:
It [sc., actual knowledge] is an act in respect o f a conclusion  
acquired through demonstration and all that goes with it (in 
toJo suo amhitu ). It is able to be defined as fo llow s. 
[D isp osition a l] know ledge is assent to a conclusion  
acquired through a distinction or distinctions.804
It was maintained that an act o f understanding produces a concomitant
d isposition  which cooperates in the production o f  another act o f
understanding w hich is o f  the same nature as the first act o f
understanding. Thus, an act o f understanding “a” would produce a
disposition “b” which would be a partial cause in producing another act
of understanding “c ”. In the same way, "a” and "c” produce a new
disposition "d” in such a way that “b” and "d” constitute a single
dispositional quality. The same can be said for other o c c u r r e n c e s . ^ o ^
D ispositions are only partial causes in the production o f acts. Mair
writes
From which is fo llow s that that act [of understanding] is 
never produced by a disposition which it produced or vice  
versa, but the whole disposition is produced by the whole  
act, but the w hole act is not produced by the total 
disposition. The first part o f the act is produced by the 
intellect and by an actual notion o f the premises and again
204 Mair. Posteriora, [j/g. aa 5^%]. Sed scientia actualis potest sic definiri. Est 
actus conclusionis per demonstrationem acquisitus in toto suo ambitu. Potest sic 
definiri. Scientia est assensus conclusionis per distinctionem vel distinctioncs 
acquisitus.
205 Mair. Posteriora, [v/^. aa 5 ^b] Primus actus intensus producit habitum. Sit 
primus actus “a” ct habitus “b” itcrum “b” habitus producit partialcm actum  
eiusdem speciei cum “a” puta “c” ct cum “a” producit unum actum totalcm, ct sic 
“a” ct “c” constituant unam formam. Rursus “a” ct “c ” producunt habitum dc 
novo, scilicet “d”. Modo “d” ct “b” constituant qualitatcm habitualcm, ct sic 
conscqucntcr.
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an actual notion o f them [viz., the prem ises] with a 
disposition co-produce a second act.206
There is no infinite regress since, according to Mair, the first act o f  
understanding, by its very nature, produces a disposition. Once a 
conclusion o f a syllogism  has been demonstrated by the intellect, the 
intellect through a disposition spontaneously generated by the first act o f  
understanding, readily assents to the truth o f the conclusion. There is no 
need for a re-application o f the premises to know the truth o f the 
conclusion. If this were not the case it would be virtually impossible to 
make any claims to knowledge in the strict sense. Since knowledge in 
the strict sense is acquired through discursive reasoning there is some 
need to consider whether an assent o f dispositional knowledge is evident 
in the same way that actual knowledge is evident. This has serious 
implications. If the assent produced through a disposition is not evident 
then it is not knowledge. The assent to a knowable proposition, on this 
account, would need be an assent o f faith. It is obvious from what has 
been said that actual scientific notions produce dispositional scientific  
notions but it was thought that where the notions o f the former were 
evident the latter were not. Knowledge in the strict sense requires the 
application o f premises. Mair puts the matter in this way:
If I had actual knowledge concerning one conclusion which 
produced a disposition, and I forget the actual knowledge 
along with an actual notion o f the premises, I will assent to 
that conclusion with only as much certainty as before I 
remember that at one time I knew that. And when that 
assent is certain and inevident it will be faith, it will not be 
know ledge nor opinion since I do not doubt [that 
conclusion]. And so on for other veridical dispositions.
3 0 6  Mair. Posteriora, aa 5^^] Ex quo [see fn. 305] liquet quod numquam
actus ille producitur ab habitu quern produxit vel e diverso, sed totus habitus a 
toto actu producitur sed totus actus non producitur a toto habitu. Prior pars actus 
producitur ab intellectu et notitia actuali præmissarum et iterum notitia actualis 
earundem cum habitu conproducunt secundum actum.
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Therefore [dispositional knowledge does not produce actual
know ledge].207
It is possible to maintain that the reason that an actual scientific notion is 
capable o f producing a notion that is o f a different nature is similar to 
the ability o f intuitive notions to cooperate in the production of  
abstractive notions that are different in kind. Thus, if  it is asked what 
kind o f assent occurs when the assent is produced by a disposition the 
answer is, it is an assent o f faith.208 This is not the definitive account.
Mair thought that there was a second position which he thought was not 
“improbable”, a position according to which the scientific disposition
inclines to a scientific assent that is o f  the same most 
specific  species as the know ledge that produces the 
disposition. This is the case because any disposition  
produced by an act, or acts, inclines to the production o f  
like acts entitatively of the same most specific species.209
Briefly stated, acts o f knowing, whether they are produced immediately
by the apprehension o f and assent to the premises, the valid inference,
and the conclusion o f  a discursive syllogism ; or, whether they are
produced through direct knowledge of the conclusion and dispositional
knowledge o f the premises, both produce evident assents to knowable
propositions.
297 Mair. Posteriora, [5 /^. aa 6''^“i’b]. Si ego habui scientiam actualem de una
conclusione quæ habitum produxit, et obliviscar scientiæ actualis cum actuali 
notitia præmissarum assentiam illi conclusioni tan ta certitudine sicut antea 
memini quod interdum illam scivi, et cum ille assensus est certus et inevidens erit 
fides non erit scientia neque opinio quia non dubito, et sic de aliis habitibus 
veridicis. Igitur.
208 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 4; \fol. 10^^]. Potest quis dicere quod assensus
sequens est alterius speciei a scientia actuali, sicut habitus notitiæ intuitivæ non
inclinât (ut constat) in notitiam intuitivam, sed in notitiam abstractivam alterius 
speciei sic potest dici in proposito. Si petas quis ergo assensus erit dicitur quod 
erit assensus fidei.
299 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 4; \fol. IQva-vbp A lio modo potest dici (et non
improbabiliter ut opinor) quod ille habitus inclinât in assensum scientificum  
eiusdem speciei specialissimæ cum scientia productiva illius habitus. Ratio est 
quia quilibet habitus productus ab aliquo actu vel actibus inclinât in similes actus 
in specie specialissima entitative.
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THEOLOGICAL TRUTH
In order to clarify further what Mair understood by knowledge, I 
would like to conclude this chapter with some remarks concerning the 
nature o f theological truth and whether it is possible for the pilgrim to 
have scientific knowledge o f theological truth. According to the first o f  
two definitions Mair gives for theological truth “a theological truth is a 
truth formed about God or a truth about creatures that leads back to 
God”.210 There are several important implications that are drawn from  
this definition. First, “not all theological truths are believed by faith, but 
some are opinative, for example, God is able to do the infinite, or God 
alone produces blessedness.”2U Moreover, it follow s that not all truths 
are strictly speaking theological since propositions such as “This triangle 
has three equal sides and three equal angles” are properly scientific  
knowledge. Moreover, in relation to some theological propositions there 
can be evident assents. Mair writes:
It is possible for the pilgrim to have an evident notion  
concerning many theological truths. This is obvious since 
philosophers can arrive at an evident notion o f this, “God 
exists”, which is obvious from Physics  8 and Metaphysics  
12. At least they were able to deduce somethings evidently 
about God or about creatures ordered to God.2U
However, there is another way in which theological truth can be
understood. It is this second definition which is more relevant to
determining whether it is possible for the pilgrim to have scientific
210 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; [fol. Veritas theologica est veritas de Deo  
formata vel de creatura ut habet reductionem ad Deum.
211 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; [/<?/. Non omnes veritates theologicæ sunt 
fide credendæ, sed aliquæ sunt opinativæ, ut Deus potest facere infinitum, vel 
Deus producit se solo beatitudinem.
212 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; [fol. 71"^ ]. Possibile est viatorem de multis 
propositionibus theologicis habere evidentem notitiam. Patet quia philosophi 
devenerunt ad notitiam evidentem istius, “Deus est”, ut patet 8 Physicæ , et 12 
Metaphysicæ. Saltem evidenter aliqua deducere poterant de Deo vel de creaturis 
in ordinis ad Deum.
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know ledge o f theological truth. T heological truth in the second  
definition is taken
for the writings o f holy scripture, either for an act or 
disposition o f the mind in relation to such writings, both 
collectively and divisively, for one proposition, for one act 
or disposition or for several; just as logic in the strict sense 
is an assent to one logical conclusion or several, and 
som etim es it is understood for a logical proposition.
Moreover, theology is understood for a disposition o f those 
things which are derived from articles of faith and from the 
sayings o f holy scripture just as conclusions are derived
from principles.213
The truths contained in holy scripture are the premises from which 
conclusions are inferred. On the basis o f  the above definition Mair 
infers several corollaries, but it is the last one which is important for our 
discussion. It is obvious, according to Mair,
that an assent o f theological discourse is an assent o f faith.
For if  one assents to some conclusion on account o f the 
premises he believes precisely, such an assent will not be 
greater than the assent to the premises. Now the assent to 
the prem ises is faith. Therefore [the assent to the 
conclusion o f a theological demonstration is faith]. I said 
“on account o f the premises he believes” because it can 
often happen that the consequent is evident where the 
antecedent is inevident, but then the evidence o f the 
conclusion com es from a source other than from the 
certitude o f the premises. And it follow s as a corollary that
212 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 4; \fol. lO'^b] Alio modo capitur veritas theologica 
pro scriptura sacri canonis, seu pro actu, vel habitu mentis respectu talis 
scripturae, et collective et divisive pro una propositione, uno actu, vel habitu, vel 
pro multis, sicut logica proprie est assensus conclusionis logicalis unius vel 
plurimum, et interdum capitur pro propositione logicali. Adhuc capitur theologia 
pro habitu eorum quæ deducuntur ex articulis fidei, et ex dictis sacræ scripturæ, 
sicut conclusiones ex principiis.
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by no means is the assent to a conclusion in theological
discourse knowledge.214
The claim  that a consequent can be evident where the antecedent is 
inevident seems absurd. In the first instant even the qualification, that 
the source o f the evidence is other than the certitude o f  the premises, 
seems inadequate to dispel this apparent absurdity. It does not seem at 
all possible for an inevident conclusion to become evident, even if the 
source o f this evidence is external to the premises. There is no specific  
resolution o f this difficulty in the text. However it is plausible that Mair 
envisages that the conclusion becom es evident only by means o f the 
absolute power o f God which transforms the inevidence into evidence.
This is consistent with the claim that the certitude that is required for 
evidence originates in something extraneous to the premises. This does 
not make the contemporary reader very comfortable but it is the most 
plausible explanation.
There is yet another issue that should concern the reader at this 
point. This is the claim that while on the one hand it is possible to have 
evident notions o f theological truths such as “God exists”, on the other 
hand the assent to theological truth has been reduced to an assent o f  
faith. This is striking and there is no ready manner in which to shed 
light on this difficulty. However, the suggestion appears to be this: if  
theological knowledge is considered as a body o f theological truths then, 
while assent to some theological truths such as “God exists” are evident 
and thus are true scientific assents; this does not detract from the fact 
that theology, on the whole, is about clarifying the nature o f faith. And
214 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 3; \fol. IH^]. Patet quod assensus discursus 
theologici est fides. Nam si quis assentiat alicui conclusioni propter præmissas 
créditas præcise, talis assensus non erit maior assensu præmissarum. Modo 
assensus præmissarum est fides. Igitur. Dixi propter præmissas créditas quia stat 
crebro quod consequens sit evidens ubi antecedens inevidens est. Sed tunc 
evidentia conclusionis aliunde venit quam a certitudine premissarum. Et ex hoc 
corollarie sequitur quod nullatenus assensus conclusionis in discursu theologico 
est scientia.
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faith, in the words o f Hugh o f St. Cher, is nothing other than “the 
certitude o f the mind about absent things, and is placed above opinion
and below k n o w l e d g e . ” 2 i 5
212 Mair. In primum, prol. q. \ ,\J o l. 7 ^b] ...secundum Hugonem de Sacramentis 
liber 2, parte 10 capitulo 2 dicentem: fides est certitudo animi de rebus
absentibus supra opinionem, et infra scientiam constituta.
C h a p t e r  7  
T h e  V ir t u e  o f  F a it h
S o m e  b a s i c  c o n c e p t s
“How is the pilgrim able to acquire faith?”. The problem Mair 
confronts is a very modern one and it rests at the centre o f our inquiry 
into the foundations o f know ledge and the distinction between  
knowledge and belief: What do w e mean by religious assent? Mair 
writes that belief can be understood in three ways. First, in its most 
universal employment, and then faith amounts to the same thing as 
“assent”. In this way, we “believe” the things we know and the things 
which we “opine”.216 This broad sense o f “b e lie f’ though acceptable for 
common parlance is inappropriate for philosophical investigation as it 
subsumes the categories o f naturally caused and freely given assent. In a 
restricted sense belief is understood as “unhesitant assent to propositions 
whose truth is established only by the testimony o f others.”2u  Mair 
does not elaborate on the importance o f this definition as a model 
representing the acceptance o f propositions based on trust. George 
Lokert, was quite clear that ‘Taith” was not to be understood only as 
directed to propositions that pertained to salvation. He wrote that an 
assent of faith was not to be understood in the limited sense o f religious
216 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; [fol. Primo communissime et tunc tantum
valet quantum assentire. Quomodo credimus ilia quæ scimus et ilia quæ 
opinamur.
217 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 1; [fol. f b ] ,  Capitur stricte pro assentire sine 
formidine propositionibus de quarum veritate non constat nisi per testimonium  
aliorum.
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faith, or more specifically, assent to articles o f the Catholic faith but was 
to be understood to be any non-erroneous assent whose truth was not 
immediately evident whether it is true or f a l s e  218 Lokert includes the 
clause “whether it is true or false” because, as we shall see below, the 
w ill can cause one to assent to a true or proposition and then it is 
considered to be positively affected (pia affectata) ; but the will can also 
cause one to give assent to a false proposition and then the will is said to 
be depraved (prava affectata). The third accepted em ploym ent o f  
“faith” and the one to which Mair devotes his attention in the 
Commentary  is “assenting without hesitation to propositions that pertain 
to salvation about which the master [sc., Lombard] says in Book 3, 
distinction 23 Chapter 2 : “faith is a virtue by which things unseen are 
believed. Nevertheless, it should be understood that it does not concern 
all things which are unseen but only those things to believe which, as 
Augustine says in the Enchiridion, pertains to r e l i g i o n . ” 2 1 9  Some details 
are added when in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics  Mair 
describes faith as “an assent which is true, unhesitant, and i n e v i d e n t ” .220 
These various elements are brought together in the following discussion:
An act o f faith, or actual faith, is an actual judicative notion 
which is certain and inevident, o f  a truth pertaining to 
religion, accepted through revelation. Rem ove, the term 
“actual” and the definition o f  an act o f faith and o f a
218 Lokert. Scriptum in materia notitiarum, ig. f  ...non capimus fidem pro 
assensu propositionis pertinentis ad salutem vel pro fide catholica præcise sed 
pro quolibet assensu firmo inevidente non erroneo sive sit verus vel falsus.
219 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; [Jol. Tertio modo accipitur proprie pro
assentire sine formidine propositionibus quæ pertinent ad salutem. De quo dicit 
Magister libro 3, di. 23 cap. 2: Fides est virtus qua creduntur quæ non videntur. 
Quod tamen non de omnibus quæ non videntur accipiendum est sed de his 
tantum quæ credere, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio, ad religionem pertinet. Et 
in ista significantia utimur vocabulo. Augustine. Enchiridion ad  Laurentiwn de 
Eide et Spe et Caritate in Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina (Volume 46), ed. 
E. Evans, (Brepols, 1945); [p. 52].
220 Mair. Posteriora, [sig. n  8^^]. [Fides] capitur hie ut eius descriptio sit assensus 
verus firmus non evidens.
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disposition o f faith whether acquired or infused agrees.
“Certain” is said to d istinguish  it from  opinion.
“Inevident” is said to exclude evident notions such as 
understanding, knowledge and wisdom. And this St. Paul 
to the Hebrews Chapter 11 im plies saying “Faith is an 
argument o f the non-apparent”. “Of a truth pertaining to 
religion” because a firm and inevident assent to another 
proposition, such as, “Carthage is in Africa” is not faith as 
Augustine says in the Enchiridion  Chapters 8 and 15:
Hence, whatsoever things do not pertain to the attainment of 
happiness neither lead to it [sc., happiness], nor pertain to 
religion by means o f which the highest God is worshipped 
on the way [to the end] so that in the end He will bless in
heaven.221
This definition clearly differentiates faith from knowledge which is 
described as an assent which is a true, unhesitant and evident caused by 
principles necessitating the intellect. I will have something more to say 
on these matters shortly but for the moment it is sufficient to have these 
drawn to one’s attention before proceeding to Mair’s exposition o f how 
the virtue o f faith is acquired.
Concerning the manner in which faith is generated there are 
various opinions. Some posit that the will of itself is able to 
produce every [act of] faith. Others [e.g., Holkot] think that 
faith can be produced by a means that takes the intellect 
captive. The third is the common [view] [e.g., Ockham and
221 Mair. In tertium, q. 8, d. 23; [fol. 53^^]. Fides actus sive actualis, est notitia 
adhæsiva actualis certa ct inevidens veritatis ad religionem  pertinentis per 
revelationem acceptæ. Deme terminum actualis et definitio fidei actui et fidei 
habitui acquisitæ et infusæ conveniet. Dicitur “certa” ad opinionem separandum. 
Dicitur “inevidens” ad excludendas notitias évidentes quemadmodum sunt 
intellectus, scientia, et sapientia. Et hoc innuit A postolus ad  H ebreos 11 
inquiens: Fides est argumentum non apparentium. Dicitur “veritatis ad
religionem pertinentis” quia assensus firmus et inevidens alterius propositionis, 
ut pote istius, Carthago est in Africa, non est fides ut dicit Augustinus in 
Enchiridio  capitulo 8 et capitulo 15: Unde quæcumque non pertinent ad
felicitatem  consequendam , neque ad illam  conducunt, non pertinent ad 
religionem qua summus Deus colitur in via ut tandem beatificet in patria.
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Gregory o f Rimini] consists in the mean in which virtue is
accustomed to reside {Ethics 2) .322
Mair describes the acquisition o f faith as a virtue which consists in 
ach iev in g  the proper proportion betw een tw o extrem es. The 
characterization o f faith as a virtue implies that it is an excellence or a 
perfection o f some kind. Mair is building on Aristotle’s discussion in 
the Nicomachean Ethics where virtue is a rationally determined m id­
point between two vices, one of excess and one o f d e f i c i e n c y . 3 2 3  in fact, 
A ristotle’s application o f the doctrine o f  the mean in describing virtue 
pertains to moral excellence. Here, the doctrine o f the mean is being 
applied to describe what characterizes correct thinking in relation to 
faith. The virtue o f faith is a state in which faith is neither exclusively  
naturally caused nor exclusively freely caused. An assent o f faith is not 
simply the result of an act o f the intellect nor is it solely the result o f an 
act o f will. It is not the former because a pre-condition for a virtuous act 
is that the action is voluntary. It is not only the product o f will because 
then the will could prompt one to assent to something unknown which is 
absurd. The virtue o f faith is achieved by the proper balancing o f  these 
two extremes. One extreme could be characterized as “blind faith” 
because it does not have sufficient knowledge to make faith reasonable.
The other extreme would be to think that faith can be the result o f an act 
of intellect alone.
322 In primum, prol., q. 1; \fol, Sed circa modum quo fides generatur varia
est opinandi ratio. Aliqui enim ponunt voluntatem posse se sola omnem fidem  
producere. A lii {in marg. Holkot] existimant fidem solum posse produci a 
medio captivante intellectum. Tertia est communis {in marg., Ockham q. 25, 2 
et Gregory Prologus q. 1, solutione ad quartum art. 4] in medio consistons in 
quo solet residere virtus 2 Ethicorwn  [1109^31]. It has not been possible to 
locate the reference given for Ockham. For Gregory’s position see: Gregory of 
Rimini. G regorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super prim um  et secundum  
sententiarum, [Volume 1, pp. 40-57].
323 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, [1107^1-5].
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There are two categories of virtue. There is virtue as an excellence  
o f character, that is, as moral virtue; and as an excellence o f thought or 
an intellectual virtue. Granting that faith is a virtue we must determine 
into which category it f a l l s . 3 2 4  One is tempted to conclude that faith is 
best described as an intellectual virtue, more specifically as a virtue 
similar to the Aristotelian virtue o f phronesis,  or practical w isdom , 
which is nothing other than “a reasoned and true state to act with regard 
to human g o o d s ” . 3 2 5  it is an excellence o f thought which guides 
deliberation directed towards action and it may be characterized as a 
kind o f  “correct thinking” which guides all human praxis. This is not 
unreasonable and it may prove to be the proper way to understand the 
nature o f faith as a virtue but such a judgment is rash at this juncture.
Our course o f  inquiry is charted in the follow ing propositions put 
forward by Mair in order to elucidate the concept o f acquired faith in 
terms o f Aristotle’s doctrine o f the mean.
(1) Demonstration does not produce faith. (2) A topical 
argument does not produce faith. (3) The intellect and 
infused faith are insufficient for the production of faith. (4)
The will with its act is insufficient for the production o f  
faith. (5) Acquired faith is produced by a motive and pia  
affectio.^^^
324 For a discussion of issues relevant to determining the epistemological status of 
faith see A. Kenny. Faith and Reason, (New York, 1983). Alvin Plantinga. 
“Reason and Belief in God” in Faith and Rationality, eds. Alvin Plantinga and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, (Notre Dame, 1983). Robert Merrihew Adams. The 
Virtue o f  Faith and other Essays in Philosophical Theology, (New York, 1987).
32  ^ Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, [1140^20-21].
3 2 6  Mair. In primum, proL, q. \  ,\ fo l .  irb-vaj Et pro responsione secundum hanc 
propositionem [viz., ...in medio consistens in quo solet residere virtus] ponuntur 
propositiones quæ sequuntur. Prima est. Demonstratio non producit fidem. 
Secunda propositio. Argumentum topicum  non producit fidem. Tertia 
propositio. Intellectus et fides infusa non sufficiunt ad quamlibet fidem  
acquirendam. Quarta propositio. Voluntas cum suo actu non sufficiunt ad 
productionem fidei. Quinta propositio. Fides acquisita producitur a motivo et 
pia affectione.
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This passage clearly illustrates the difficulty o f determining in what 
way faith is be understood as an excellence. It is not possible to acquire 
the virtue of faith by means of simple acts o f intellect or acts o f will: 
faith is neither exclusively naturally nor freely caused. Faith is not 
demonstrative knowledge which is both scientific and evident.327 
Demonstrative knowledge is the result of a simple and firm intellectual 
apprehension and assent to the truth of a conclusion generated through a 
syllogism. Faith is not a naturally caused and hesitantly held assent 
which is the nature of the conclusion derived from the premises o f a 
topical argument.328 The conclusion of a topical argument is an 
opinative assent and hence the technical medieval sense of the term 
“opinion’Yopm/o). A conclusion of a topical argument is nothing other 
than one based on a process o f dialectical reasoning or sufficient 
authority. The intellect and infused faith by definition cannot be the 
basis for acquired faith since infused faith presupposes a special act of 
divine grace.329 The will and its acts are also insufficient to produce 
faith.330 This is obvious in light of the brief remarks we made earlier 
concerning the medieval dictum nihil volitum nisi præcognitum: the will
327 Mair. In prim um , prol., q. 1; \fol. D^]. Prima propositio probatur sic. 
Demonstratio producit notitiam evidentem et scientificam quia ut dicitur Primi 
Posteriorum  capitulo 2 Omnis demonstratio est syllogism us apodiction in 
faciens scire. Modo fides est inferior scientia inferioritate notitiæ.
328 Mair. In primum, p r o l ,  q. 1; \Jol. Secunda propositio probatur quia 
argumentum topicum solum producit opinionem et assensum formidolosum; ergo 
non producit fidem quod est assensus certus.
329 Mair. In prim um , p r o l ,  q. 1; [Jol. 1^^]. Tertia probatur de multis parvulis 
Christianorum baptizatis et ablatis per Mahumetanos et Tartaros qui venientes ad 
annos discretionis non possunt credere articulos fidei nostræ.
330 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. \ ,\J o l. Quarta probatur sic. Voluntas non
potest imperare intellectui ut opinetur ad nutum sine motivo: ergo non potest 
imperare ei ut credat sine motivo. Antecedens patet: quia ut ait Philosophas 2 De 
Anima textu commenti 54. Imaginari possumus cum volumus opinari autem 
minime. Et confirmatur ratione. Ad oppositum propositionis sequitur quod 
voluntas potest facere intellectum assentire cuicumque propositioni sine motivo: 
et sic poterit facere assentire intellectum huic; astra sunt paria; vel huic; papa 
dormit. Consequens est contra experientiam quia hoc modo potest facere quod 
numquam mentiatur in prolatione propositionis neutræ cum possit facere 
intellectum assentire sine ratione probabili.
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is not able to choose without its object already being known. Faith is 
generated by a motive (motivum) and a positive movement o f the will 
{pia ajfectio  ) which prompts the intellect to give unhesitant and firm 
assent to a conclusion that was previously held only tentatively.331 The 
m otive {motivum) o f  an assent o f  faith is nothing other than the 
conclusion o f a topical argument, in other words, a probable reason 
{ratio probabilis). The epistemic certitude attributed to an act of faith 
originates not in reason alone but also requires the involvement o f will.
The evidence o f experience is insufficient to cause the intellect to give 
unhesitant assent to propositions or articles o f  faith. At best, the 
evidence before the intellect can prompt a weak and hesitant assent; only 
a positive movement o f the will can transform this assent into one that is 
not simply true but also one that is held firmly and without hesitation.
It is fitting to follow  the exposition o f the issues as they were
understood and developed in the Commentary on the Sentences o f  Peter
Lombard  where Mair states that he is to explore the concept o f faith 
the,
according to^light o f natural reason. He is describing the pilgrim’s 
journey toward the acquisition o f faith. It is an account which agrees 
with the ordinate power o f God (potentia D ei ordinata) but not the 
absolute power of God (potentia Dei absoluta). Definitions are in order.
The absolute power o f God is the power in virtue o f which God is able 
to accomplish anything short o f a contradiction. The ordinate power o f  
God is that which conforms to the laws o f nature. The nominalist 
framework is omnipresent and it would be a mistake to construe these 
powers as being really distinct. Potentia Dei ordinata and potentia Dei 
absoluta  are two names imposed to signify two modes o f acting. While
331 Mair. In prim um , p r o l ,  q. l , \ f o l  Quinta propositio probatur. Nam
fides acquisita producitur aliquomodo et non videtur quo alio ergo verisimile est 
quod sic producatur.
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it is true that God can accomplish more according to potentia absoluta 
than he can according to potentia ordinata this, as Mair suggests, is 
analogous to a king being able to do more de facto  than de iure 
scripto.'^^^ These concepts were o f  paramount importance to the 
medieval philosopher as they touched upon, and, even threatened the 
possibility o f achieving epistemic certitude since it could be argued that 
God can deceive by means o f His absolute power since this does not 
imply any contradiction in His nature. This view was opposed by many 
philosophers and theologians, including John Mair, who thought that the 
ability o f God to deceive conflicted with His essence as the One, the 
Good and the True. It is important to note that the implication o f the 
doctrine is not that there are two really distinct powers in God but that 
human beings have lim ited know ledge in respect o f  how God 
accom plishes his works. The distinction between the concepts o f  
potentia ordinata and absoluta is an important tool in pointing out the 
fragility o f human knowledge and the ability o f human beings to grasp 
the som etim es mysterious nature o f the universe. John Mair is not 
setting out to understand faith sim ply as a theologian. He is not 
investigating the nature o f the mystery o f faith per se. He is embarking 
upon this journey first and foremost as a philosopher who is attempting 
to provide an interpretation o f the nature o f acquired faith. He is giving 
an account o f faith as it is acquired in this lifetim e in virtue o f the 
knowledge human beings have o f the ordinary workings o f God through 
his creation, i.e., nature. This is not to deny nor to minimize the impact
332 Mair. In primum, d. 43, q. 1; \fol. lOO '^h], ...duplex est potentia Dei ordinata 
scilicet et absoluta. Potentia absoluta Dei se extendit ad ilia quæ contradictionem  
non implicant... Alia est potentia Dei ordinata et est ilia quæ est conformis legi 
ordinatæ quæ nobis constat per scripturam vel revelationem, non quod sint duæ 
potentiæ realiter distinctæ, sed quia Deus propter duplicem modum agendi quem 
habet vel habere potest duobus nominibus vocatur si cut dicimus quod multa 
potest rex de facto quæ non potest de iure scripto.
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o f the fact that the journey is a faithful one, rather, it is to emphasize the 
fact that acquired faith is essen tia lly  rational and grounded in 
experience.
TH E PHENOMENON OF FAITH
Faith is acquired in virtue o f both an act o f intellect and an act o f  
will. It is not a simple act o f will but an act that involves a positive 
movement o f the will to accept the evidence available to the intellect as 
sufficient grounds for belief. The account that Mair provides is as 
follows:
Pia ajfectio  can be understood in two ways. One way is 
that which does not consider sophistic arguments in the 
opposite direction. For instance, you preach to som eone 
that Christ is God and in testimony o f this claim you say to 
a lame man: Rise and Walk. On hearing these words 
Socrates is able to consider sophistic arguments against this 
position by saying that this is by means o f magic or some 
such thing and this is depraved {prave affectatum). In 
another way [it is possible to understand p ia  ajfectio  as], 
excluding these sophistic arguments and without positing 
any act o f w ill, and then an act o f faith which w ill be a 
certain and inevident notion will be caused without any act 
of will since that miracle does not capture the intellect in 
the same way as a demonstration or an intuitive notion 
concerning a contingent judgment. This however would be 
to agree with Holkot.333
333 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; [/o/. ...pia affectio potest intelligi duobus
modis. Uno modo quod quis non considérât sophismata in oppositum. Exempli 
causa; alicui predicas Christum esse Deum, et in attestationem illius dicis claudo. 
Surge et Ambula, tunc Sortes audiens potest considerare sophisticationes in 
oppositum dicendo quod hoc est per artem magicam vel aliquid tale; et hoc est 
prave affectatum. Altero modum excludendo istas sophisticationes nullum actum 
voluntatis ponendo, et tunc sine actu voluntatis causabitur actus fidei qui erit 
notitia certa et inevidens, quia illud miraculum non captivat intellectum sicut 
demonstratio vel notitia intuitiva de iudicio contingenti. Hoc est autem esset 
coincidere cum Holkot.
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Robert Holkot, a late 13^  ^ century English Dominican friar, had 
maintained that faith was naturally caused without the cooperation o f the 
will. He thought that “belief in articles o f  faith or any other proposition 
is not in the free power of m a n . ”334 B elief in a proposition o f any kind 
was the result o f the intellect grasping a proposition and judging it to be 
true on account o f the evidence. This is to align faith with opinion and 
know led ge w hich are both naturally caused. M air and his 
contemporaries were critical o f this difficult position. Their central 
objection was that a pre-condition for an assent to be considered virtuous 
or not is its voluntariness. Mair writes that “since God obliges us to 
believe and yet does not oblige us to do something which goes beyond 
our powers, we will be free to believe and not to b e l i e v e . ”335 He 
continues “moreover assent is a perfection of the will and therefore faith 
is in our power which does not seem to be true unless, for believing, the 
free action o f the will were to c o o p e r a t e ” . 336 Properly understood pia  
ajfectio is a positive movement of the will which prompts the intellect to 
assent unhesitantly to a proposition w hose truth w ithout such  
cooperation is doubtful. Mair explains that pia  ajfectio supposits for an 
act o f will, connoting that it wills that which agrees with religion and 
denies that which is opposed to it. W illing negatively (nolle) opposes 
the generation o f faith and as a result positively  w illin g  (velle) 
cooperates in the generation o f it.337 p  is a positive movement o f the
334 Robert Holkot. Super Sententias. (Lyons, 1501); [sig. a 2^^]. ...credere 
articulis fidei vel quamcumque propositionem non est in hominis libera potestate.
335 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; \jol. H h] Rursus cum Deus obliget nos ad 
credendum et non obliget nos ad illud quod transcendit vires nostras liberum erit 
credere et non credere.
3 3 6  Mair. In prim um , prol., q. 1; \jol. ...assentio autem est voluntatis 
perfectio ergo fides est in nostra potestate, quod non videtur esse verum nisi ad 
credendum concurreret actio libera voluntatis.
337 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; [jol. fva-vbj pj^ affectio enim supponit pro actu 
voluntatis connotando quod velit illud quod concernit religionem et nolit illud 
quod ei adversatur...Et sic nolle répugnât generationem fidei et per consequens 
velle ad generationem eiusdem concurrit.
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will that prompts one to give unhesitant assent to that which just has 
occurred, i.e., the coincidence o f the command “Get up and walk” and 
the act o f walking on the part o f a hitherto lame individual, is evidence 
of a miracle. In the absence o f such a positive motivation o f the will 
there is no act o f belief. The sceptic, one suffering from prava ajfectio 
will claim  that the available evidence suggests something else and is 
more likely to be the result o f an act o f magic or some such thing but 
nothing more. The evidence in both cases is the same and it affords a 
probable reason for either conclusion. Faith is not irrational but is firmly 
grounded in both an act o f intellect and an act o f will. The will is a 
partial cause o f an assent o f faith and it is not capable of impeding the 
effects o f evident principles. However, the will must cooperate with the 
intellect which knows these principles if there is to be an act o f belief.
There is an interesting question which should be addressed: Is it
possible to ascribe an act of faith exclusively to an act o f will?
The response Mair gives is insightful: An act o f w ill can be
considered in two ways. In the first instance, it can be taken as the 
commanded act o f will {actus voluntatis imperatus) which is nothing 
else than the act o f believing itself. In the second instance it can be 
taken as the elicited  act o f w ill {actus voluntatis elicitus), that is, 
according to the act o f will as the efficient cause o f the act o f belief. In 
the first sense an act of faith is an act o f will but not in the second sense 
since the act o f faith insofar as it is an elicited act inheres in the intellect 
and is an assent. The elicited act is located in the intellect because the 
will as an efficient cause o f belief necessarily involves understanding. It 
is really an act o f intellect and first and forem ost inheres in the 
intellect.338 R is no doubt possible that Mair simply means that an act of
338 Mair. In primum, pro l.; q. 1; [jol. ^ h ]  Respondetur distinguendo quod sit 
actus voluntatis, vel imperatus, et sic concedo, vel actus elicitus, sic nego; sed
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faith primarily inheres in the intellect and secondarily inheres in the will.
This is consistent with Mair’s claim: “and if by means of the possible or 
the im possible it were to happen that the intellect was to be separated 
from the w ill the assent would inhere in the intellect and not in the 
w ill.”339 O f course, another option would be to have located the act o f  
assent in the will alone. But this cannot be admitted because an act of 
assent assumes knowledge. The will in-itself is simply impotent without 
knowledge o f the object of belief, thus the necessity of the intellect in 
producing an assent o f faith.
The will is able to effect the certainty o f an assent. The hesitant 
nature o f an opinion is moved to unhesitance in virtue of an act o f will.
In this way, an opinative act is transformed into an act of faith. It may 
be objected that from this it follow s that in a similar way demonstration 
and w ill together produce a notion entitatively more perfect than 
scientific knowledge. It also follow s from this principle that the will and 
apprehensive notions o f first principles would produce a notion which is 
greater in perfection than a judicative notion o f a first principle. In the 
same way it is probable that an intuitive notion o f whiteness and an act 
of will would produce a more perfect intellection than the intuitive 
notion that would be produced by means o f  the intellect and the 
o b j e c t . 3 4 0  This, as Mair indicates, is to misunderstand the nature o f
quia inhæret intellectui et est assensus, realiter est actus intellectus et ei primo 
inhæret.
339 Mair. In primum, p ro l., q. 1; [Jol. Et si per possibile vel impossibile
intellectus separaretur a voluntate, intellectui iile assensus inhæreret et non 
voluntati.
340 Mair. In primum, prol., q. I, [Jol. l^h] Sed contra hoc arguitur [See fn. 339]. 
Ex illo sequitur quod demonstratio et voluntas producerent notitiam perfectiorem 
entitative quam sit scientia. Probatur sic. Per te argumentum topicum et 
voluntas producunt notitiam perfectiorem opinione et argumentum topicum tam 
generaliter reddit opinionem  quam argumentum demonstrativum generat 
scientiam . Et ex eodem  principio probatur quod voluntas et notitiæ  
apprehensivæ primi principii producerent notitiam unam perfectiorem quam est 
notitia iudicativa primi principii. Eadem via probabitur quod notitia intuitiva
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scientific demonstration which does not admit o f degrees. Unlike an 
opinative assent which is hesitant, scientific knowledge is certain and 
evident: “It is caused by principles necessitating the intellect”. Mair
treads cautiously. He claims that if  this position is accepted then it is 
very difficult to disprove and he judges that it is therefore more 
reasonable to reject the inference than to attack the premises. Mair must 
reject the inference and not the premises because to reject them would 
endanger his own position since his opponent’s argument draws heavily 
on the combination o f natural and free causation which Mair has used to 
explain the phenomenon o f faith. Thus he writes: “Experience, in fact 
attests that when I look at the wall, from the fact that I bring to bear an 
effort o f  the w ill to a w illing to look, I do not know thereby the 
whiteness any more clearly at the end than in the beginning.”341 The 
will is involved only insofar as it is responsible for having directed one’s 
attention to the wall, the will does not cooperate in the cognitive process.
The role o f pia  ajfectio is essential in the production o f an act of  
faith and it was the subject o f a good deal o f controversy. It was 
generally thought that pia  affectio was able to prompt an assent greater 
than reason could prove. However some thought that this could cause 
someone to assent to an article o f faith without any probable reason. 
Because o f its possible implications the claim that the will could cause 
an assent to be held more firmly than reason could prove was handled 
with care. The fo llow in g  passage reports two o f the possib le  
implications o f maintaining such a position:
albedinis et actus voluntatis producunt intcllcctioncm perfectiorem quam esset 
notitia intuitiva producta ab intellectu et ab obiecto.
341 Mair. In primum, p ro l., q. \ ,\fo l. U h ] Si quis concederet illata difficile esset 
ilium redarguere, sed rationabilius iudico in omnibus negare consequentiam. 
Experientia namque teste quando intueor parietem, per hoc quod ego appono 
conamen voluntatis ad velle intueri, non lympidius cognosco albedinem in fine 
quam principio.
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First it fo llow s that if one is able to assent more to one 
neutral proposition, which reason proves, by means o f a 
command of the will one is able to assent to a proposition 
without reason. For exam ple, if  the intellect is able to 
assent to this “God is Three and One” more firmly than 
reason proves, then one is able to assent to this “God is 
Three and One” without motive. Second, it then follow s  
that p ia  ajfectio is a more powerful cause o f an assent o f  
faith than a topical argument is and a topical argument 
produces a hesitant assent without the aid o f the w ill.
Therefore pia  affectio, which is an act o f w ill, is able to 
produce an assent without the cooperation o f a topical
reason.342
In the first instance there is no hesitation on the part o f Mair to 
accept the antecedent which states that the will is able to command 
assent to propositions that are not established simply on the basis o f  
evidence. The inference, that the w ill can command assent to a 
proposition without reason, is rejected since, as was often asserted, the 
will is blind in its operations without the assistance of the intellect. In 
the second case it is conceded that the will is a more powerful cause than 
a topical argument in the production o f an assent o f faith. It is obvious 
that the conclusion o f a topical argument, an assent which is naturally 
caused but hesitantly held, is properly said to be o f the intellect. Despite 
the concession that the will is a more powerful cause than an intellect’s 
topical reason, it does not follow that either the intellect or the will alone 
is able to produce an assent o f faith. The certainty attributed to an assent 
of faith or a proposition is a derivative o f  a conjunction o f pia  ajfectio
342 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; [jol. 2^^]. Turn primo. Si quis potest assentire 
plus uni propositioni neutræ quam ratio probat per imperium voluntatis potest 
assentire uni propositioni sine ratione ut si intellectus potest assentire huic: Deus 
est tri nus et unus firmius quam ratio probat; ergo sine motivo potest assentire 
huic, Deus est trinus et unus. Tum secundo. Pia affectio est potior causa 
assensus fidei quam ratio topica et ratio topica producit assensum formidolosum  
sine iuvamine voluntatis; ergo pia affectio quæ est actus voluntatis potest 
aliquem asssensum producere sine concursu rationis topicæ.
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and a motive or ratio probabilis. The conjunction of both of these is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the certainty that is attributed to an 
assent o f  faith. Pia affectio , while it is necessary in the production of an 
act o f faith, is not in-itself sufficient. In the same way, it is not the case 
that a topical argument is in-itself sufficient to cause an assent o f faith.
Mair thought that even an infinite number of topical arguments are not 
able to produce an assent o f faith, nor are they able to produce an 
evident n o t i o n . 3 4 3  He is emphatic: “Certitude is nothing other than
assent by means o f which I assent with certitude. Now that assent, as is 
obvious from what has been said above, is produced by means o f pia  
affectio and a m o t i v e . ” 3 4 4
The precise nature o f this positive motivation o f the will and the 
role o f reason is questioned in the following passage:
If the intellect has equal and opposed reasons, for example, 
four for proving “a is b” and just as many on the opposite 
side for proving the contradictory, the will is now able to 
assent to one part or the other and only pia  affectio does 
this.... It is not correct to say that the intellect is more 
inclined to the true part, because let us suppose that as much 
as the intellect is inclined to the truth there is so much of a 
reason posited in o p p o s i t i o n . 3 4 5
In short, there are as many reasons for assenting to the true as there 
are for assenting to the false proposition. The result is that when it has a 
motive the intellect is just as likely to assent to the false as it is to assent
343 Mair. In primum, p ro l., q. 1; \fol. 2^^]. Sed nego quod infinita argumenta 
topica possunt producere fidem vel notitiam evidentem.
344 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; [Jol. 2^^]. Certitudo enim nihil aliud est quam 
assensus per quam certitudinaliter assentio. M odo ille  ut patet ex dictis 
producitur a pia affectione et motivo.
345 Mair. In primum, prol., q. l , [ f o l .  2 ^h] Si intellectus habeat rati ones oppositas 
æquilibres quattuor ad probandum “a esse b” et totidiem  in oppositum  
contradictorium iam voluntas potest assentire uni parti, vel alteri, et sola pia 
affectio hoc facit... Non valet dicere quod intellectus magis inclinatur ad partem 
veram quia ponamus quod quantum intellectus inclinatur ad verum tantum 
ponatur rationis in oppositum.
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to the true. 346 Assent could be given either to the proposition or to its 
negation. M oreover, it might be suggested that given that there are 
equal reasons for assenting both to the negation and to the affirmation o f  
the proposition, this implies that the assent is produced only by means o f  
a positive m ovement o f the w ill. Mair thinks that this situation is 
analogous to their being four grades o f  cold equally acting on and 
resisting four degrees o f heat. If there had been six grades o f heat then 
the action, i.e., a warming, would originate in the two additional 
grades.347 %t is clear that one part o f the reason is hindered from wholly 
producing its effect, nevertheless, the effect it produces will not be as 
intense, because the assent in that case would have been be much more 
remiss than if  there had not been opposed reasons. This is similar to the 
case where the balance o f four equal and opposed degrees o f cold and 
heat is altered in favour o f the latter and a subsequent warming effect is 
produced.348 Against this Mair thought that if we assume that there are 
good reasons for assenting to either case, then it should probably be said 
that the aggregate o f p ia  affectio together with the probable reasons 
produce the assent. And on the basis o f  the above Mair claims that “the 
greater the magnitude o f an act o f  will the more intense will be the 
assent”.349 it should be noted that the description of the intensity o f an
346 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1 ;[/<?/. 2*'h]. Item intellectus assentit falso sicut vero 
quando habet motivum.
347 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; \fol. 2^ ’h]. Sed contra hoc dicis. Quattuor 
rati ones impediunt activitatem oppositarum sic ut nihil agant, et assensus ibi 
aliquis producitur, ergo a sola pia affectione, quemadmodum si quattuor gradus 
frigoris æqualiter agerent et resisterent cum quattuor gradibus caloris, si fuerint 6 
gradus caloris actio a duobus gradibus proveniet.
348 The choice of analogies is an interesting one. It associates the late-medieval 
discussion of the intensity and remission of forms in respect of the qualities of 
physical objects with the intensity and remission of assent. For a discussion of 
the intensity and remission of forms see: Edith Sylla. “Medieval Concepts of the 
Latitude of Forms: The Oxford Calculators.” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et 
littéraire du moyen âge. 40 (1973): 223-83 and Marshall Clagett. The Science 
o f Mechanics in the M iddle Ages, (London, 1959).
349 Mair. In primum, p ro l., q. \ \ [ fo l .  2 rb-vaj Respondetur. Una pars rationum 
non impeditur a suo effectu totaliter bene tamen ne tam intensum effectum
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assent as a function o f the magnitude o f the positive movement o f  the 
will is only true in respect o f inevident and freely w illed assents. It 
follow s from what has been said that it is now possible to assent to “a is 
b” and now to dissent from the same proposition but it is not the case 
that such a transition is sudden. This is obvious according to Mair 
because an assent endures for some period o f t i m e .350 This is not a 
particularly satisfactory inference. However, the inference is defended  
on the grounds that through an effort o f the will it is not necessary for a 
heretic to assent to something which is against faith, nor is it necessary 
that the heretic dissent from a proposition which pertains to faith. The 
heretic is blinded by the depravity o f his will and does not acquiesce to 
the truth through r e a s o n . 3 5 i  It seem s that as Mair understands the 
situation the assent given by the heretic endures because o f the effort o f  
the will and that such assents are by their nature erroneous. As a result 
the assents are not according to dictates o f right reason. However, it is 
not necessary that the heretic assents to the false or dissents from the 
true, it is possible that the heretic assents to the true and dissents from  
the false. In both cases it is a chance occurrence since the depravity o f  
the will is a hindrance to the truth. It is not clear how this contributes to 
supporting the claim that it is possible to assent to “a is b” and then 
dissent from the same proposition after some period o f time. The 
suggestion may be that the effort o f the will which causes the heretic to 
assent unhesitantly to the false or to the true generates a disposition in
producat; assensus enim in illo casu erit multo remissior quam si non es sent 
rationes oppositæ. Eodem modo totus calor ut 6 producit calorem remissiorem ut 
6 videlicet ut duo stante frigore ut 4  Et secundum magnitudinem actus volendi 
assensus erit intension
350 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 1; \fol. 2^^]. Ex isto sequitur quod nunc possum  
assentire huic “a est b” nunc illi dissentire non subito; assensus enim durât per 
aliquid tempus.
351 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 1; \fol. Patet per appositionem actus volendi
heretici non necessitantur assentire heresi nec dissentire fidei hoc absit sed 
excæceti sunt ex sua malitia et non rationabiliter acquiescunt vero.
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the heretic which is hard to change. The heretic is disposed to adhere to 
the false and to dissent from the true, but it is not necessary that the 
heretic behaves in such a way. The assent generated through the effort 
of the will continues for some time, but the effort o f the w ill can be 
reduced to nothing at some time. Hence the heretic may abandon a 
dissent from a true proposition or an assent to a false proposition.
The assent to a proposition o f faith insofar as it is based on a 
combination o f a topical argument and a positive movement o f the will 
surpasses the limits o f reason. W illiam  Manderston writes that the 
positively affected will {voluntas p ia  affectata) causes the intellect to 
believe more than reason proves, that is, it prompts the intellect to assent 
to a given proposition to which the motive would not be sufficient to 
cause the intellect to assent.352 This prompts the follow ing difficulty:
Are articles o f faith opposed to natural reason?
Mair writes that natural reason proceeds from true and known 
principles to true conclusions according to the light o f nature. It is 
useful to consider the account given by Manderston who defines natural 
reason as knowledge o f what is possible (cognitio possibilis)  and it is 
that which is based on those things which we experience without the 
benefit o f revelation or authority. He continues: it is clear that without 
revelation or authority the human intellect would infer that it is not 
possible that something simple is really several things and the human 
intellect would also infer that a woman is not able to bear a child and 
remain a v i r g i n . 353 These different understandings o f natural reason
332 Manderston. Bipartition, [sig. f ira-rbj Patet igitur quod voluntas pia affectata 
facit intellectum credere plusquam ratio probat, hoc est, facit assentire alicui 
propositioni cui motivum non esset sufficiens facere intellectum assentire.
353 Manderston. Bipartition, [5/g. f Ub] Sed hie occurit difficultas utrum articuli 
fidei sint contra rationem naturalem. Pro hoc dubio notandum est quod ratio 
naturalis sive summe naturale dicitur cognitio possibilis viatori ex his quæ 
experimur seclusa revelatione vel auctoritate et certum est quod seclusa  
revelatione vel auctoritate investigando atque concludendo ex his quæ experimur
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result in distinct conclusions. Mair, like Manderston, is also challenged 
to explain how it is that one thing is three things, i.e., the doctrine of  
divine simplicity and o f the trinity. He responds: Many articles o f faith 
at first glance appear to the philosopher to be opposed to natural reason 
but they are not.354 This is a sharp contrast to the following conclusion 
o f Manderston who explains that articles o f faith are said to be both 
against and on account o f natural reason, that is, against the assent which 
would have been produced naturally from those things which we  
experience and those things which we know without the benefit o f  
revelation or a u t h o r i t y . 3 5 5
The response to the question “How is the Christian to acquire 
faith?” must be given in terms o f the intellect and w ill. It is a 
combination o f an act o f intellect and an act o f will. The intellect, as we 
have seen, is a power o f understanding: it apprehends, it remembers and 
it judges. It is capable o f scientific knowledge which is based on evident 
principles and it is capable o f opinative knowledge or opinion. An 
opinion is a claim to knowledge which is held only hesitantly. Neither 
scientific knowledge nor opinion constitute faith. Scientific knowledge 
which is naturally caused by principles necessitating the intellect, lacks 
the element o f free causation which is so necessary to faith being a 
virtue. An opinion in and o f itself is hesitant and thus lacks the 
epistemic certitude that is attributed to an assent o f faith. The virtue o f  
faith is a state in which an assent o f faith is neither exclusively naturally
et in magna indagatione cognoscere possumus inferret humanus intellectus quod 
nulla res simplex est plures res et quælibet earum et quod mulier non potest 
parere virgo manens.
334 Mair. In primum, pro l., q. 1; \Jol. 3^^]. Multi autem articuli fidei primo 
obtuitu videntur philosopho contra rationem naturalem sed non sunt.
333 Manderston. Bipartitum, [.s/g. f irb-vaj g x  isto patet solutio ad dubium quod 
tales articuli fidei sint dicendi contra et præter rationem naturalem, id est, contra 
assensum qui naturaliter haberetur ex his quæ experimur et humana cognitione 
congnoscimus seclusa revelatione vel auctoritate. Et istud probabilius quam 
oppositum.
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nor exclusively freely caused. It is an assent which is produced by a 
combination o f a probable argument and a positively affected act of will.
Faith is firmly grounded in human experience and is rational but the 
evidence it affords us is itself insufficient to produce the certainty that 
characterizes an act o f faith. When we believe an article o f faith we are 
extremely reluctant to abandon such a proposition. This reluctance 
originates only partially in the evidence before us. Our determination to 
maintain this proposition in the face o f adversity is motivated by an act 
o f will positively inclined to accept the proposition as true and to do so 
without hesitation. Hence faith as a virtue is rational if and only if this 
movement o f the will is guided by the intellect for the will is blind 
without the counsel o f reason.
Is FAITH AN INTELLECTUAL OR MORAL VIRTUE?
It is now the moment to return to a question raised earlier in the 
discussion: “Is faith an intellectual or moral virtue?”. The difficulty in 
answering the questions rests on the fact that there is an ambivalence in 
Mair’s account o f faith. Mair appears to describe the virtue of faith as 
intellectual excellence since an assent o f faith is achieved only if there is 
an appropriate balance between an act o f intellect and an act o f will in 
relation to the object of belief. On the other hand, faith is a perfection o f  
the will. It is in our power. And God would not oblige us to believe that 
which is beyond our power, therefore we are free to believe or not to 
believe. W e choose to believe and our choice is reasonable. Faith as an 
intellectual virtue must balance the extreme characterized as blind faith 
and the other extreme which identifies faith with knowledge.
However, there is a definite sense in which faith is a moral virtue 
since acquiring faith leads to excellence of character. The pilgrim who 
argues that “Every highest good ought to be loved, God is the highest
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Good, therefore God ought to be loved” lives his life accordingly. That 
virtue is an excellence o f character emerges more clearly when the 
exam ple is not theological in nature. Understood in this way an assent 
o f faithj^any non-evident, true assent. Faith, broadly understood, is any 
fiduciary relationship. Trust is extended to someone on the basis o f  their 
character. I judge that the person before me is to be trusted because o f  
what I know about the person and what I know because others have told 
me. These are probable reasons for extending my trust to that person but 
they are not sufficient to cause an assent o f trust—my assent continues 
to be hesitant. Trust is only acquired when my w ill removes the 
hesitance from my assent to the propositions which have suggested only 
good grounds for trusting that person. There is no doubt that trust is an 
intellectual virtue insofar as it is an excellence o f thought. However, it 
is clear that trust guides our actions with others and in this sense can 
properly be said to be a moral virtue.
Moreover, Mair often adheres to the principle that the whole should 
be named after the most important part. Hence the solution to the 
question hinges on determining whether the most important part o f faith 
is intellectual or is concerned with excellence o f character. I am not 
clear on the answer to this difficult and interesting question. The 
temptation to claim that the most important part o f the virtue of faith is 
the intellectual is strong since Mair emphasizes, as w e have seen, that 
w hile both the intellect and the will cooperate in the production o f an 
assent o f faith it is also true that the will is powerless without the 
guidance o f the intellect. Moreover, according to Mair, if  the intellect 
and the will were separated by the absolute power of God, an assent of  
faith would inhere in the intellect and not the will. It was also shown 
that where propositions in the first instance seemed to contravene reason 
this did not mean that they were in reality contrary to reason. The
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intellect could discover their reasonableness. One can conclude that: 
faith is an intellectual virtue since this does not exclude the virtue o f  
faith from being directive o f human action. Thus, faith can be classed as 
an intellectual virtue without detracting from its importance in leading to 
the excellence o f human character.
C h a p t e r  8
C o n c e r n in g  t h e  R e l a t io n s  B e t w e e n  K n o w l e d g e , 
F a i t h , O p in io n
INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapters a detailed account was given o f “How the 
Pilgrim is to Acquire Faith”. In the course o f this discussion, the entire 
cognitive process o f  the pilgrim was investigated in order that an 
understanding might be achieved o f the way in which the pilgrim  
acquires know ledge. Subsequently, attention was given to the 
distinction between evident assent and inevident assent with special 
reference to the distinction between knowledge and faith. Knowledge is 
characterized by unhesitant assents to propositions which are both 
dubitable and necessary which are fitted by nature to become evident by 
the application of premises. Faith is characterized by unhesitant assents 
to dubitable propositions that pertain to salvation. In this chapter 
attention will be given to the question: “W hether faith  and know ledge  
are com patib le?”.
A c t u a l  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  f a i t h  a r e  n o t  c o m p a t i b l e
The first thesis advanced by Mair contends that “acts o f faith and o f  
knowledge are not compatible in the same subject in relation to the same 
proximate object.”356 The “proximate object” is nothing other than the
356 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; [Jol. IH^]. Prima est. Actus fidei et scientiæ 
non se compatiuntur in eodem subiecto respectu eiusdem obiecti propinqui.
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c o n c l u s i o n . 3 5 7  This thesis is obvious since if it were possible to give an 
assent o f knowledge and an assent o f faith in relation to the same 
proposition, then there would be both evident and inevident assent in 
relation to the same proposition, which is contradictory. Since scientific 
and faithful assents are differentiated at least in part on the basis of  
evidentness, namely in respect o f the division between propositions of  
knowledge and faith. The division between evident and inevident 
assents is m utually exclu sive  and jo in tly  exhaustive. Even the 
application o f  sy llog istic  reasoning to a proposition o f faith is 
insufficient to generate an evident assent. A proposition of faith as the 
object of assent is in the first instance both hesitant and inevident, the 
hesitance is only abandoned by means o f the cooperation o f the will 
positively affected to embrace the proposition. Mair gives the following  
explanation as regards the incompatibility o f acts o f knowledge and of  
faith in relation to the same complex:
The means which produces faith, namely authority or a 
topical argument, can be applied to a first principle. On the 
other hand, if it does not generate faith, this is because the 
evident and clear notion which is caused through the 
apprehension o f terms im pedes such a method from  
generating faith, and there is incompatibility between those 
acts, but a scientific assent is a clear notion. Therefore, if 
scientific assent precedes faith, it impedes the production of 
faith and if it finds faith it removes it from its midst. 358
337 Mair. In prim um , p r o l ,  q. 5; \Jol lU ^ ]. Obiectum autem propinquum 
conclusionem ipsam appelle.
338 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 5; \fo l  lU h-vaj Contra hoc argumenter, [viz.. 
Actus fidei et scientiæ non se compatiuntur in eodem subiecto...] Medium  
produetivum fidei, auctoritas vel argumentum topicum potest applicari prime 
principio Si autem non generat fidem hoc immo est quia notitia evidens et clara 
quæ causatur ex apprehensione terminorum impedit tale medium generare fidem, 
et est incompossibilitas inter illos actus. Sed assensus scientificus est notitia 
clara, ergo præcedens fidem eius productionem impedit, et ipsam inveniens e 
medio tollit.
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Mair thinks that it is possible to argue against the first conclusion  
claim ing that acts o f knowledge and acts o f faith are com patible in 
relation to the same conclusion, in the same way that intuitive notions 
and abstractive notions co-ex ist in relation to the same object o f  
cognition. Mair concedes that it possible for som eone to have an 
intuitive and abstractive notion in relation to the sam e object 
simultaneously, but he denies that this implies that the judgments they 
give rise to are com patible because intuitive notions cause evident 
judgments concerning the existence or non-existence o f their objects 
while abstractive notions do n o t . 3 5 9
A u t h o r i t y  a n d  d e m o n s t r a t i v e  k n o w l e d g e
A related issue concerns the role o f authority and its relation to 
demonstrative knowledge. At issue was whether knowledge or faith was 
generated when both the demonstration and the authority o f the ancient 
doctors was present to the pilgrim. Mair thought that it was obvious 
that knowledge corrupted the authority o f  the ancient doctors. He 
writes:
It is conceded that someone has an authoritative text, that is 
a proposition by an authoritative man along with a 
demonstrated conclusion, in order to show that someone 
who is not able to have demonstrations sometimes uses 
authorities, or to show that his doctrine agrees with many 
others. And this is m ost powerful after d ialectical 
argum ents, rarely after dem onstrations. But, w hen  
dem onstration and authority are adduced together a
339 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 5, \Jol. 1 1  va-vbj Contra primam conclusionem  
argumentor. Sortes habet notitiam abstractivam et intuitivam respectu eiusdem  
obiecti simul et semel, quarum una est notitia obscura et alia clara, ergo non 
inconvenit habere scientiam et fidem de eodem obiecto propinquo... Ad primum 
concedo antecedens. Non enim  verum quod ego  iam habens notitiam  
abstractivam “a” obiecti absentis illam amittam in præsentia “a” obiecti, quia 
nulla inter eas videtur repugnantia. Sed nego consequentiam, et causa est, 
quoniam non habemus aliqua indicia opposita. Notitia enim intuitiva causat 
aliquod indicium, abstractiva vero nullum saltem de præsenti.
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scientific assent is caused in the intellect, and the authority 
does not cause an assent o f faith. For acts o f the active are 
in an inclined agent (in patiente disposito). Book 2 De  
Anima  [414h4]. Now, the mind is not then [sc., after a 
demonstration] inclined to receive faith. But, the assents in 
relation to the prem ises, which are different, are not 
opposed, but the assents to the conclusion, are opposed  
since it is the same conclusion. W hy one knows one 
proposition and believes another is not at issue. Sometimes 
causes are opposed but not the effects, for exam ple, 
whiteness and blackness are opposed, but the species are 
compatible with each other.360
Hence, while it is possible to know some premises and believe other
premises in the same syllogism s, it is not possible that the assent one
gives to the conclusion is both an act o f knowledge and o f faith. This is
the case because otherwise it would follow that it is possible to adhere
evidently and inevidently to the same proposition which, as w e have
already seen, is a contradiction.
INFUSED FAITH AND ACTUAL AND DISPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
The second thesis Mair considers, and the final one in our account, 
claim s that “infused faith is com patible with both actual and 
dispositional knowledge”. It is a particularly theological thesis and a 
discussion o f it need not detain us since we are primarily interested in 
philosophical issues. It is sufficient to note that it is a theological and
360 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; \fol. lU ^ ] . Conceditur quod quis habet 
auctoritatem , hoc est, propositionem  authentici viri cum conclusione  
demonstrata, ad ostendendum quod ille qui non potest habere demonstrationes, 
utatur interdum auctoritatibus, vel ut suam doctrinam aliis conformem in multis 
ostendat. Et hoc facit potissim um  post argumenta dialectica, raro post 
demonstrationes. Quando autem demonstratio et auctoritas simul adducuntur, 
assensus scientificus causatur in intellectu et auctoritas nullum assensum fidei 
causat. Actus enim activorum sunt in patiente disposito, secundo D e Anima. 
Modo anima tunc non est disposita suscipere fidem. Assensus autem circa 
præmissas non repugnant, quæ sunt variæ. A ssensus vero conclusionis  
adversantur cum est eadem. Quare quis sciât unam propositionem et credat 
aliam, non est dubium. Interdum causæ repugnant et non effectus ut albedo et 
nigredo repugnant, sed earum species sese compatiuntur.
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not a philosophical matter since the proposition asserts that infused faith 
is not only a pre-requisite for all that is believed, but is also a pre­
requisite for any assent whatsoever. This is a clear reminder that 
medieval philosophers are also theologians. The second thesis however 
relates closely  to a distinction Mair draws, namely, when considering 
whether knowledge destroys faith.
According to Mair, it is clear that since infused faith is a pre­
condition o f all acts o f  understanding it is able to co-exist with both 
knowledge and acquired faith. At the same time it has been shown that 
it is not possible to have know ledge and faith in relation to the 
conclusion o f the same syllogism . Though essentially a theological 
matter there is one final point that should be made concerning the 
relationship o f knowledge to faith and the doctrine o f meriting one’s 
blessedness. It was thought that since acts o f faith and acts knowledge 
are both acts of intellect, having knowledge of, and a having a belief in, 
a conclusion are equally meritorious: “and though the will through its act 
cooperates in the production o f faith and not in the production o f  
knowledge, nevertheless it is able to will both equally meritoriously, for 
example, I will seek a demonstration which demonstrates this, “God 
exists” but I am ready to believe firmly when I do not acquire (invenio) 
the k n o w l e d g e ” . 3 6 i  Moreover, Mair continues that it is maintained by 
Gregory that “faith has no merit where human reason supplies the 
experience. He [sc., Gregory] has in mind the case when a man would 
not believe unless not believing were not humanly p o s s i b l e . 3 6 2  Hence,
361 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; \fol. lU ^ ] .  Et licet voluntas per suum actum 
concurrat ad productionem fidei et non ad productionem scientiæ, tamen potest 
utrumque velle  æque meritorie ut volo  inquirere dem onstrationem  ad 
demonstrandam hanc, Deus est, paratus tamen credere firmiter ubi non invenio 
scientiam.
362 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 5; \fol. lU h ]  ipud autem dictum Beati Gregorii in 
homilia: Fides non habet meritum ubi humana ratio præbet experimentum, 
intelligitur ubi homo non crederet nisi humanitus vinceretur ad credendum.
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whether the pilgrim’s assent o f faith merits blessedness or not depends 
on whether the assent o f faith is in relation to a proposition which is 
properly an object of faith. If the pilgrim was to adhere to a proposition 
through faith and not knowledge where the proposition was properly a 
knowable proposition then there would be no merit to his assent of faith.
Mair continues:
It is otherwise in the case o f  the industrious Christian 
attempting to demonstrate it [sc., a proposition o f faith].
Indeed, when there is a strong sophistical reason inclining 
to the opposite o f the act o f believing, then believing is of  
more merit, because then believing is more difficult. Now, 
art and virtue are about the difficult Ethics 2 [1105^]. And 
thus there is more merit in believing that God is one in 
essence and three in persons and that the body o f Christ is 
contained under the species o f bread and wine, than in 
believing that God e x i s t s . 3 6 3
The application o f  reason to understanding faith is in -itself  
meritorious. Moreover, if through reason an article which pertains to 
salvation is shown to be barely probable, i.e., “God is Three and One” 
and the pilgrim continues to believe by means o f a w ill positively  
affected then that act o f belief is more meritorious than believing an 
article o f faith which is more probable, i.e., “God exists”.
A c q u i r e d  f a i t h  a n d  d i s p o s i t i o n a l  k n o w l e d g e
Related to the first thesis is the claim that “acquired dispositional 
knowledge and acquired faith are not compatible in relation to the same
363 Mair. In primum, pro l., q. 5; [fol. Secus est in casu laboriosi
Christiani conantis illam demonstrare. Ubi vero est fortis ratio sophistica
inclinans ad oppositum actus credendi ibi credere est magis meritorium quia tunc 
credere est difficilius. Modo ars et virtus circa difficile secundo Ethicorum. Et 
sic magis est meritorium credere quod Deus est unus in essentia et trinus in 
persona et quod corpus Christi continetur sub speciebus panis et vini quam 
credere quod Deus est.
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proximate object”.^^ The incompatibility is defended on the basis that 
the conclusions o f acts o f knowledge and acts of faith are not, in the first 
instance, compatible. Moreover, that the dispositions o f knowledge and 
faith are not compatible is supported by Aristotle who thought that all 
virtues are generated and destroyed in an opposed way by the same 
means . 6^5 However, against the third thesis Mair presents the following  
argument:
Suppose that Socrates has an opinative or an erroneous 
[and] very intense disposition of a conclusion “a”. Suppose 
that a demonstration is adduced for it. Through the fourth 
thesis o f this question, [sc., a disposition o f acquired faith is 
not opposed to an act o f knowledge and vice versa], actual 
knowledge will co-exist with an opi native disposition, and 
any act how soever small can produce a disposition.
Therefore [acquired faith and dispositional knowledge are 
compatible in relation to the same proximate object]
Mair thought if  an opinion precedes the generation o f  knowledge 
through the application o f premises to a probable argument, then an act 
o f knowledge can co-exist with an opinative disposition for a brief 
period of time. Consequently, if  an opinative disposition is able to c o ­
exist with an act o f knowledge for a brief period o f time it must be able
Mair. In primum, pro l., q. 5 ,[fo l. ll^b]. Tertia conclusio. Habitus scientificus 
acquisitus et tides acquisita non se compatiuntur respecta eiusdem  obiecti 
propinqui.
Mair. In primwn, proL, q. 5 \\fo l. 11^^]. Probatur conclusio. Utrobique tanta 
est repugnantia inter habitus acquisitos quanta inter eorum actus. Modo actus 
scientificus et actus fidei repugnant ex prima [conclusio]. Igitur. Probatio 
mai oris, quia ut dicitur 2 Ethicorum  [1103^6-1103^25] virtutes fiunt et 
corrumpuntur ab eisdem contrario modo factis.
366 Mair. In primwn, proL, q. 5; \Jol. 13^^]. Contra tertiam conclusionem arguitur 
sic. Habeat Sortes habitum opinativum vel erroneum “a” conclusionis valde 
intensum, adducatur ei demonstratio, scientia actualis stabit cum habitu opinativo 
per quartam conclusionem  [sc.. Habitus fidei acquisitæ non répugnât actui 
scientifico ediverso.] huius questionis, et quilibet actus quantumcumque parvus 
potest producere habitum. Igitur.
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to co-exist perpetually and its nature does not rule this out.367 He 
continues
an opinative disposition is o f some resistance and one [item 
of] knowledge is o f a greater activity than another, as is 
obvious from two knowledges o f a superior and an inferior 
kind (species), as regards intensity and weakness. Thus one 
opinative disposition is o f a greater resistance than another 
which is inferior or weaker in k i n d . 368
Dispositions and acts are susceptible o f degrees. The more intense 
an act o f knowledge the less resistance will be exhibited by an opinative 
disposition. Similarly, the more intense the assent to an opinion, the 
more difficult it will be for that resistance to be overcome. However, the 
longer an act o f knowledge endures the more an opinative disposition  
will be corrupted since the act o f knowledge “acts according to its entire 
a c t i v i t y ”.369 Mair draws this conclusion: while acts o f knowledge and 
opinative dispositions incline to formally opposed effects they are only 
virtually and not formally opposed to each o t h e r . 370 Acts o f knowledge 
and opinative dispositions are virtually opposed to each insofar as they 
are ways o f relating to the same proposition. Where acts o f knowledge 
produce scientific understanding, an opinative disposition inclines one to 
opinion. It is clear that the intensity o f acts o f knowledge destroys 
opinative dispositions in relation to their activity and resistance. But it 
was thought necessary that an opinative disposition could endure for
367 Mair. In primwn, proL, q. 5; [fol. 13^ ]^. Actus scientificus stabit cum habitu 
opinativo per breve tempus, ergo perpetuo potest cum ipso stare, et ei non 
adversatur suapte natura.
368 Mair. In primwn, proL, q. 5; \fol. 13^^]. Item habitus opinativus est alicuius 
resistentise et una scientia est maioris activitatis quam alia, ut patet de duabus 
scientiis superioris speciei et inferioris de intensa et remissa. Sic unus habitus 
opinativus est maioris resistentiæ quam alius inferioris speciei vel remissior.
369 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 5; [fol. 1 3  Actus autem scientificus quanto 
diutius continuatur, tanto plus habitus opinionis corrumpit, quia agit secundum  
totam suam actionem.
370 Mair. In primum, p ro l., [fol. IH ^]. Actus namque scientificus et habitus 
opinativus virtual iter contrariantur et non formaliter et inclinant in effectus 
formaliter contraries
R. N. Wood Chapter 8: Knowledge, Faith, Opinion 201
som e time before being destroyed by the activity o f a scientific act o f  
understanding. Thus the third thesis claiming the incompatibility o f  
acquired faith and acquired knowledge should be rejected since even the 
smallest act produces a disposition.
The next thesis to be considered declares that “a disposition of 
acquired faith is not opposed to an act o f knowledge and not vice 
versa.”37i According to Mair, this is obvious by induction. He thought 
that this was the case since it is possible to admit to deceitfulness, or 
some other kind of intemperance, and to have a pre-disposition to 
perform similar acts of deceitful ness in the future.372 What is being 
suggested is that the admission to having been deceitful is a recognition 
that acts of this kind are wrong. However, this recognition is itself 
insufficient to compel a change in behavior. Mair concludes: “Therefore 
a disposition and an act that are opposed to each other can coexist”.373
O p i n i o n , f a i t h  a n d  k n o w l e d g e
The implications o f the intensity and remission o f different kinds of  
intellectual acts, namely, opinion, faith and knowledge are interesting 
since it was thought probable that an intense act o f opinion might not be 
destroyed by a remiss, or less intense act o f knowledge. However, this 
consequence was not to imply that the destruction o f knowledge could 
occur directly through the activity o f an opinion. The analogy is given 
in terms o f the activity and resistance o f physical properties. For 
exam ple, it was customary to maintain that humidity is greater in
371 Mair. In primum, p ro l., \foL Quarta conclusio. Habitus fidei acquisitæ 
non répugnât actui scientifico nec ediverso.
372 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5, [fol. ID ^ ]. Quarta conclusio patet inductive. 
Nam si lubricus vel aliqua alia specie intemperantiæ irretitus pæniteat de mala 
vita præterita, constat quod habebit magnam proclivitatem ad peccata præterita, 
et hoc non nisi ratione habitus remanentis.
373 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; [fol. ID ^]. Ergo habitus et actus oppositi simul 
stant.
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resistance than it is in activity and that dryness is less an active property 
than a resistant one. Therefore, it might be claimed that an opinion is 
more resistant than it is active and that knowledge is more active than it 
is resistant. Consequently an opinion is not, properly speaking, an active 
cause in the destruction o f knowledge; rather, knowledge gives way to 
opinion through its own infirmity. It might be suggested that an opinion 
which is infinitely intense can destroy a scientific assent which is finite 
in intensity. However, if this is granted then one ought to also allow that 
an opinion o f great but finite intensity destroys some given scientific 
a s s e n t . 3 7 4  xh is is not a reasonable position since it would follow  that 
ultimately all claims to knowledge would fall victim to sophistic or 
opinative arguments to the contrary. What emerges from the account 
that Mair provides is the reaffirmation that “an opinion is hesitant 
concerning the opposite. That is, an opinative assent can be destroyed 
through opposed reasons if many difficulties are adduced. An evident 
assent is indestructible.”375
O p i n i o n  g e n e r a t e d , k n o w l e d g e  C o r r u p t e d
The interest in the relationship o f dispositional knowledge and 
acquired faith gave rise to the claim that a sophistic argument is capable 
o f causing an erroneous assent thereby destroying a scientific assent.
This was supported by the claim that error is capable o f  destroying 
knowledge in relation to the conclusion o f a demonstration and it is not 
necessary that it destroys know ledge o f either the premises o f the 
demonstration or o f any self-evident proposition. This was put forward
37"^  Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 5; \fol. 13^^]. Et si admittas quod infinita opinio 
quamcumque scientiam quantumlibet intensam finitam corrumpat, dicere debes 
quod multum intensa opinio et finita aliquam scientiam corrumpat.
375 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; [fol. 1 3 ^h] ...opinio est cum formidine de 
oposito, idest, assensus opinativus potest deleri per rationes oppositas, si multæ 
difficiles adducantur. Assensus autem evidens non potest deleri.
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on the basis that assent to the premises o f  a demonstration is always 
more clear than e r r o r . 3 7 6  it is obvious, as Mair indicates, that such a 
distinction is not a good one since, like the assent that is given to the 
conclusion  o f  dem onstration, the assents to the prem ises o f a 
demonstration and self-evident propositions are them selves evident 
assents. Mair explains that “if you admit that error is able to destroy an 
evident notion, such as a piece o f scientific knowledge, [then] gradually 
you ascend from the destruction o f the piece of knowledge to the assents 
to the premises and the self-evident p r o p o s i t i o n . ”377 brief, the 
question o f whether knowledge is capable o f being destroyed by error is 
tantamount to asking whether an evident assent which is an assent which 
is true, unhesitant, and naturally caused by principles com pelling the 
intellect can be destroyed by an erroneous assent which is, by its very 
nature, always inevident.
Starting with the assumption that know ledge and opinion are 
themselves compatible it might be argued that since opinion is more 
hesitant than faith, it fo llow s that knowledge and faith are themselves 
compatible in relation to the same conclusion. On this account it would 
be possible to defend the compatibility o f knowledge and faith on the 
grounds that while knowledge is adhered to more intensely than any 
opinion it is also true that a series o f  topical arguments could remove all 
hesitance from the hesitance o f an opinative assent. In this way a 
scientific assent would be capable of superseding an opinative one. This 
is only possible if one accepts that opinative and scientific assents are o f
376 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; [Jol. 13^^]. Dices. Error potest corrumpere 
scientiam , non tamen oportet quod corrumpat notitiam  præmissarum  
demonstrationis vel propositionis per se notæ, cum assensus præmissarum et 
propositionis per se notæ sunt clariores.
377 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; \fol. 1 3 ^^j gj admittas quod error potest 
corrumpere unam notitiam evidentem puta scientiam, paulatim a corruptione 
scientiæ ad corruptionem assensus premissarum et propositionis per se notæ 
conscendes.
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the same most specific species because this would assum e that the 
hesitance o f an opinative assent is extrinsic to the nature o f  such an 
assent. Hence there would be nothing incongruous in the hesitance o f an 
assent being destroyed and superseded by the certainty o f a scientific  
assent. The response to this is obvious since we have already examined 
the claim that it is not possible to acquire faith even by means o f an 
infinite number o f topical arguments. Mair thought that his opponent’s 
arguments allow ed for an infinite, but not a finite, set o f  opinions 
inhering in the same intellect to generate k n o w l e d g e . 378 M oreover it 
fo llow s from his opponent’s position that “an infinite set o f  topical 
arguments could produce an evident assent, and thus another infinite set 
o f topical arguments could produce a notion as clear as first 
p r i n c i p l e s . ”379 This is absurd, since according to Mair, an opinion is by 
its very nature always hesitant. Hence, while it is tempting to think that 
an infinite set o f topical arguments will remove the hesitancy o f the 
assent this is simply not consonant with the technical sense o f the term. 
However, it is true that an infinite set o f topical arguments in support of  
an opinion increase the firmness with which that opinion is held. Mair is 
explicit on this matter. It is not that the hesitancy o f the assent is 
diminished, “for strictly speaking, topical arguments do not diminish the 
hesitancy, but increase the [intensity of] assent”.380
Given that there is a basic incompatibility between faithful and 
opinative assents in relation to the same conclusion, there remains the 
difficulty o f accounting for the claim that faith is acquired by means o f
378 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 5; {fol. 1 2 ^h] Dices. Infinita argumenta topica 
générant scientiam, sed non finita.
379 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; {fol. 12*"^ ]. Contra hoc insto. Tunc argumenta 
topica producerent assensum evidentem, et sic alia infinita producerent notitiam  
adeo claram ut primi principii, quod est absonum.
380 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; {fol. 12^^]. De diminutione autem formidinis 
nihil ad propositum, argumenta namque topica non proprie dim inuant 
formidinem, sed augent assensum.
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the conclusion o f a topical argument and an act o f  will. The assent in 
both instances is to the same proximate object o f the proposition, i.e., the 
conclusion. The crucial characteristic that permits the existence o f faith 
and opinion is the fact that the hesitance with which an opinion is held 
can be reduced. It can be destroyed by other opinative arguments 
tending towards the contradictory o f  the proposition, but more 
importantly in this instance, the hesitance can be destroyed by an act of 
w ill. Thus the role o f p ia  affectio in producing an assent o f  faith. 
Opinative assents remain forever hesitant. Only a positive movement of  
the will can be destroy the hesitance o f an opinative assent; however, if  
the hesitance is removed by an act o f will, then there is no longer an 
opinative assent; instead, there is a faithful one. Opinative and faithful 
assents belong to different and mutually exclu sive categories: no 
opinative assent is an act o f  faith and no act o f faith is an opinative 
assent.
FAITH AND ERROR
There was some speculation concerning whether the pilgrim was 
able to assent to a proposition in error and to know that the assent was in 
fact an erroneous one. It was generally agreed that error occurs when 
som eone assents to a fa lse  proposition or dissents from a true 
proposition.381 Though I w ill not attend to the long standing debate 
concerning the way in which a proposition is true or false it was 
commonly held that a proposition is true if things are as signified by the 
proposition and conversely a proposition is false if things are not as 
signified by the proposition.382 The question is whether someone is able
381 See e.g., Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 5; [Jol. Error est assensus falsi vel 
dissensus veri.
382 Gabriel Nuchelmans. Nuchelmans. Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories o f  
the Proposition. (Amsterdam, 1980); [pp. 114-119]. Nuchelmans. Theories o f  
the Proposition. The definitive philosophical/historical accounts o f the truth and
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knowingly to assent to a false proposition. It is problematic to claim that 
it is possible since knowledge is characterized by evidentness. Hence,
Mair writes:
No one is able to know that he is mistaken. Proof. Grant 
that Socrates knows that he is mistaken about proposition 
“a”, therefore he evidently knows that he is assenting to 
som ething fa lse  or d issenting from som ething true.
W hichever o f these is granted he neither assents to 
something false, nor dissents from something true. If he 
knows that this is the case no one is able to assent 
(especially by nature) to something false knowing that it is 
false.383
Moreover, Mair continues, it is not possible for someone to assent 
to a proposition that he thinks is false since
if he judges that he is assenting to a false proposition, then 
he has the judgment, ““a” is false” and he judges thus. It is 
not in his power to assent to that proposition although for a 
long time it had been thought (putatur) that this was the 
case. Thus, no one is able to believe that he is mistaken 
about proposition “a”.384
This would seem to imply that it is never possible to recognize the 
possibility o f sometimes being mistaken. This is simply not the case
falsity of propositions are Theories o f the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval 
Conceptions o f the Bearers o f Truth and Falsity (Amsterdam, 1973) and Late- 
Scholastic and Humanist Theories o f the Proposition. See also Broadie. 
Introduction to Medieval Logic, [p. 58] Broadie gives a concise account of 
Buridan's pivotal definition which he reports as follows; “Every true proposition 
is true because, howsoever the proposition signifies, so it is in the thing signified 
or in the things signified”. See John Buridan. Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. J. 
Schneide, (Munich, 1983); [p. 17].
383 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; [fol. Isto præmisso [viz.. Error est
assensus falsi vel dissensus veri ] dicatur quod nullus potest scire errare. 
Probatur sic. Da quod Sortes sciat se errare circa “a” propositionem; ergo 
evidenter cognoscit se as senti re falso vel dissentire vero. Quocumque illorum  
dato nec falso as sentit nec vero dissentit. Si sciat ipsum esse tale, nemo potest 
assentire (potissimum naturaliter) falso scito esse tali.
384 Mair. In primum, p ro l, q. 5; \fol. 1 4 ^^ ] gj iudicat (sc.. Sortes) quod assentit 
falso, tunc habet indicium quod “a” est falsum et sic iudicat. Non est in facultate 
sua illi assentire quamvis diu putatur talis. Sic nemo potest credere se errare 
circa a propositionem.
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since as Mair indicates there is nothing to prevent the pilgrim from  
opinatively assenting to the fact that he errs in one o f his assents whether 
actual or dispositional.385 How does the pilgrim come to realize that one 
o f his assents is erroneous?386 The response is full o f insight. In most 
general terms, how the pilgrim comes to be aware o f an erroneous assent 
is described as follows: There are certainly occasions when over a period 
of time a number o f good reasons, that are opposed to the proposition to 
which assent has been given, present themselves to the pilgrim. These 
reasons suggest that assent to the contradictory o f the original 
proposition is more reasonable. The pilgrim, Mair writes,
as a result begins to let slip the assents to the propositions to 
which he previously assented which he thought were true at 
the time at which he assented. Now, however, when he 
assents to the opposite he judges that the reasons were 
frivolous and that he had been deceived, and in this way he 
begins to know that he had been m i s t a k e n . 3 8 7
The pilgrim com es to realise that he is mistaken in virtue o f his 
awareness that he is in possession o f a certain quality and this quality is 
an error. There is no coincidence in describing error as quality. More 
explicitly  it is a quality which vitally m odifies the intellective power. 
Hence, error like all other things which vitally modify the intellective  
power is a notion.
385 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; \Jol. 14^^]. Dictum est circa “a” vel “b” 
propositionem quia non videtur inconveniens quod quis assentiat opinative quod 
ipse in aliquo assensu actuali vel habituali erret.
386 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; [Jol. 14**^ ]. Petis quomodo quis incipit se scire 
errasse.
387 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 5; [fol. Hoc modo Sortes assentit huic “a” 
Homo differt ab homine, vel “a” cælum contingenter est cælum, propter aliquas 
exponentes, quas reputat commuai modo loquendi conformes. Tandem successu 
temporis aliquibus rationibus urgetur rationabilius assentire contradictoriis 
illarum, et per consequens incipit amittere assensus propositionum quibus ante 
assentiebat, quas veras putabat tempore quo assentiebat. Nunc autem cum  
opposito assentit, iudicat illas ratione orationes frivolas, et se fuisse deceptum, et 
sic incipit scire errasse.
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C o n c l u s i o n
The question “whether faith and knowledge are com patible” has 
been answered on the basis o f a careful consideration o f  the relationship 
between the evident assent o f  dem onstrative know ledge and the 
inevident assent o f faith, opinion and error. Moreover, it has been 
shown that in order to determine whether knowledge and faith are 
compatible it is necessary to distinguish between actual and dispositional 
knowledge, actual and dispositional faith, and so on. For, as w e saw, 
while it is not possible for an act of faith and an act o f knowledge to 
stand in relation to the same proposition this does not imply that it is not 
possible for an act o f faith and dispositional knowledge to co-exist.
C h a p t e r  9
Is T h e o l o g y  T h e o r e t i c a l  o r  P r a c t i c a l
K n o w l e d g e ?
INTRODUCTION
Mair, in common with many medieval philosophers, thought that an 
adequate theory o f knowledge was necessary to explain how the pilgrim  
is able to acquire faith. A s we have seen, one o f the building blocks o f  
late-medieval epistem ology is the notion. W e have so far discussed  
several divisions between notions. One further division is particularly 
relevant to our d iscussion— that between theoretical and practical 
notions. Theoretical notions give rise to theoretical knowledge which is 
knowledge o f the reason why it is and why something is the way that it 
is. In contrast, practical notions give rise to practical knowledge which 
is concerned with action and necessarily involves an act o f  w ill. 
Practical knowledge shows what is to be pursued and what is to be 
avoided. This chapter is dedicated to clarifying the distinction between 
theoretical and practical notions. The discussion is introduced by the 
fo llow in g  question; “W hether theology is practical or theoretical 
(speculativa) k n o w l e d g e ” .3 8 8
SOM E DEFINITIONS
The first distinction that should be made in relation to practical and 
theoretical knowledge is that where the former concerns understanding
3 8 8  Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 6; [Jol 14^^]. An theologia sit scientia practica an 
speculativa.
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and is directive o f human activity, the latter is exclusively concerned 
with understanding and is not directive of human activity. In order to 
clarify  the m eaning o f the terms “practical” (p racticu s)  , and 
“theoretical” (speculativus) Mair gives a brief account o f their origin.
He reports that the Latin for ''praxis'' is "actus” (act) or " operatic” 
(operation) and "practicus” is that which is "operativus” (operative).389 
The Latin for "theoria” is "specu latio” or "contem platio”. On that 
account "th eoreticu s” has the sam e sense as "speculativus” or 
"contem plativus” It should be noted that there are instances when 
Mair employs the term praxis  in the original Greek to indicate a sense o f  
the practical (praxis) in a more inclusive sense than is communicated by 
either the term "actus” or "operatio”. Praxis is most accurately defined 
as “an act o f a power different from the intellect fitted to be directed by 
an act o f the intellect, or [it is defined] thus, praxis  is an elicited or 
commanded act o f w ill.”391 On the occasions where Mair uses praxis  in 
this sense, the term praxis  will be retained in the translation. The 
contrast which is being developed is that the various expressions 
employed in order to refer to practical knowledge embody a reference to 
something beyond intellectual activity, for example, building or creating 
something like a house. In contrast, “theoretical knowledge (speculatio) 
is an act o f intellect not tending beyond the intellect”.392 Theoretical 
knowledge does not aim at anything beyond intellectual activity, for
389 Mair. In primum, pro l., q. 6; \fol. Praxis Græce, dicitur actus Latine seu
operatio, et practicum idem est quod operativum.
390 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \foL Theoria Græce, dicitur speculatio seu
contemplatio Latine, inde theoreticum id est speculativum seu contemplativum.
391 Mair. In tertium, q. 8, d. 33; \fol. 82^^]. Praxis est actus alterius potentiæ ab 
intellectu natus ab intellectus actu dirigi, vel sic, praxis est actus eiicitus 
voluntatis vel ab ea imperatus.
392 Mair. In tertium, q. 8, d. 33; [fol. 82 1^ ]^. Speculatio est actus intellectus non 
tendens ultra intellectum.
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example, it is not knowledge directed to building or creating a house.
Mair gives the following definition of theoretical knowledge;
Theoretical knowledge (speculatio) is a judgment by which 
something is judged to exist or not to exist, or to be such or 
not to be such, and thus about tenses other than the present 
(de extrinsecis temporibusp^^, judging nothing about what 
should be done, for example the judgment by which it is 
judged that “God is Three and O n e ” .394
Where Mair provides only one definition o f theoretical knowledge 
he gives four definitions for the term “practical knowledge” but limits 
his discussion to the two definitions relevant to his inquiry. Our 
discussion will be based on the two definitions Mair considers at length.
First, practical knowledge, he writes, “is taken to be an act which is in 
the power of the a g e n t . ” 3 9 5  Second, practical knowledge “is taken to be 
every elicited act which agrees with the dictate o f right r e a s o n . ” 3 9 6  Mair 
draws several consequences. First, “every act o f will is practical”.
“This is obvious”, according to Mair, since an act o f w ill “is an act 
existing in the power o f  the agent. Therefore, by definition, it is 
practical, first the elicited act and then the act commanded by it.”397 
Despite Mair’s claim to the contrary, this is quite obscure. The attention 
of the reader is directed to the fact that an act of will consists o f first the
393 The other tenses to which Mair refers are the past, the future, the possible, and 
the imagined. See Mair. D e am pliatione. [sig. gg 7^^]. “...there are five  
temporal differences “is”, “was”, “will be”, “can be”, and “imagined to be”.” 
For the Latin see fn. 182.
394 Mair. In primum, pro l., q. 6; \fol. 1 4 ^h] Speculatio autem est iudicium quo 
iudicatur aliquid esse vel non esse, seu esse tale vel non esse tale, et ita de 
extrinsecis temporibus, nihil iudicando de operabili, ut iudicium quo iudicatur 
deus esse trinus et unus.
395 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \fol. 14^^]. Tertio capitur pro operatione quæ est 
in potestate operantis.
396 Mair. In primum, p r o l ,  q. 6; \fo l  14^^]. Quarto modo accipitur pro omni 
operatione conformiter elicita dictaminum rectæ rationis.
397 Mair. In primum, p r o l ,  q. 6; \Jol 1 4 ^h] Omnis actus voluntatis est praxis. 
Patet quia est actus existens in potestate operantis, ergo est praxis, per eius 
definitionem primo actus eiicitus, postea actus imperatus ab eo.
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elicited act (actus eiicitus) and afterwards the commanded act (actus 
imperatus). The elicited act is the volition to perform an action while 
the performance o f that action is the commanded act. Manderston gives 
a good account:
The elicited act is the act o f the w ill itself. Of this kind 
there are volition and nolition. The commanded act is the 
act caused by means o f the act o f will commanding that 
such an act is to be done. For example, I will to walk. This 
volition is called the elicited act and the walking or the 
external act is called the commanded act.398
Mair puts this succinctly “every act emanating from an elicited act is a
commanded a c t . ”399 The proof offered in support o f the statement that
every act o f will is practical is now more perspicuous since it is clear
that in this instance the elicited act culminates in some kind o f  activity,
e.g., walking. A helpful way o f distinguishing the elicited act from the
commanded act is in terms o f an inner act and an outer act o f will. The
elicited act is an inner act o f volition or nolition, the commanded act is
the outer act extending to the external thing willed or denied by the inner
act o f choosing or denying. However this would be to claim  that all
elicited acts o f will culminate in a commanded act. This is not the case
since there can be factors which mitigate against an elicited act giving
398 Manderston. Bipartitum, [5’/^. b Eiicitus quidem est actus ipsius 
voluntatis cuiusmodi est volitio  vel nolitio. Imperatus est actus causatus 
mediante actu voluntatis imperantis talem actum fieri. Exempli gratia volo  
ambulare ista volitio dicitur actus eiicitus et ambulatio sive talis operatio exterior 
dicitur actus imperatus. Cf., Mair. In primum, d. 17, q. 7; \Jol. 6 2 ^^] Ad 
vigesimumnonum ubi petitur quæ res est actus exterior vel actus imperatus, 
dicitur quod frequenter est homo vel eius organum. Quando enim homo occidit 
homicidium est volitio qua vult occidere hominem proprie, et ille est actus 
eiicitus. Homo occidens brachium vel ferrum est actus exterior. Actus est res 
agens quæ non est anima nec animæ inherens. Actus exterior est operatio 
transiens in obiectum exterius. Et operatio activa est res operans, homicidium  
exterius nihil aliud est quam homo actual iter applicans organa pro quæ mediate 
vel immediate occidit. Comestio exterior est homo ci bum per os assumens. Et 
ita in aliis suo modo dicatur.
399 Mair. In primum, d. 17, q. l,\foL  6 2 ^^] Sgd de actu imperato dicitur quod 
omnis actus ab actu elicito emanens est actus imperatus.
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rise to a commanded act. Thus while it is helpful to draw the distinction 
in terms o f internal and external acts it must be recognized that it is not 
comprehensive.
TH E THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL INTELLECT
The w ay in w hich  theoretical and practical notions are 
distinguished does not rule out the possibility o f  acts o f intellect being 
practical. Mair explains:
that the intellect is practical by way o f extension does not 
imply that no act o f intellect is practical, for though the 
in tellect does not im m ediately extend to its activity, 
nevertheless it is extended by means o f the command o f the 
will. For since the intellect commands that there should be 
speculation, the will commands the intellect to s p e c u l a t e .
Mair appeals to A ristotle’s discussion in the Third Book o f the D e
Anima o f w hich, in a later d iscussion , he g ives the fo llow in g
interpretation: “the intellect is practical only by means o f extension, now
to extend is to tend beyond oneself, therefore a notion is called practical
because it tends beyond itse lf”.40i Thus how the theoretical and
practical intellect are to be distinguished is similar to the way in which
the intellect and will are to be distinguished as powers of the mind. It is
worth remembering that according to Mair the terms “intellect” and
“w ill” name the same simple and indivisible substance, i.e., the mind.
Nevertheless, though at the metaphysical level it is true to claim that the
intellect is the will in every way, this does not mean that the intellect and
the w ill are com pletely indistinguishable. They are distinguished
400 Mair. In primum, prol. q. 6; \Jol. 14’‘h], Septimo sequitur quod illud 3 De 
Anima. [432^26-433^1] Intellectus extensive sit practicus, non infert quod nullus 
actus intellectus sit practicus, nam licet intellectus non extendatur immediate ad 
suam operationem, tamen extenditur mediante imperio voluntatis, nam cum  
dictât intellectus speculandum esse, voluntas imperat intellectui ut speculetur.
401 Mair. In tertium, q. 8, d. 33; \fol. 82i’h], ...intellectus sola extensione sit 
practicus, modo extendere est extra se tendere; ergo notitia vocatur practica quia 
extra se tendit.
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according to reason and are thus “beings o f reason” {entia rationis). 
“Intellect” refers to the mind engaged in an act o f understanding and 
“w ill” refers to the mind engaged in an act o f choosing or denying. The 
terms express different ways o f relating to the objects o f the mind. The 
“intellect is practical by extension” since it extends to its objects by 
means o f the will. This bring us to the question: In what way are the 
theoretical intellect and the practical intellect to be distinguished?
Mair gives the follow ing account of the theoretical and practical 
intellect:
Moreover, the intellect is said to be practical because o f a 
practical d isposition  and a practical act, and to be 
theoretical because o f a theoretical act and a theoretical 
disposition. It is not so much a real distinction between the 
practical and the theoretical intellect, but it is numerically 
the same intellect, because under one concept (ratio) it is 
called practical, and under another theoretical, just as the 
intellect is really the will. This is how it comes about that 
this is literally true: “A practical disposition inheres in the 
theoretical in tellect, at the sam e tim e a theoretical 
disposition inheres in the practical intellect.”492
The similarity o f the argument in favour o f the identity o f the practical
and theoretical intellect to that offered in support o f the claim that the
mind and its powers are identical is undeniable. It will be remembered
that the terms “intellect” and “w ill” were predicated o f the mind only by
means o f extrinsic denom ination. In a sim ilar way, the terms
“theoretical intellect” and “practical intellect” are also predicated o f the
mind and each other by means o f  extrinsic denom ination. The
402 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \Jol. I5^b-va] Intellectus autem practicus ab 
habitu et actu practice denominatur et speculativus intellectus ab actu et habitu 
speculative. Nen est tantum discri men reale inter intellectum practicum et 
speculativum, sed est idem intellectus numere, quia alia ratiene vecatur 
practicus, et alia ratiene speculativus, sicut realiter intellectus est veluntas. Que 
fit ut hæc sit vera de virtute sermenis: intellectui speculative habitus practicus 
inhæret, identidem intellectui practice habitus speculativus inhæret.
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theoretical and practical intellect refer to the mind engaged in different 
kinds o f intellectual activities. Moreover, in the same way that it is true 
to say “The intellect is the w ill”, it is also true to say, “The theoretical 
intellect is the practical intellect”. The terms “theoretical intellect” and 
“practical intellect” signify the same mind, they sim ply refer to the 
different kinds o f intellectual activities in which the mind can be 
engaged. It is clear that the theoretical intellect is m ost close ly  
associated with the mind considered as an intellectual power and that the 
practical intellect is most closely associated with the mind as a volitive  
power. It is apparent that in the same way that the terms “intellect” and 
“w ill” do not reveal the true metaphysical nature o f the mind it is also 
true that the terms “theoretical intellect” and “practical intellect” do not 
adequately express the metaphysical nature o f the mind. The crucial 
point o f this discussion is that despite the fact that the distinction  
between the practical and theoretical intellect is accidental since they are 
not real parts o f the mind, it is wrong to affirm that the mind does not 
relate to its objects in different ways.
PRACTICAL N o t i o n s
The building blocks o f practical knowledge are practical notions. 
Notions are not said to be practical because something immediately acts 
but because something is directed to acting. Mair explains: “the science 
of medicine does not immediately cause health in the body, but medicine 
only guides by teaching in what w ay and how health can be 
a c h i e v e d . ” 4 0 3  Hence practical notions are roughly speaking sign posts 
indicating in what way the ends o f an activity can be achieved. Practical
403 Mair. In primum, p ro l., q. 6 ,\fo l. 1 4 ^h] ...scientia medicinalis non immediate 
causat sanitatem in corpore, sed solum docendo dirigit qualiter et per quæ sanitas 
fieri possit.
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notions can direct praxis  o f an agent in two ways, formally and virtually.
Mair gives this account o f the distinction:
...one notion is formally directive o f praxis  immediately 
according to itself (secundum se) , the other only virtually, 
either containing [a notion] virtually and proximately or a 
notion remotely guiding praxis. A practical notion formally 
[directing praxis] is a com plex judgment (by extrinsic 
denomination) indicating in what way or with what things 
something should be done. An example [of the formally 
practical]: that quartan fevers are cured through heat, 
continuous and daily fevers through cold. An example o f  
the second [i.e., a virtually practical notion] that the flesh of 
birds is easy to digest.464
The distinction between formally practical notions and virtually 
practical notions can be clarified by building on Mair’s examples. In the 
case o f illness a doctor gives specific recommendations of how health 
can be regained and prescribes a certain course o f medical treatment to 
be followed. The recommendations o f the doctor are specific, explicit 
and formally directive o f praxis since no additional inference as to what 
should be done to regain health is required by the patient. However, the 
statement “the flesh o f birds is easy to digest” is a virtually directive 
practical notion since the behaviour o f the agent is modified only if  he 
has the knowledge that it is good to eat easily digestible meats. The 
notion generated by the proposition is in-itself insufficient to guide 
action, an act o f inference based on additional knowledge, that is 
knowledge extraneous to the proposition itself, is also required. There is
464 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; [fol. 1 4 rb-va] Duobus autem modis contingit 
notitiam esse praxis directivam nam quaedam notitia est formaliter secundum se 
immediate praxis quædam tamen virtualiter, vel continent virtual iter et de 
propinquo vel remote notitiam directivam praxis. Notitia practica formaliter est 
iudicium complexum denominatione extrinseca enuncians qualiter vel per quæ 
aliquid est agendum. Exemplum: ut quartanæ febres curandæ sunt per calida, 
continuæ et quotidianæ per frigida. Exemplum secundi: ut cames volatilium sunt 
facilis digestionis.
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a clear sense in which a virtually directive notion is not a practical 
notion at all. This is confirmed by Mair when he writes that “for a 
notion to be practical it is not sufficient that it is virtually directive o f  
a c t i o n ” . 4 0 5  This is asserted because otherwise the distinction between 
theoretical and practical know ledge would collapse since virtually 
directive notions, as is obvious from the above example, have the same 
form as the propositions o f theoretical knowledge; i.e., they assert that 
this exists or does not exist, or, that this is the case or this is not the case.
This is most explicit in the following passage:
Properly, a practical notion is formally directive o f  praxis, 
and it is only a complex notion indicating how, or through 
which things, or when and so on for other circumstances, if 
the act is to be done. But, a notion which is not indicative 
and form ally directive o f praxis  is theoretical and not 
practical, either proxim ately or rem otely v irtually  
containing a notion which is p r a c t i c a l . 406
As we have already discussed this does not mean that there are not 
cases when a theoretical notion is in some sense practical. This is 
obvious from the definition o f praxis  as an act which is in our power and 
which agrees with the dictates o f right reason. However, it does follow  
that “no practical notion is a theoretical n o t i o n ” . 4 0 7  This is the case 
because it is im possible that the same object requires and does not 
require the agent to act. Mair concludes: ‘Therefore it is impossible that 
the same judgm ent is practical and theoretical, since a practical
405 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; [fol. 1 4 ^^] Ad notitiam esse practicam non 
sufficit eam esse virtualiter directivam praxis.
406 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \fol. I4 va-vb] ...notitia proprie practica est 
formaliter praxis directiva et est tantum notitia complexa enuncians qualiter, aut 
per quæ, aut quando, et sic de aliis circumstantiis sit agendum. Notitia vero quæ 
non est enunciativa et formaliter directiva praxis est theorica, et non practica, sive 
propinque sive remote notitiam virtualiter contineat quæ est practica.
407 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \Jol. 14^^]. Prima [conclusio] licet aliqua 
speculatio sit praxis nulla notitia practica est notitia speculativa. Prior pars huius 
propositionis patet ex predictis in definitione praxis.
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judgment concerns a practical dictate, but a theoretical [judgment] is not 
about the p r a c t i c a l . ” 4 0 8  Mair is aware that this is true only in relation to 
simple propositions. It is quite different with a conjunctive proposition 
(propositio conjunctiva) such as “God is Three and One and God ought 
to be loved by m e” in relation to which there are several judicative 
notions united to form a judgment o f the proposition as a whole. The 
judgment o f a conjunctive proposition such as “God is Three and One 
and God ought to be loved by m e” is both theoretical and practical since 
the object o f the assent to the first part of the proposition, i.e., “God is 
Three and One”, is a theoretical dictate, and the object o f the assent is 
the practical dictate, i.e., “God ought to be loved”. “But the judgment o f  
the w hole conjunctive proposition”, according to Mair, “has this 
aggregate for its object, therefore for that reason [the judgment] will be 
theoretical and for the same reason it will be practical, and vice  
versa.” 409 This is a particularly interesting thesis since it portrays the 
complexity o f the judicative process in relation to complex propositions, 
and indeed o f syllogism s since it should be clear that some syllogism s 
are theoretical and others practical. Having established that some 
judicative acts are theoretical and others practical it might be wondered 
whether theoretical and practical dispositions are distinguished through 
their objects, i.e., propositions or through their ends.
46  ^ Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \fol. 14^^]. Secunda pars patet quia impossibile 
est idem obiectum importare praxim et non importare praxim; ergo impossibile 
est idem iudicium esse practicum et speculativum, quia iudicium practicum est 
de dictamine practico, speculativum vero de non practico 
499 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \Jol. 14^^]. Potest enim esse unum iudicium  
sim plex totius copulativæ, et duæ notitiæ iudicativæ, vel très secundum  
exigentiam partium copulativæ. Modo capto iudicio simplici istius copulativæ, 
Deus est Trinus et Unus et Deus est a me diligendus, hoc iudicium est practicum 
et speculativum. Probatur quia duo iudicia respectu duarum partium illius 
copulativæ sic se habent, quod unum est practicum et aliud speculativum, quia 
unus assensus habet dictamen practicum pro obiecto, et aliud dictamen 
speculativum, sed iudicium respectu totalis copulativæ habet hoc aggregatum pro 
obiecto, ergo qua ratione erit speculativum, eadem ratione erit practicum, et 
econverso.
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H o w  TO DISTINGUISH THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
Acts produce dispositions that are o f the same nature, scientific acts 
produce scientific disposition, acts o f faith produce dispositions o f faith.
It is not surprising therefore that theoretical and practical dispositions 
are distinguished in the same way that actual theoretical and practical 
knowledge are distinguished. A s a preliminary it is necessary to point 
out that Mair is not suggesting that the distinction between theoretical 
and practical know ledge is an intrinsic or real one: theoretical
knowledge is not to be distinguished from practical knowledge in the 
same way that Socrates is distinguished from Plato; rather, it is to be 
distinguished in the way that the intellect is distinguished from the will.
Mair thinks that the distinction between theoretical and practical 
knowledge is for the sake o f argument (arguitiva) and accidental.^io
In particular, in respect o f the judgment given to conjunctive and 
disjunctive propositions the distinction between theoretical and practical 
knowledge is also for the sake o f argument. As we have seen, the assent 
given to the conjunctive proposition “God is Three and One and God 
ought to be loved” is both theoretical and practical since assent to the 
conjunct “God is Three and One” is theoretical and the assent given to 
“God ought to be loved” which is a practical dictate is by that fact 
practical. Thus, considered as a whole the proposition both indicates 
something to be the case and commands an act. This is not to claim that 
the same assent is both theoretical and practical. Mair writes: “there is 
no doubt that there is a theoretical and practical assent concerning the 
same remote object, for example, concerning the subject o f the practical 
object [i.e., practical proposition], or concerning the predicate. For I
410 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; [Jol. 151" ]^. Scientia speculativa a practica 
distinguitur arguitive ab obiectis totalibus, hoc est a propositionibus ipsis.
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have a theoretical notion o f this, “Man is risible” and a practical notion 
o f this, “Man ought to be loved on account o f God”.4U
In so far as it is not possible to have a notion which is 
simultaneously theoretical and practical o f the same proximate object, it 
is also true that it is not possible to have a disposition which is 
simultaneously theoretical and practical. Mair puts the case as follows:
“any practical d isposition  is distinguished from any theoretical 
disposition by means o f its particular end.”4i2 The end particular to the 
disposition o f  theoretical know ledge is understanding, and the end 
particular to practical knowledge is action. The phrase “by means of its 
particular end” is important since there is a temptation to claim that 
theoretical knowledge can be considered practical insofar as it applied to 
resolve and clarify issues. For instance, one might wish to acquire 
knowledge o f the science o f geometry in order to construct a bridge.
Mair gives the example o f someone wishing to learn geometry in order 
to teach it to his pupils. In both these examples the temptation to claim  
that theoretical knowledge is also practical is misplaced since it confuses 
the desire to learn geometry with the desire to apply that knowledge. In 
respect o f a theoretical disposition there is no intellectual act which 
directs praxis  “since its elicited act is not directive, for every practical 
disposition is directive o f some act, which indeed is its directive act, 
different from the particular elicited act.”4U in order to sharpen the 
distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge Mair refers the
411 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \fol. 15*’h], Non dubium est quin sit assensus 
speculativus et practicus de eodem obiecto remoto, ut de subiecto obiecti practici, 
vel de prædicato. Nam habeo notitiam speculativam de hac, homo est risibilis, et 
practicam de hac, homo est diligendus propter deum.
412 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \fol. 151"^ ]. Secunda conclusio. Quilibet habitus 
practicus a quolibet speculativo proprio fine distinguitur.
413 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \fol. IS '^h]. Habitus autem speculativ[us] nullus 
est actus directivus cum eius actus eiicitus non sit directivus. Omnis enim  
habitus practicus directivus est praxis alicuius qui quidem est eius actus 
directivus alius ab actu proprio elicito.
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reader to the authority o f Aristotle and Averroes as advocates o f his 
position. He quotes from the M etaphysics where Aristotle writes that 
“the end o f theoretical know ledge is truth, the end o f  practical 
knowledge is a c t i v i t y . ” 4 1 4  He also makes reference to Aristotle’s De 
Anima and A verroes’ commentary on the same where once again  
theoretical and practical understanding are differentiated according to 
their e n d s . 4 i 5  There is no doubt that theoretical and practical knowledge 
are to be distinguished, and that they are to be distinguished according to 
their ends. However, these distinctions are according to Mair accidental 
since they can be distinguished only according to the manner in which 
they relate to their objects. It was generally accepted that a disposition 
inclines the intellect towards acts that are like the acts from which it 
e m e r g e d . 4 1 6  For example, a practical disposition inclines the intellect 
towards practical assents which are like the assents from which the 
practical disposition emerged, and a theoretical disposition produces 
theoretical assents which are like the assents from which the theoretical 
disposition emerged. Given this a distinction between a practical and a 
theoretical disposition can be formulated in terms o f the elicited acts 
which produced the disposition. A disposition is practical if and only if 
an elicited act o f w ill leads to, or is directive o f praxis. Similarly, a 
disposition is theoretical if and only if the elicited act o f will leads not to 
praxis but guides the intellect to acquiring knowledge o f the truth.
414 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \Jol. IS^'h]. Et 2 M etaphysicæ  [993^)20-21] 
theoricæ finis est veritas, practicæ vero opus.
415 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \Jol. 15^ ^^ ]. Et tertio De Anima [433414-15], 
intellectus qui propter aliquid ratiocinatur et practicus differt a speculativo in 
fine. Ubi commentator commentato 49, Operativus (inquit) differt a speculativo 
in participatione et fine. The text of Averroes reads “Et intellectus per quem 
agitur (et est operativus) differt a speculativo in perfectione et fine.” Averroes. 
In Aristotelis De anima, [pp. 516-518; n.b. p. 516 lines 10-11].
416 Mair. In tertium, d. 23, q. 5; {fol. 5Hh]. An habitus inclinet præcise in actus 
similes actibus a quibus emersit. Respondetur. Dicitur quod sic.
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THEORETICAL PREMISES AND PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS
Given that the ends o f theoretical and practical knowledge are 
different it is interesting to consider whether there are occasions when a 
practical assent can be based on a combination o f  theoretical and 
practical assents. The sim plest expression o f this is a theoretical 
syllogism  whose conclusion follow s from a major premise which is the 
object o f a practical assent, and a minor premise which is the object of a 
theoretical assent. Such a proposition on the account given by Mair is o f  
a mixed nature since the assent to the whole proposition would be 
constituted o f assents to both theoretical and practical propositions. The 
classic examples o f this kind o f syllogism  are given by Aristotle in De  
motu animalium. They are “I ought to create a good, a house is good: 
Straight away I create a house” and “I need a covering, a coat is a 
covering: I need a coat. What I need I ought to make, I need a coat: I 
make a coat. And the conclusion “I must make a coat” is an a c t i o n . ”4i7 
In each case one o f the premises is theoretical, it indicates what is the 
case; therefore the assent to that premise is a theoretical notion. The 
other premise is in both cases practical since it is o f  the good and 
thereby prescribes what is or ought to be done. The syllogism  concludes 
in an action. W e have already encountered the syllogism  Mair uses to 
exemplify the kind o f practical syllogism  with which w e are concerned.
It is, “Every highest good ought to be loved, God is a highest good; 
therefore God ought to be l o v e d . ” 4 i 8  The difference between Aristotle’s 
practical syllogism  and Mair’s is striking: whereas Aristotle’s practical
417 Aristotle. De motu animalium, [701^15-20],
418 Mair. In primum, p r o l,  q. 6; \fo l  15^4] Conceditur quod conclusio practica 
sequitur ex duabus assensibus quarum una præmissarum est practica et alia 
speculativa, ut sic arguendo, “Omne summum bonum est diligendum, Deus est 
summum bonum; ergo deus est diligendus”. “Omne malum est vitandum, 
adulterium est malum; ergo adulterium est vitandum”. Minores istorum  
syllogismorum sunt speculativæ et earum assensus sunt speculativi. See also 
Mair. In tertium, q. 8, d. 33; \fo l  8 2 ^h]
R. N. Wood Chapter 9; Theoretical & Practical Knowledge 223
syllogism  concludes in an action, Mair’s syllogism  concludes in an 
ought-judgment. On Mair’s account, it is sufficient for a syllogism to be 
directive o f praxis  in order for it to be classed as practical. In Mair’s 
syllogism , the assent to the minor premise can be properly ascribed a 
truth value since it is a statement signifying a state o f affairs. It is 
insufficient in and o f itself to cause a practical notion since it is not 
directive o f activity. Mair thought that if the assent to the minor premise 
in a syllogism such as this is sufficient to generate a practical notion then 
the theoretical notion is j e t t i s o n e d . 4 i 9  The precise relationship o f  
practical knowledge to other kinds o f knowledge was the subject o f  
much debate. There are two questions which require our attention. The 
first question is: Whether theology is theoretical or practical knowledge?
The second question concerns the relationship o f practical to prudential 
knowledge. I shall now turn to this matter.
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  a n d  p r a c t i c a l  k n o w l e d g e
TO THEOLOGY
In the first o f three theses, Mair contends that theology cannot be 
considered either theoretical or practical knowledge because it does not 
meet the requirements o f knowledge in the strict sense o f the term.420 
O bviously, this is to understand theology in such a way that a 
theological assent is nothing other than an assent of faith.421 However, 
in the second thesis Mair writes that theological knowledge will be 
constituted o f both theoretical and practical notions if the scope o f the 
term “knowledge” is broadened, or the scope o f the inquiry is expanded 
to consider any theological assent, and to understand theology as a body
419 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; [fol. 15^4] s i  assensus minorum in his 
syllogismis sufficiant ad notitiam practicam, evacuabis notitiam speculativam.
420 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; {fol. 14^^)]. Prima est negativa quæ sic probatur. 
Theologia non est scientia ergo neque est practica neque speculativa.
421 See section on “Theological Truth” in Chapter 6 pp. 167-170.
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o f knowledge constituted out o f  simple acts o f assent and intellectual
d i s p o s i t i o n s . 4 2 2  Mair writes:
This is obvious [viz., that there is a distinction between 
theoretical/speculative and practical theology] since it is 
true of one o f these that its act is not formally directive o f  
praxis, but it is true o f the other that its act is formally 
directive o f praxis. Therefore, one is theoretical and the 
other practical. The consequence holds because o f  the
terms. 423
Mair is drawing our attention to the fact that in the body o f knowledge 
known as theology some o f the assents that we give are theoretical and 
others practical. Examples o f theoretical assents include “God exists”, 
“Christ is God”, and “God is the highest G ood”; examples o f practical 
assents include “God ought to be loved”, and “On account o f God you 
should love your neighbour”.
The third and final thesis put forward to determine whether 
theology is theoretical or practical knowledge understands theology not 
as simple act o f assent or disposition but collectively . T heology, 
understood in the collective sense, includes both theoretical and practical 
dispositions. On this understanding theology is to be classed as practical 
knowledge.424 “This is obvious”, according to Mair, “since the most 
powerful part o f theology directs praxis, but it is right that the whole 
should be named after the most important part. Therefore [theology is
422 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 6; \fol. 1 4 ^h] Extendendo terminum scientia, vel 
petendo de quocumque assensu, et capiendo theologiam pro simplici actu vel 
habitu, aliqua theologia est speculativa et aliqua est practica.
423 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 6; \Jol. 14^^]. Patet quia alicuius theologiæ actus 
non est alicuius praxis formaliter directivus, alicuius vero actus est praxis 
formaliter directivus. Igitur aliqua est speculativa et aliqua practica. 
Consequentia tenet ex termini s.
424 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 6; \fol. 14^^]. Tertia conclusio. Collective  
capiendo theologiam  quæ includit habitus speculativos et practicos ipsa est 
practica.
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practical k n o w  l e d g e ] .  ” 4 2 5  Theology was thought to be directive o f  praxis  
since scripture and the dictates o f authorities such as Augustine contain 
notions that are both formally and virtually directive o f praxis  insofar as 
scripture and the dictates o f  the authorities are concerned with  
promoting a life of charity. Moral philosophy is practical in the same 
way that theology is practical. Mair thought, that on A ugustine’s 
reading o f Aristotle’s Nicom achean Ethics, Augustine had understood 
Aristotle to have said that the whole o f moral philosophy is practical 
because praxis is the end o f the most powerful part o f moral philosophy. 
Initially the follow ing passage from the Nicom achean Ethics is only  
reported: “Since moreover this treatise is not, like the others [sc., the 
other treatises], about contemplation, for we are inquiring not so that we 
might know what virtue is, but so that we might become good (ut boni 
ejficiamurY'. However Mair expands on the original Aristotelian claim  
when he continues, “and nevertheless, there are many theoretical notions 
in moral philosophy, for example, that virtue mediates between two 
extremes, that there is more opposition between two extremes than an 
extreme and the intermediate s t a t e ” . 4 2 6  Thus, moral philosophy  
considered as a unified body o f knowledge is practical knowledge, that 
is, knowledge which aims at action and not knowledge which aims at 
understanding or contemplation. Though there are theoretical notions
425 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 6; \fol. 14^ ^^ ]. Patet quia potissima pars theologiæ  
est directi va praxis sed iustum est totum a potiori parte denominari; igitur.
426 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \fol. 14^^]. Præterea tota moral is philosophia 
vocatur practica quia ille est finis potissimus eius, secundum illud Aristotelis 2 
Ethicorum  2 Capitulo 2 [1103^26-29]: Cum autem præsens tractatio non 
contemplationis sit ut cæteræ gratia, non enim ut sciamus quid nam sit virtus, sed 
ut efficiamur boni consideramus, et tamen multæ sunt notitiæ speculativæ in 
morali philosophia, ut puta quod virtus mediet inter duo extrema, quod extrema 
magis pugnant quam extremum cum medio. Cf., Mair. In tertium, q. 8, d. 33; 
\fol. 82vh] Sexta conclusio [viz., notifia practica potest deduci ex notitiis non 
practicis et notifia speculativa ex notifia practica ] patet. Tota moralis scientia est 
practica secundum Aristotelem  2 Ethicorum. Moralis philosophia non est 
contemplationis gratia non enim ut sciamus quid est virtus scrutamur sed ut boni 
efficiamur.
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contained in moral philosophy such notions, as w e are about to see, are 
prudential notions which direct and regulate all virtue.
PRACTICAL AND PRUDENTIAL KNOW LEDGE
The second question about the relationship o f  practical knowledge 
to other kinds o f  knowledge primarily concerns the relationship o f  
practical knowledge to prudential knowledge but it also incorporates a 
discussion  o f  the relationship o f prudential reasoning to moral 
philosophy. These issues are introduced in the response to the following  
question: In what way is practical knowledge to be distinguished from  
the prudential?
It is not surprising that the distinction between practical and 
prudential reason is not a real distinction but only one o f reason, i.e., it is 
an accidental distinction. In the discussion o f scientific knowledge it 
was shown that knowledge in the strict sense concerned the universal 
and the necessary. This is a requirement also laid down for practical 
knowledge. Similarly it might be argued that if there is to be something 
such as prudential knowledge, then it too must concern the universal and 
the necessary since its basis is practical knowledge. How then to 
account for the fact that human action requires both universal and 
singular dictates o f reason? In this instance, it is best to use the words of 
Mair:
I understand Aristotle as follows: Prudence is sometimes of  
the universal and o f the necessary, and then it agrees in 
supposition with practical knowledge. Indeed, it differs 
from moral philosophy which is about dispositions o f the 
will. For it is plain that it does not differ from [prudence] 
itse lf which is intellectual moral philosophy (m oralis  
philosophia intellectualis). But it is not necessary that 
prudence is o f the universal and o f the necessary which is 
required for knowledge. And thus it is a distinction o f
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reason. Or the aggregate o f  practical know ledge is 
distinguished from the aggregate o f prudential knowledge 
(prudentiæ ) since one multitude includes contingent 
propositions which the other e x c l u d e s . 4 2 7
It is obvious that some distinctions need to be made to clarify precisely
in what way prudential knowledge is different from moral knowledge.
Later in the Commentary on the Sentences Mair writes that prudence is
concerned with both the universal and the s i n g u l a r . 4 2 8  This is clearly
stated in the Prologue  to the Com m entary on the Sentences in the
following passage:
Prudence is nothing but a judicative notion revealing that 
something is to be done as it ought to be done or to be fled  
as it ought to be. For exam ple the judicative notion by 
which I judge that this person afflicted with cholera [and] 
agitated by bile should be calmed through soothing words, 
or a notion o f this, “All virtue is to be p u r s u e d . ” . 4 2 9
The dictates o f prudential knowledge can be both universal and
singular. Universal prudential knowledge, when it is constituted by
judicative notions such as “All virtue is to be pursued” or “All vice is to
be shunned”, is synonymous with practical knowledge: its principles are
universal and necessary. H owever, it is also clear that prudential
knowledge is not only concerned with the universal since it is also
427 Mair. In primum, proL, q. 6; \fol. 15^^]. Ego sic intelligo Aristotelem [sc., 
Nicomachean Ethics 1139^20-1141^23], prudentia est interdum universalium et 
necessariorum, et tunc coincidit in supponendo cum scientia practica. A morali 
quidem philosophia differt, quæ est de habitibus voluntatis, pal am est enim quod 
non differt ab ipsamet quæ est moralis philosophia intellectualis. Sed non est 
necesse quod prudentia sit universalium et necessariorum, quod requiritur ad 
scientiam. Et sic est discri men rationis, vel aggregatum scientiæ practicæ 
distinguitur ab aggregato prudentiæ, cum una multitudo includat contingentes 
propositiones quas alia excludit.
4 2 8  Mair. In tertium  q. 2, d. 33; \fol. 7 7 va-vbj Prudentia est universalium... 
Prudentia est singularium.
429 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; [foL 1 5 ^h] Prudentia nihil aliud est nisi notitia 
iudicativa ostendens aliquid esse faciendum taliter qualiter fieri debet vel 
fugiendum taliter qualiter fugi debet, ut notitia iudicativa qua iudicio quod iste 
cholericus bili commotus est per levia verba mitigandus, vel notitia huius, 
omnem honestum est prosequendum.
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constituted by judicative notions which elicit a  specific course o f  action, 
for example, the judicative notion through whiich one judges that cholera 
should be cured in this or that way, or that to give to this or that charity 
is good thing. “Prudence”, in the words o f  Mair, “is the guide and 
controller o f all moral virtues. M oreover it is the same thing for  
prudence to direct virtue and to regulate it, and to reveal in what way it 
ought to be d o n e . ” 4 3 0  Prudence is itself an intellectual virtue, that is, a 
virtue concerned with judging truly or rightly. Specifically it is a virtue 
which directs praxis. It will be recalled that the medieval philosophers 
in whom  we are interested contended that nothing is w illed  unless 
already known (nihil volitum nisi præ cogniîum ). This was emphasized 
with the claim that the will is blind in its operation without the assistance 
o f the intellect. It is arguable that since prudence is an intellectual virtue 
it fo llow s that all moral virtues necessarily presuppose that the moral 
agent has prudential knowledge. The constant juxtaposition o f  the 
intellect and the w ill, o f  theoretical and practical know ledge, o f  
prudential and moral knowledge has immediate appeal since it gives 
clear expression to the diversity of acts o f which the mind is capable and 
at the same time emphasizes that this diversity does not originate in 
separate powers of the mind but originate in the simple substance that is 
known as mind. It has also emerged from our account that there is a 
priority o f the intellectual over the practical. This is clear from the 
assertion that the will is blind in its operations without the assistance of  
the intellect. This has important consequences for understanding the 
relationship o f intellectual virtues to moral virtues since on the account 
given by Mair it is necessary that prudence be in position before there is
430 Mair. In primum, prol., q. 6; \fol. 1 5 ^h] Prudentia est auriga et directrix 
virtutum moralium. Idem autem est prudentiam dirigere virtutem, et eam  
regulare, et ostendere qualiter ipsa fieri debeat.
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even the possibility o f acquiring a moral virtue. In the next section I 
want to return to a consideration o f the nature o f faith and to determine 
the kind o f relationship that exists between acts o f intellect and w ill 
required for the generation o f an assent in relation to an article o f faith.
IS FAITH THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE?
Faith is generated by means o f a topical argument and a positive 
movement o f the will. This implies that the assent to an act o f faith is 
neither exclusively the result o f an act o f intellect, nor is it exclusively  
the result o f an act o f will. Doubt was cast on this by the suggestion that 
if the intellect and the will were distinct in such a way that they could be 
separated by the absolute power o f God then the assent o f faith would 
inhere either exclusively in an act o f  intellect; or the assent o f faith 
would inhere primarily in an act o f intellect and only secondarily in an 
act o f w ill. The same assertion is made in respect o f  prudential 
knowledge. Here too it was thought that if the intellect and will could be 
distinguished then prudence would either inhere exclu sively  in the 
intellect or primarily in the intellect and only secondarily in the will.
The question o f the primacy o f the intellect over the will also arose when 
considering theological knowledge as a collection o f theoretical and 
practical dispositions. On this account theological know ledge is 
practical because understood co llective ly  the goal o f  theological 
knowledge is to indicate how charity and other theological virtues are to 
be acquired. It emerges from these various descriptions o f different 
kinds o f knowledge that the primacy o f the intellect over the will does 
not exclude the possibility o f  practical notions having primacy over 
theoretical notions. This primacy o f practical notions over the 
theoretical results in the whole being denominated practical. Succinctly, 
faith is formally directive of praxis . Therefore, it can be concluded that
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the virtue o f acquired faith is primarily practical and only secondarily 
theoretical, since it includes both theoretical and practical dispositions.
This holds true despite the claim that in exceptional circumstances an 
assent o f faith would inhere either exclusively  or primarily in the 
intellect and not the will.
C o n c l u s io n
In many ways our discussion o f knowledge and belief has been like 
the journey of the pilgrim. The journey started with the question: “How 
is the pilgrim to acquire faith?”. It was quickly discovered that before 
approaching the epistemological question o f how faith is acquired it was 
first necessary to determine the metaphysical nature o f human beings. 
Human beings are composed o f matter and form and their specific form 
is the mind (anima intellectiva). The mind is a metaphysically simple 
substance composed o f the powers o f intellect and will. The intellect is 
the power to understand and the will the power to choose. Though we 
refer to these powers as distinct they are not really separable from each 
other: “the intellect is the will in every w ay”. Mair thought that the 
powers o f  intellect and will are distinguishable only by reason, and in 
order to prove that this is the case he deployed his vast knowledge of  
termini S t  logic. He showed that the terms “intellect” and “w ill” refer 
absolutely to the same indivisible substance which we know as mind but 
they connote different activities. “Intellect” connotes the mind engaged 
in an act o f understanding and “w ill” connotes the mind engaged in an 
act o f choosing.
Notions are nothing other than the cognitive acts through which a 
cognitive power is vitally changed. Alm ost the entire range o f  notions 
was investigated. W e considered the division between sensory and 
intellectual notions, intuitive and abstractive notions, apprehensive and 
judicative notions, evident and inevident assent, and finally theoretical 
and practical notions. These are the foundations o f late-m edieval
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epistemology and they proved central to providing an answer to how the 
pilgrim is able to acquire faith.
Before giving any response to the question o f how the pilgrim is to 
acquire faith attention was first given to a consideration o f  what faith is 
not: faith is neither scientific knowledge, nor is faith opinion. Faith is 
not scientific knowledge because scientific knowledge is about that 
which is universally evident and true. Though opinion is inevident in a 
way similar to faith, faith is not opinion because opinion is always 
hesitant. In contrast, faith is unhesitant assent to truths that pertain to 
salvation. It emerges that an assent o f faith is caused by the intellect 
assenting to the conclusion o f an opinative argument and that this assent 
is supplemented by a positive movement o f the will. This movement o f  
the will causes one to adhere to the opinative assent unhesitantly. The 
involvement o f both the intellect and the will is necessary to produce an 
assent o f faith, neither one o f them is sufficient in and o f itself to cause 
an assent o f faith. The only exception to this is if  one grants that the 
intellect can be separated from the will by means o f the absolute power 
of God, then the assent o f faith would inhere in the intellect.
With a firm understanding o f the nature o f scientific, opinative, and 
faithful assents in place it was then shown that acts of faith and acts o f  
know ledge cannot occur sim ultaneously in relation to the same 
proximate object i.e., the conclusion o f a syllogism . This is the case 
because if it were possible, then there would be both evident and 
inevident assent in relation to the same proximate object, which is 
logically impossible. The same holds true in relation to the possibility of  
opinative and scientific assents co-existing in relation to the same 
conclusion. However this does not mean that it is not possible for actual 
knowledge to be incompatible with a disposition. This is proved 
because while someone may have knowledge that something is to be
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pursued, this knowledge may not manifest itself in outward behaviour.
In contemporary debates this issue is som etim es c lassed  as the 
defeasibility o f practical reason. It is generally held that knowledge 
which is directive o f activity is defeasible by the addition o f  new 
information into the reasoning process. In more technical terms, the 
conclusion o f a practical syllogism  is an action, and such a conclusion is 
said to be defeasible by the introduction o f  new premises into the 
syllogism .
The division between theoretical and practical know ledge was 
treated last in the discussion because it draws heavily on issues  
introduced and developed in earlier chapters. Theoretical and practical 
notions are the building blocks o f theoretical and practical knowledge.
A theoretical notion is one which is directed toward understanding and a 
practical notion is one which is formally directive o f praxis. A s it was 
shown, it is not sufficient for a practical notion to be only virtually 
directive o f praxis. It is a necessary condition for a notion to be called 
practical that the notion is immediately directive o f praxis. To be 
immediately directive o f praxis is to indicate precisely how some end is 
to be achieved. Among the many interesting issues considered was the 
relationship o f theoretical to practical premises, a relationship which was 
discussed in the context o f theological knowledge.
It was reported that there is no such thing as theological knowledge 
in the strict sense because knowledge concerns the propositio  scib ilis  
which is a proposition fitted to becom e evident by the application o f  
premises to it. Hence theology cannot be described as either theoretical 
or practical knowledge. However, Mair does not hesitate to defend the 
thesis that theology considered not sim ply as individual acts or 
individual dispositions but considered collectively as the product o f both 
theoretical and practical dispositions is practical knowledge. It is
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practical because though theology is a product o f both theoretical and 
practical knowledge the greater part o f theology is concerned with 
praxis. And, according to Mair, it is fitting that the whole should be 
named after the greater part. Theology is formally directive o f praxis in 
a number o f ways. In the first instance theology is practical because 
examples o f practical theological notions include such things as "God 
ought to be loved ” and "Love your neighbour because God has 
commanded it”. Moreover, it was also asserted that theology was 
formally directive o f praxis on the basis o f  theoretical theological 
notions such as “God exists”. It is obvious that if one gives scientific or 
theoretical assent to a proposition o f this kind, there are wide ranging 
consequences. For instance, the pilgrim who has knowledge o f  the 
existence o f God will almost certainly m odify his behaviour since he 
will accept that the commandments o f the Old Testament which are 
practical dictates, are truly the word o f God. I say “almost certainly” 
since it is not incompatible that the pilgrim knows that God exists and 
does not modify his behaviour because o f some defect o f the will. There 
is also the possibility that one who assents to the existence o f God does 
not assent to the claim that there is any direct connection between God 
and his creatures. This latter option cannot be applied to the medieval 
concept o f the pilgrim. However, it does show that the pilgrim who 
possesses theoretical know ledge does not necessarily act on that 
knowledge. There is a gulf between knowledge and action which is 
bridged by means o f an act o f will which commands the pilgrim to act.
This is particularly clear in the case where the will commands the 
pilgrim so that he might believe that the command o f the preacher to the 
lame is a miracle bearing witness to the fact that “Christ is God”. The 
preacher commands “Get up and W alk”, and on hearing these words the 
lame man gets up and walks. The evidence is insufficient to prove that
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what has happened is more than a coincidence. It is the command of the 
will that causes the pilgrim to believe that a miracle has taken place.
The central theme o f my thesis has been the nature of assent and the 
foundations o f knowledge. In particular, I have been interested in the 
divisions between intuitive and abstractive notions, apprehensive and 
judicative notions in order to clarify the way scientific assent relates to 
assents o f faith and opinion, i.e., assents o f probable reason. It is clear 
that late-medieval philosophers such as John Mair and the members of 
his circle shared a lively interest in this area. Moreover, in opposition to 
the claim that Mair and his colleagues were so entrenched in scholastic 
m odes o f thinking that their philosophical and even theological 
innovation was negligible, it has been shown that this is not the case. It 
cannot be denied that Mair and many o f his contemporaries were 
primarily influenced by thinkers such as W illiam o f Ockham, but it is 
clear that their w illingness to integrate the philosophical insights of  
thinkers such as Aquinas helps to show that Mair and the members o f his 
circle were dynamic and creative philosophers. This is particularly 
obvious in the writings o f John Mair whose impact on philosophers and 
theologians o f late-m edieval Europe is only now being properly 
acknowledged.
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